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Abstract 
The study reported herein addresses the research question, "To what extent do 
excellent performing UK construction contracting organizations 
demonstrate and employ recognized Learning Organization processes?" It 
utilized a case-study based approach as that approach was seen as being most 
useful for exploring the processes that may or may not have been clearly defined by 
each participating organization. The study sought to move beyond the theories of 
knowledge created by the accepted seminal works on The Learning Organization 
model and the largely positivist works on construction contractor performance, 
which have focussed on ‘output’ measures only. 
The literature reviewed indicated minimal understanding of excellent contractor 
performance from the perspective of the customer within the construction industry 
and even less understanding of the practical application of Learning Organization 
processes within the industry. It suggested the need for research to address the 
issue by examining how construction customers viewed excellent contractor 
performance and what processes excellent performing contractors actually 
employed. 
The assumption behind this research is that the organization adapts and responds to 
its environment and takes action to survive and flourish dependent upon its 
understating of that environment. This is the same behaviour as a living organism in 
nature displays, and thus requires the researcher to view the organization as a 
sentient being. Such a view underscores the epistemological perspective, that is the 
assumption of what knowledge is and how it may be discovered, adopted in this 
thesis. The research herein reported therefore follows a post-positivist standpoint. 
The methodological position for the research sits within a functionalist paradigm, a 
paradigm that enables consideration of the participating organizations within the 
construction industry to be viewed as a ‘whole’ and as having interrelated parts. This 
position was considered to be the most useful for the research. 
The particular approach chosen was that of multiple case studies carried out on the 
same subject. Carrying out multiple case studies across different organizations 
provided case-based themes, which was seen to give the research a greater 
credibility. By definition, the method was therefore one of a collective case study 
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(Creswell, 2007), where several cases were brought to bear on a single issue. It was 
intended to draw practical examples of Learning Organizations together so that the 
commonalities and differences between and among them could be integrated in a 
reformulated Learning Organization model for the construction industry. 
During the data collection phase, two elements of the research were abandoned as 
unnecessary and impractical respectively. The unnecessary element was the 
questionnaire element of the contractor case studies, which was abandoned due to 
the breadth and depth of data gathered through the other elements of the research 
(interviews, focus groups and field observation). The impractical element was the 
intended comparative study on poor performing contractors. This was abandoned as 
customers almost without fail noted that poor performing contractors were generally 
not retained on their programmes and therefore their supply chains tended only to 
range in performance from adequate to excellent. Secondly, it was realized following 
discussions with customers that poor performers were likely to be aware of their 
poor performing status and therefore be unlikely to want to participate in the 
research. 
The customer organizations identified a number of clear areas where they identified 
excellent contractor performance. The clear position was that the standard output 
performance indicators of project completion to time, cost, quality, and health and 
safety were no longer indicators of excellent performance in the industry. These 
indicators were now the minimum performance required to satisfy the customer and 
there was seen to be a further suite of more behavioural measures which were the 
indicators of excellent performance. These findings were drawn together in a single 
model for procurement and performance management. 
The contracting organizations nominated as excellent performers fell largely into the 
‘medium sized’ bracket of the construction industry. Indeed, some of the 
participating customers noted that the larger contractors were actually poorer 
performers at behavioural aspects of service delivery. The nominated contractors’ 
processes were examined against the Learning Organization framework provided in 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) to establish the extent to which recognized Learning 
Organization processes were being employed. It was noted in the conclusions that 
whilst all of the organizations employed some Learning Organization processes, none 
could be said to be a model Learning Organization possessing all of the processes 
which Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggested. The fact that each organization 
possessed some Learning Organization processes was accepted against the critique 
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of Ortenblad (2007) that Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model is all-encompassing in 
terms of accepting processes into the Learning Organization model. 
Implications for industry practice were identified based upon the backdrop of 
procurement and performance management. It was argued that, based on what is 
noted as really important to construction customer organizations, the procurement 
and performance management functions should be better aligned to identify 
Learning Organization processes and their manifestation as excellent contractor 
performance from the perspective of the customer. For contractor organizations, 
there was identified a need to attend to developing Learning Organization processes. 
There also appeared to be a need for the customer to support the journey of their 
contractors towards becoming a Learning Organization. 
Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model was then adapted for the construction industry to 
reflect this need for customer involvement if the contractor was to adopt Learning 
Organization processes. This adaptation was considered necessary due to the 
construction industry model of the customer being more involved in the design and 
construction phases of their product, coupled with the fact that a single construction 
customer can represent a large volume of their contractors’ turnover (up to 20% is 
not uncommon). Furthermore, the low contractor profit margins driven by a lowest 
price tendering culture (often 2-3%) leave little money for internal investment. The 
support of an informed customer which does not use a lowest price tendering 
process was therefore deemed necessary. 
A number of recommendations for further research may be seen to emerge from this 
study. Questions were raised as to the reason why larger organizations do not 
appear as able to provide behavioural excellent performance as medium sized 
contractors which was considered to be an area for further exploration. In addition, 
the concept of ‘family’ atmosphere (raised several times by participants during the 
contractor case studies) and its impact upon the ability for the organization to learn 
and provide excellent performance was seen to be worthy of further study. Finally, 
there was deemed to be the potential to examine the applicability of the extended 
Learning Organization model developed herein to other industries and/or 
organizational cultures.  
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Abbreviations Used Herein 
CDM – Construction Design & Management 
CEO – Chief Executive Officer 
CPD – Continuing Professional Development 
EFQM – European Foundation for Quality Management 
EI – Emotional Intelligence 
FM – Facilities Management 
HR – Human Resources 
HRD – Human Resource Development 
HRM – Human Resources Management 
JV – Joint Venture 
KPI – Key Performance Indicator 
LO – Learning Organization 
MD – Managing Director 
PDR – Personal Development Review 
PM – Project Manager 
PPP – Public Private Partnership 
ROCE – Return on Capital Expended 
SPV – Special Purpose Vehicle 
TUPE – Transfer of Undertakings, Permanent Employment 
TQM – Total Quality Management 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the thesis and its component parts. The 
first section sets out the background to the research herein reported, locating that 
research within the UK construction industry. The research is exploratory in nature as 
the intention is to see whether the construction organization which demonstrates 
processes most closely attributed to those sometimes associated with a Learning 
Organization (LO) provides excellent performance to its customers. 
The second section, entitled justification for the research, the research problem, and 
the research questions outlines why the research is considered to be of importance 
and mentions the five disciplines of Senge et al’s LO that provide an analytical 
framework for the thesis. Some contextual understanding of the research problem 
follows. The research question and a series of sub-questions to be addressed in the 
research herein reported are then stated. 
The third section provides a brief outline of the chosen methodology which is 
contextualised within nomothetic and ideographic perspectives. This section also 
contains a brief introduction to the UK construction industry and outlines what is 
understood by the terms ‘contractor’ and ‘customer’ within this thesis. 
The fourth and final section briefly outlines the structure of the thesis. It also states 
why this thesis makes a significant contribution to industry practice and to 
knowledge. 
1.1 Background to and justification for the research 
The research question itself spawned from a conversation which the author had with 
one of his key customers. This customer wished to understand whether and how his 
first tier contractors learned; and whether and how this improved the service they 
provided to that customer. The customer had stated that he did not believe in the 
concept of the LO. He was of the opinion that only individuals learned and, through 
such learning, raised their performance to the customer. He was also of the view that 
first tier contracting organizations did not capture that learning well. 
The author had an opposite view, namely that contracting organizations must learn in 
order to survive and that they learn in the same way as an organism. Instead of an 
organism made up of living cells, there is an organization made up of living 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 2 
individuals. There is further discussion of the organism as a model for the 
organization in the literature review chapter. 
The research, therefore, almost became an opportunity to understand and settle this 
difference of opinion. The question of whether the concept of the LO was a model 
that first tier contractors could and did employ was to be the first part of the 
research. The second part was to answer the question of whether this model could 
translate into improved contractor performance from the perspective of the customer. 
The context of this research is the UK construction industry which has been criticized 
for, amongst other things, its lack of change and innovation leading to an inability to 
improve performance and reduce cost/waste (Egan, 2002). Egan (2002) also states 
that construction teams tend to be transient because they are generally drawn 
together from many organizations to deliver a single project or programme. This 
project singularity and ad-hoc nature of teams leads to individual and single loop 
learning (following Argyris & Schon, 1978) taking place on the job at the expense of 
the customer. 
Single loop learning involves the detection and correction of error. When something 
goes wrong, another strategy that will work within the governing variables is 
generally employed. Goals, values, plans and rules are operationalized and not 
questioned (Argyris & Schon, 1974). Single loop learning rarely appears to be 
transmitted back through the organization in order to develop and change the body 
of knowledge and underlying assumptions of the organization so that processes may 
be improved. 
Chinowsky et al (2007) describes the construction industry as one where the focus on 
production often overshadows any process improvement required of the organization. 
This production focus spills over into a ‘learn-on-the-job’ culture which allows for 
production objectives to be maintained almost at the expense of individual and Team 
Learning (Raiden & Dainty, 2006). Notwithstanding cultural and habitual issues, there 
should be no reason why a construction organization cannot adopt many elements 
inherent in a LO approach (Raiden & Dainty, 2006). 
The prevalence of single loop learning and a production focus may mean that others 
from the same organization are likely to travel through the same single loop 
individual learning process when they come to deliver a very similar 
project/programme (Cheng et al, 2004). In addition, a failure to challenge the 
underlying knowledge and assumptions may mean that the organization becomes 
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slow to change and that finding new customer-orientated solutions is rarer than it 
should be (Chinowsky et al, 2007). This lack of change may mean that the 
organization is slow to react to a rapidly changing environment, or misses the 
opportunity to take the lead in reshaping the environment; two capabilities of the LO 
as discussed by Senge et al (1994). 
Construction organizations are also historically weak at showing flexibility and acting 
proactively or even reactively to the changing demands of their environment or their 
customers. In addition, previous research has demonstrated that most organizations 
within the industry employ the same strategies and operational procedures (Holt et 
al, 2000). Such a lack of response to changing demands appears to show little regard 
for how process improvement should reflect the culture of the organization. Without 
this alignment, it is unlikely that the concept of an organization as a LO can exist 
within the UK construction industry. 
The confirmation that the situation has not significantly improved in the UK 
construction industry in recent years came when Sir John Egan gave a speech to 
industry leaders in June 2008 on the tenth anniversary of the issuing of his first 
industry report (see Egan, 1998). In this speech he was quoted as giving the industry 
as a whole “four out of ten” for implementing the required changes and 
demonstrating the required improvements over those ten years. Clearly this criticism 
indicates room for improvement and suggests scope for research and learning. 
There is further merit for the line of enquiry adopted within this thesis due to the 
paucity of research into the customer benefits derived from becoming a LO in the UK 
construction industry (following Love et al, 2004). Raiden & Dainty (2006) also states 
that there is little research into whether adopting LO processes improves 
performance to the customer in a UK working environment generally. 
Of the little research that has touched upon this area, Chan et al (2005) notes that 
recent works have suggested that it is the customers themselves that drive 
Organizational Learning within their own contractors in order to derive benefits. 
Cheng et al’s (2004) position is that a learning culture and climate should be created 
in construction partnering environments in order to drive continuous improvement. 
This piece of research is the most in depth of the recent works; unfortunately it only 
brings together theoretical works rather than examining real life case studies. 
Furthermore, much of the recent research in this subject area has been quantitative 
in nature, such as Jashapara (2003); or has been more of a review of recent 
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literature with an attempt to reflect the findings in those reviews onto the UK 
construction industry, as in the works of Love et al (2004) and Maqsood et al (2007). 
Whilst there is utility in these approaches for furthering the understanding of the 
subject, it could be contended that quantitative outcomes do not provide the 
understanding as to whether LO processes translate to an organization which 
provides better performance to its customers than its peer group within the UK 
construction industry. Thus, the research herein reported is qualitative in nature. 
It has been postulated that becoming a LO is a capability that enables the 
organization to obtain improvement in organizational financial performance (Garcia-
Morales et al, 2007). The financial viewpoint can be summed up in a single quote 
from Lew Platt, former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Hewlett-Packard: ‘‘If HP knew 
what HP knows, we would be three times as profitable’’ (Yang, 2007: 83). A broader 
view is offered by Senge et al (1990: 3) when he says that what is required is: 
Organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create the 
results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are 
nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are 
continually learning to see the whole together. 
This quote serves as a useful framework for the research herein reported as it sums 
up the LO’s five disciplines, as proposed by Senge et al, and the results that they 
create. People expanding their capacity refers to Personal Mastery; new patterns of 
thinking refers to Mental Models; seeing together refers to Shared Vision; people 
continually learning refers to Team Learning; and seeing the whole refers to Systems 
Thinking. Each of these disciplines is further explained in this thesis. 
The creation of improved results is the key object from the perspective of the 
research undertaken for this thesis, as without the ability to create improved results 
from LO processes, there would be scant business drivers for adopting such 
processes. Love et al (2004) draws from Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) in suggesting 
that the key success factor for construction organizations in the future will be the 
intellectual capital it can deploy rather than its size or physical assets. Love et al 
(2004) goes on to make the very salient point that given the industry’s well 
documented poor performance (Egan, 2002), repeating current strategies are likely 
to lead to poor performance and a reduction in profits. 
Garcia-Morales et al (2007) states that there is currently little understanding of 
whether LO processes translate into improvement in service performance. In 
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addition, he critiques the empirical research on the basis that it fails to take into 
account the time lag between LO process and performance. One of the key issues 
with the empirical research cited within this thesis is that much of it purports to 
demonstrate links between single processes and organizational performance. Many of 
the links, however, may be indirect and possess other interrelationships which also 
influence organizational performance, as suggested by Garcia-Morales et al (2007). 
Much of the recent research appears to neglect this premise (Garcia-Morales et al, 
2007). 
The research herein reported identifies such interactions and provides an 
understanding as to whether those interactions really do have a direct influence upon 
organizational performance. If this research is to be of value to the UK construction 
industry, it needs to demonstrate that not only do contractors with recognized LO 
processes perform best for their customers, but also that these organizations can be 
identified at a stage before contracts are established. This insight will allow customers 
to be able to identify the best performing organizations by looking for the LO 
processes at the procurement stage of the contract process. 
There is also little clear understanding about how contracting organizations interact 
with their environment (Love et al, 2004). Currently, nearly all customer 
relationships, whether based around a single project or a large programme of works, 
are contractually based. Indeed, relationships that purport to be ‘alliances’ often have 
a contract as their basis. These contracts are likely to have been competitively 
tendered in some way. It may be argued that these tendering and contractual 
processes do not give enough understanding, from any party’s perspective, of the 
way in which interaction may be seen to take place. 
A LO should be adept at shaping its environment (Senge et al 1990, 1994). Therefore 
a construction LO should be more likely to produce excellent performance for their 
customer. Garcia-Morales et al (2007) suggests that becoming a LO usually has a 
direct and positive influence on improvements in performance. Organizations that 
demonstrate greater breadth, depth and speed in their learning deliver higher 
performance (Garcia-Morales et al, 2007). The main aim of organizational learning is 
to enhance performance. Organizations that learn quickly gain a greater strategic 
capability that enables them to maintain a position of competitive advantage. Their 
learning strategies, attitudes, and behaviours guide them to superior long-term 
performance. In addition, creating organizational knowledge, by which new 
knowledge is drawn out of existing knowledge, is a cornerstone of innovation. 
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Garcia Morales’ (2007) position is highly plausible and aligns well with Senge et al 
(1990, 1994). However, the research used to support Garcia Morales’ (2007) 
argument is qualitative and the performance discussed is the CEO’s opinion of how 
his organization performs compared to his competitors. The performance factors are 
also all internal rather than customer facing. As such, Garcia-Morales et al’ (2007) 
position has potential participant bias and thus requires further exploration. 
Holt et al (2000) also proposes that construction organizations need to become LOs 
in order to gain competitive advantage over their peer group. His position is that this 
advantage can be gained by being able to do three things better than its competitors. 
Firstly, there is the ability to recognise changes in demand that could have an 
adverse impact on its operations quicker than its competitors. Secondly, there is the 
need for flexibility to respond to changes in customer needs and demands. Finally, 
there is the ability to understand its own capabilities relative to demand. 
The perspective of the research being reported in this thesis supports Holt et al’s 
(2000) view, albeit that the above three points must be understood from the 
perspective of the customer rather than introspectively as is suggested in his work. 
In order to gain competitive advantage, the organization may have to demonstrate to 
its customer that by understanding those three things it can provide a better 
performance than its peer group. 
Construction organizations themselves have not displayed this ability to demonstrate 
competitive advantage. For example, Love et al’s (2004) position is that construction 
organizations have failed to keep pace with the technological and social changes 
which influence their environment. In addition, they have been unable to understand 
fully their customers’ expectations and requirements as they have concentrated their 
marketing efforts in getting onto tender lists. This approach has taken precedence 
over customer relationship marketing which would have enabled them to gain such 
understanding. 
Furthermore, major contractors have tended to align themselves with the customers’ 
consultants rather than the customer themselves, thus creating another level of 
communication to distance them further from understanding customer needs (Nesan 
& Holt, 1999). It is a postulation of the research herein reported that a LO would 
understand the customer relationship and cultural alignment elements and therefore 
be better able to align themselves with their customers’ needs. Indeed Love et al 
(2004) suggests that the best way for first tier contractors to realign themselves for 
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successful performance would be to embrace a degree of transformational change 
and implement a customer focussed strategy. 
In addition, it has been suggested that the LO in the construction industry should be 
founded upon Total Quality Management principles in order to reduce the number of 
inherent quality failures (Love et al, 2004). New knowledge can be generated through 
the pursuit of quality. In that way the two practices can combine to improve the 
overall performance and customer focus of the construction organization (Ferguson-
Amores et al, 2005). 
Movements such as Total Quality Management and Business Process Reengineering 
are useful business realignment techniques. Neither should, according to Senge et al 
(1990, 1994), be employed without first implementing LO processes aligned to 
improving quality of performance to the customer. Without LO processes and 
customer alignment any such other programmes will not be sufficiently focussed 
(Senge et al, 1990; 1994). In addition, the business culture may not have been 
satisfactorily altered to allow a real difference to be made. In recent years, 
construction organizations have indeed tried to change in order to gain competitive 
advantage over their peers. This has often been done through a process 
improvement approach, usually Total Quality Management or similar, with little 
thought to the process of learning (Love et al, 2004). A process improvement 
approach, without the underlying foundation of an understanding of learning gives 
little consideration to how existing knowledge can be better utilized under the new 
processes. 
Furthermore, the lack of a total quality management basis for learning within the 
organization results in a reactive stance when dealing with customers (Love et al, 
2004). Lack of understanding of learning and its outcomes creates a culture of focus 
upon the immediate project and its economic status. Such a focus leads to a distant 
contractor–customer relationship which precludes the contractor from understanding 
the real needs of his/her customer and in turn being able to provide real value. The 
status of the relationship leads to contractors focussing upon differentiation by price 
which in turn causes further quality issues and customer dissatisfaction when trying 
to deliver with minimal resources in order to maintain profit margins (Love et al, 
2004). 
The proposition of the research herein reported, therefore, is that there is an 
opportunity for the implementation of LO principles in the UK construction industry. A 
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further proposition is that there also is an opportunity for organizations within the 
industry to be able to gain competitive advantage over their peer group if they can 
use LO processes to drive improved services to the customer (Love et al, 2004). 
Garcia-Morales et al (2007) makes it clear that being a LO is a long-term 
commitment and adds value in a way that, say, making short-term price cuts cannot. 
Love et al (2004) states that few contracting organizations currently appear to 
demonstrate the will to provide a LO environment. 
Lack of will does not mean that contracting organizations are not learning, but it does 
mean that much of the learning done will be individual and thus not necessarily 
transferred into the organization per se. In addition, much learning is devoted to the 
detection and correction of errors whilst maintaining organizational norms. Little is 
done to change the norms so that fewer errors occur (Love et al, 2004). Senge et al 
(1990) postulates generative learning being a key element to maximizing synergy, 
thereby preventing errors and providing excellent performance to the customer. 
Generative learning is defined by Osterberg (2004: 145) as “the development and 
use of new organizational paradigms”. Senge et al (1990:14) defines it as “learning 
that enhances the capacity to create”. Both definitions refer to the creation of new 
ways of working for the organization. 
Further to the internal LO question, there is the issue of how well contractor 
organizations understand their clients. An industry wide shift in strategy and vision 
from construction contractors generally is needed, as set out in Love et al (2004). A 
‘customer value strategy’ may be a partial solution which will require a rethink in the 
approach to quality (Flint et al, 2002). This strategy will require a change in cognitive 
and emotional responses to the environment and the beliefs about ‘the way things 
should be done’. Love et al (2004), however, does not devote much argument to 
what the customers actually deem to be value; a limitation the research herein 
reported will address. 
Furthermore, there is a need to expand the current body of research beyond that of 
recent papers such as Raiden & Dainty (2006). Raiden & Dainty’s work, for example, 
is based upon a single case study based around the Human Resources influence over 
LO capability. Indeed, Raiden & Dainty (2006) states that further work are necessary 
to establish whether her work might be applicable to the wider industry. 
Following on from Garcia-Morales et al (2007) perspective, the research herein 
reported examines organizations which provide long-term excellent performance. For 
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the purposes of the research herein reported, a long term service is any service 
which extends for two years or more. The reason for this period is that, from direct 
observations, construction industry supply chain relationships take 12-18 months to 
reach their performing stage. It can be noted later in the research that this view is 
echoed by some customer representatives interviewed – such as the quote from 
Washington in 4.2.2.11. 
1.2 The research questions 
Given this contextual framework, the proposed aim of this research is to explore the 
following question: 
To what extent do excellent performing UK construction contracting organizations 
demonstrate and employ recognized LO processes? 
In order to be able to answer this overall research question, there are a number of 
sub-questions that need to be answered. These questions are designed so that the 
answers to them assist in the discovery of the answer to the overall research 
question: 
What do customers recognize as excellent performance from their first tier 
contractors?  
What criteria may be used to identify those who provide better performance? 
Which first tier contractors currently provide excellent performance? 
Answering these questions, and therefore the main research question, will provide an 
understanding of whether the postulated advantages of the LO actually do translate 
through to competitive advantage in the form of excellent performance to the 
customer. Furthermore, answering the questions helps to provide an understanding 
as to whether the concept of the LO has actually penetrated the UK construction 
contracting industry. If it has not, there may be further research required as to why 
not and whether such developments could solve the issues raised by Egan (1998, 
2002). 
1.3 Methodology 
The research methodology is from a mid-point between the nomothetic and 
ideographic perspectives. For the perspective of this research, the definitions of these 
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two paradigms are taken from the guidance in Burrell & Morgan (2006). From a 
nomothetic perspective, the research herein reported is based upon a predetermined 
protocol and adherence to the canons of scientific rigour. From an ideographic 
perspective, the research herein reported aims to enter the everyday events of the 
organization in order to let the nature of that organization reveal itself. 
From a practical perspective, and following the aforementioned definitions, it means 
that the research herein reported does not get fully inside any one or two 
organizations as now explained. A case study approach is utilized to facilitate the 
processes employed. The use of the case study approach requires interaction with, 
and potential influence of, the subject organizations. The reason that such a balanced 
approach to the research is being employed is that identification and understanding 
of a few key causal LO processes is required. As such, it is not necessary to expand 
the research to an exhaustive point whereby an understanding of the workings of an 
entire organization is acquired. 
The philosophy of the organization and how it is constructed and operates, that is 
seen to influence this research, is most similar to that of Selznick (1948 as described 
in Burrell & Morgan, 2006); namely a structural functionalist approach. The structural 
functionalist approach takes account of both the human and organizational structure 
elements. This is the most useful paradigm for this research as the perspective on 
the LO itself is similar to that of Nonaka (1994) in that individuals create knowledge 
via cognitive mapping and social interaction which is made explicit through 
organizational processes. Selznick’s (1948) view brings together the formal and 
informal elements of the organization which work together. 
Such a perspective allows account to be taken of the potential resistance from 
individuals to the LO process. It assumes a hierarchically and socially constructed 
organization to which individuals rarely submit wholly (Burrell & Morgan, 2006) but 
which frames their actions. This notion does, however, raise an interesting challenge 
for Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) position on Shared Vision within the best-practice LO. 
Shared Vision, in its purest definition, requires all employees to come together to 
align themselves behind the organizational vision. The theory then does not appear to 
accept those individuals not submitting wholly to the vision, which brings into 
question the realism of the LO model . 
In addition, Selznick (1948) suggests the organism model of the organization as an 
analogy for its adaptive/shaping nature to its changing environment. Again, this 
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approach accords with the perspective of this research on the LO and much of the 
contemporary research. The organism model suggests that the organization adapts 
and responds to its environment and takes action to survive and flourish dependent 
upon its understanding of that environment. This is the same behaviour as a living 
organism in nature displays, and requires the researcher to view the organization as 
a sentient being. 
From an epistemological perspective, that is the assumption of what knowledge is 
and how it may be discovered, the research follows a post-positivist standpoint. In-
depth study, which involves gaining understanding as to the functioning of the 
processes uncovered within the organizations, is carried out (following Yeo, 2003). 
The methodological position is therefore within the functionalist paradigm. From the 
perspective of this research, this position is the most useful with which to approach 
the research. The intention of this research is to produce an understanding of LO 
processes for future use by construction contracting organizations. 
The pragmatic approach of employing focus groups and interviews as the basis of the 
case studies is therefore advocated and practiced within the research herein reported. 
This is done in order to be able to gain the greatest understanding of the 
organizations being researched with the impact upon the case study organizations 
being kept to a minimum. These interviews and focus groups were augmented with 
the use of field notes, observations and review of documentary evidence (where they 
are made available). 
1.3.1 UK construction industry 
For the purposes of this research, the UK construction industry is bounded by capital 
construction projects carried out by UK based first tier contractors within the UK 
itself. This boundary therefore excludes projects carried out by UK contractors 
abroad. In addition, given the fact that all customers interviewed are ‘educated’ 
customers construction-wise with large programmes of capital works, the approach is 
likely to favour contractors who carry out large programmes of works. This limitation 
is accepted given the limited number of case studies required. Such contractors are 
likely to be among the best performers simply due to the fact that they are retained 
on such long running programmes by their customers. 
1.3.2 Contractor 
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For the purposes of this thesis, all reference to the word ‘contractor’ refers to first-
tier contractors working within the UK construction industry. A first-tier contractor 
can be defined as one with a direct contractual link to the customer and who is in 
general financial charge of a construction project with responsibility for managing 
other trades on site. This party is likely to be named as the principal contractor under 
the CDM regulations 1998 and be responsible for the health, safety and 
environmental risks whilst the project is being carried out. In short, it is the 
contractor who has legal and contractual possession of the site until it is returned at 
handover to the customer. 
1.3.3 Customer 
As with contractors, the customers are bounded as UK based organizations only. This 
does not mean that the contractor’s head office needs to be in the UK, but its 
programme of capital construction works must be managed from the UK. Customers 
who have large ongoing programmes have only been selected as they are more likely 
to understand what excellent performance means to them given the many projects 
undertaken. 
This approach excludes customers who may build large one-off projects, notably 
developers. This limitation is again accepted due to the need for this research to 
understand excellent performance from the point of view of the most educated 
customers. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
1.4.1 Chapter 2: Literature Review, Theory and Related Work 
Chapter two deals with the extant literature. It is an analysis of what is the current 
position regarding the LO in the UK construction industry. This analysis is done 
mainly on literature where the authors have researched construction organizations to 
establish whether they possess LO characteristics. Some literature looks at these 
characteristics’ effects on organizational performance, but few examine the effect on 
performance to the customer. In addition, few are UK based. 
Furthermore, the chapter examines the theoretical framework of the LO which is still 
largely built upon the seminal work of Senge et al (1990, 1994). Some of the work 
since then has departed from or augmented this model, but it would appear that 
none has superseded it as yet. Therefore the analysis within this chapter deals with 
identifying the key elements which potentially can be recognized within construction 
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organizations. This analysis feeds through to the model used for the data capture 
phase. 
The analysis also looks into related disciplines, such as the Chaordic organization 
(Raiden & Dainty, 2006) which may or may not emerge in the research itself. The 
author brings these to the fore as they are secondary models within the LO literature. 
It was seen to be possible that, during the data capture and analysis stages of the 
research, they may become apparent and potentially be enablers or blockers to LO 
processes. Therefore they have been included in the literature review to give the 
reader enough of an understanding to be able to recognize their contextual nature. 
1.4.2 Chapter 3: Research Design and Approach 
This chapter deals with the design of the research which was in place at the outset, 
any changes to this approach and the reasons for those changes. This chapter is 
meant to give the reader an idea of the journey undertaken to complete the research. 
The original approach is that set out during the taught phase of the doctorate which, 
at the time was the map for conducting the research. It then deals with the changes 
that were either enforced upon the research due to external effects, or that were 
incorporated as improvements to the process that were discovered as the research 
progressed. 
It covers areas such as the selection of the original customer organizations, how and 
why these were selected, and how this led to the selection of the case study 
organizations. The research methods are covered in depth, including the reasons 
behind their selection, and the use of NVIVO as the main data analysis tool. 
1.4.3 Chapter 4: Data Collection, Analysis and Discussion – Customers 
This chapter details the methods employed to collect the data. It includes discussion 
of the interviews carried out with the customer organizations and the case studies 
carried out on the first tier contractors. For the interviews, the detail as to exactly 
how the interview questions were arrived at is set out. In addition, how the 
interviews themselves were carried out is explained. 
The data collected from the customer interviews is analyzed and organized into a 
revised framework for excellent contractor performance. This framework has been 
proposed to the wider industry as a system for procuring and managing contractors 
from an input perspective in order to improve the outputs of those contractors. 
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1.4.4 Chapters 5-10: Data Collection, Analysis and Discussion – Contractors 
These chapters deal with the case studies carried out on the nominated excellent 
performing contractors. They outline the case study process and the questions used 
during the interviews and focus groups. Furthermore, a potted description of the 
organizations themselves is provided which gives the reader a sense of the nature of 
the subject about which they are reading. 
Finally, the findings from the case studies are recorded and analyzed against existing 
LO theory. This analysis provides a basis for understanding to what extent the 
excellent performing contractors are employing LO processes. The analysis is based 
mainly around the framework provided by Senge et al (1990, 1994), but the analysis 
is augmented with comparison against research carried out up to the present day and 
from a range of sectors. 
1.4.5 Chapter 11: Interpretation of results, conclusions and implications 
This final chapter sets out the conclusions of the research behind this thesis and 
makes proposals for an update of Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model to encompass 
the model of a contracting organization in the construction industry. Furthermore, it 
makes suggestions for specific additions and/or augmentations to the five disciplines 
set out in Senge et al (1990, 1994) which are necessary for the model to fit the 
construction industry. These augmentations may or may not be necessary for other 
industries with similar operating models to construction. In this way, the thesis is 
seen to make a significant contribution to the literature. 
In addition, the final chapter sets out recommendations for future research that may 
be necessary to answer some of the questions raised within this thesis that are 
beyond its direct scope. There also are key points which are explored within this 
thesis which might have been included had extra data or time been available. These 
points are also noted as being potential avenues for future research. 
Finally, due to the nature of this doctorate being twofold in its significant 
contributions, there are recommendations to the construction industry for change and 
adoption. These recommendations are couched in as practical a style as the 
understanding generated from the research allows. It is the profound hope that these 
recommendations are adopted at least by the participants in this thesis research and 
hopefully more widely by the industry once this thesis is in the public domain. 
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2 Literature review, theory and related disciplines 
2.1 Introduction 
This purpose of this chapter is to review extant literature relating to the research 
topic. The chapter provides an analysis of the two theoretical frameworks which 
underpin the research herein reported. The first key framework is an analysis of the 
concept of the LO and how this might translate into the UK construction industry. As 
will be seen from this section, much has been written recently about the LO. This 
chapter aims to bring relevant literature together in a meaningful analysis to provide 
a framework appropriate for an understanding of the research question (and its 
subsets) for the case studies conducted with the construction contractors. 
The second key framework (in section 2.6) is the concept of excellent first tier 
contractor performance within the construction industry. This concept is analyzed in 
order to provide the framework for the customer interviews conducted as part of the 
research process and which will give the performance targets for organizations in the 
UK construction industry. 
2.2 The Learning Organization – Theoretical Base 
Much has been written about the theory of the LO since Senge et al’s (1990) seminal 
text. Some of these writings have used the UK construction industry as a backdrop 
and are discussed at length in this chapter. Senge et al (1990) suggests that the 
most successful organizations are LOs and that the ability to learn faster than 
competitors is the only sustainable advantage. 
It might, therefore, be reasonable to assume that being a LO would manifest itself in 
excellent performance, given that this must be a key area of competitive advantage. 
One strong concept of the LO involves the design of the organization so that it 
facilitates learning (Holt et al, 2000). The key to the research undertaken for the 
purposes of this thesis is to uncover such deliberate design to establish whether that 
design has contributed to competitive advantage. 
Senge et al (1990) proposed that five disciplines comprised what he deemed to be a 
LO. Those disciplines are: Mental Models, Personal Mastery, Shared Vision, Team 
Learning, and Systems Thinking. Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) seminal texts on the LO 
are still drawn upon heavily within the recent literature. The five disciplines have 
remained as the core elements of the LO. There are, however, some areas where the 
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contemporary research strays away from or augments Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) 
model. With respect to such departures or augmentations of the LO model, this 
research will remain framed within Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) five discipline model. 
The detailed reasons for this position are examined herein. In addition, critical 
discussion of the framework is not carried out within 2.2, but can be found later in 
2.3. 
2.2.1 Mental Models – theoretical base 
Mental Models are the assumptions and accepted norms which influence the way in 
which individuals and organizations view and interact with the wider world. These 
assumptions are ingrained to a point where the individual or organization does not 
realize the extent to which they influence behaviour. Senge et al (1990, 1994) 
proposes that LOs need to reflect inwardly to better understand these assumptions. 
They need to expose their thinking to external parties to allow them to influence it in 
order for them to grow and develop. 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) proposes that organizations must implement change at the 
institutional level to enable their individuals to develop fresh outlooks and learn new 
skills. This means transcendence of internal politics that creates the incumbent 
Mental Models that can undermine any attempt to create change through the other 
disciplines of the LO. One of the key elements is the distribution of business 
responsibility more widely while still maintaining an excellent level of coordination. 
2.2.2 Personal Mastery – theoretical base 
It is postulated by Senge et al (1990, 1994) that in order for the organization to 
learn, the individuals within it must learn. This is not to say that individual learning 
guarantees the organization will learn, but that it is an essential element. Personal 
Mastery is about individuals being in a continual learning mode not just in terms of 
skills, but also in terms of personal vision and spirituality. 
It is not meant as a destination or an achievement, but is defined as a continual 
journey (Senge et al 1990, 1994). In addition, those individuals with high Personal 
Mastery have awareness as to where they lack competence and knowledge and 
where there is scope for growth. This is demonstrated in Senge et al (1990, 1994) as 
holding a personal creative tension which is the gap between a person’s current 
reality and their personal vision. Addressing this tension is the concern of the 
Personal Mastery journey. 
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2.2.3 Shared Vision – theoretical base 
Shared Vision is described by Senge et al (1990, 1994) as the capacity to hold a 
shared picture of the future that the organization is trying to achieve. He suggests 
that creating a vision in this way will encourage innovation and give members of the 
organization the feeling that the organization is focussed upon the longer term. This 
vision is kept well distanced from the standard vision statement issued often by 
senior management within some organizations. If individuals are part of a Shared 
Vision, they are much more likely to want to learn and develop rather than be 
instructed to do so. 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) further states that the vision must grow through a process 
of continual reinforcement. This reinforcement occurs through the interaction of 
individuals growing the vision organically and thus fostering enthusiasm for the 
journey towards that vision. 
2.2.4 Team Learning – theoretical base 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) describes Team Learning as developing team skills to 
enable it to create the outcomes which the team members want. This is the skill set 
element of creating the environment for individuals and groups to be able to work 
together as a unit. In order to achieve this, individuals need to learn as part of a 
team rather than just as individuals. Senge et al (1990, 1994) promotes the concept 
of dialogue over discussion to allow the team to gain greater insight into problems 
and opportunities. Discussion, he suggests, involves the advocation of solutions 
without the exploration of the assumptions behind them, an approach that derails the 
learning process. 
2.2.5 Systems Thinking – theoretical base 
Systems Thinking is the concept of the LO which integrates the others into the 
coherent body of theory and practice. Systems Thinking addresses the whole and 
examines the interrelationship between the parts, thus providing the means to 
integrate the other disciplines. Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggests that one of the 
problems with management is that simple solutions are applied to complex system 
problems. Standard solutions tend to focus on organizational parts rather than 
viewing the organization as an interlinked dynamic process. Senge et al (1990, 1994) 
therefore postulates that Systems Thinking leads to more appropriate managerial 
action. 
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Senge et al (1990, 1994) further postulates that managers tend to think that cause 
and effect are adjacent in terms of time and space. This thinking has driven the 
behaviour that when faced with a problem, solutions that are adjacent in time or 
space are focused upon. In particular, actions that create improvements in a shorter 
time span are generally adopted. Senge et al (1990, 1994) argues that short term 
improvements can create very significant long term costs. Cutting the training 
budget, for example, can create cost savings, but can also severely damage the 
organization in the long term. 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggests that the problem is the feedback received from 
the initial action. Some feedback is ‘reinforcing’ – where small changes build on 
themselves. In the example above, cutting the training budget shows an immediate 
fiscal benefit with no short term visible outcome; so the manager seeks to trim 
another budget and gets the same result. In the short term there may still be 
negligible impact on the organization’s performance, but longer term the decline in 
visibility may have a detriment to performance. This is an aspect of the delay which 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggests means that some significant consequences of an 
action are not felt until some time after the action is taken. 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) proposes the use of ‘systems maps’ which show the 
systems and how they connect. It takes effort to recognize the systems and map 
them within an organization. Failure to understand systems can lead to blame and 
self-defence actions. As cause and effect cannot easily be seen, someone else must 
have caused the problem. 
2.2.6 Leadership – theoretical base 
Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) considers that leadership is a triplicate entity comprising 
the leader as designer, steward and teacher. The designer element involves the 
integration of the five LO elements which will initially mean setting up the governing 
principles such as values, vision and purpose. This means developing the Shared 
Vision in the first place and creating the learning processes to support it. 
The steward element then has the leader being the steward of that Shared Vision as 
opposed to the owner. As such, the leader is responsible for, and committed to, the 
vision and therefore has the role of managing it on behalf of the organization. They 
have to ensure that they remain open to others’ visions and allow them to influence 
their own. 
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From a teacher perspective, the leader’s role is to assist individuals with acquiring the 
most accurate understanding of reality in order to improve their level of 
empowerment. Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) position is that leaders can influence views 
of reality in terms of events, patterns of behaviour, systemic structures and the 
purpose story. The most important of these to the LO are the systemic structures and 
the purpose story, and the leader must teach the organization to focus upon these 
areas. Gaining focus in these areas allows all members of the organization to better 
understand the bigger picture of the structural forces within the organization and gain 
an understanding as to what they wish the organization to become. As such it is not 
teaching in its strictest sense, rather enabling individuals to learn for themselves. The 
leader creates the creative tension which allows individuals to see the gap between 
vision and reality and understand how to bridge that gap. 
2.3 The Learning Organization – Extension and Critique 
Most of the attempted departures from Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model still tend to 
fit well within the overall five discipline model. Senge et al’s model appears to be the 
most often cited text in most of the LO literature. In addition, most models appear to 
subscribe to Senge et al’s basic rationale for such organizations, arguing that in 
situations of rapid change only those that are adaptive and flexible will excel (Senge 
et al, 1990; 1994). 
For rapid and flexible adaptation to occur, it is argued, organizations must “discover 
how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels” (Senge et al, 
1990: 4). Furthermore, much of the recent research appears to agree that successful 
organizations are continually expanding their capacity to create their future, such as 
Japanese organizational innovation (Jackson & Debroux, 2008). 
Within Senge et al’s model, real learning makes individuals and organizations able to 
re-create themselves. For a LO it is not enough just to survive. Survival or adaptive 
learning is important – indeed it is necessary. But for a LO, ‘adaptive learning’ must 
be augmented with ‘generative learning’, learning that enhances the capacity to 
create (Senge et al 1990:14). Such learning makes employees into agents of their 
own destiny, able to act upon the structures and systems of which they are a part. 
The LO, therefore, is able to shape its reality, by moving from reacting to the present 
to creating the future (Senge et al 1990:69). 
Chinowsky et al (2007) has conducted a LO maturity survey using the LEONARDO 
model. This model provides a useful source of questioning for the process maturity 
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element of this thesis. This model does not, however, look at the process level of the 
organization but simply the diagnostic level, the implications of this are that the 
model is not useful to inform the process level examination reported within this 
thesis. It does raise a useful perspective which is incorporated into this thesis; that of 
the entity. The entity is that level within the organization where a particular 
characteristic can be observed at work (individual, group or organization). This 
characteristic becomes particularly relevant when examining how very large 
organizations group themselves in order to create a learning environment in the case 
studies herein reported. 
Thinking in these terms assists the identification of how well ingrained into an 
organization a certain process might be. It must, however, be remembered that the 
LEONARDO model may have been developed as a commercial product and therefore 
Chinowsky et al’s (2007) work was critically discounted from forming part of the 
framework as there is the possibility that it contains bias. Furthermore, the model is 
American based rather than UK and therefore its underlying process and cultural 
biases may not be directly transferable. 
Other research, such as Jimenez-Jimenez & Cegarra-Nevarro (2006) and Jashapara 
(2003) have taken a highly positivist approach to the research of the LO in the 
construction industry. Their approach generally has been to establish the presence of 
LO processes through surveys using Likert scale scoring and then to correlate the 
findings to organizational financial performance. 
Their approach suffers from three limitations. Firstly, the potential bias of those 
rating their own organization on the presence of LO processes without the need to 
explain what are those processes. Secondly, not taking into account the performance 
of the market when assessing organizational performance. Thirdly not making an 
attempt to understand cause and effect issues. The studies reported in this thesis 
attempt to overcome these limitations and thereby make a significant contribution to 
knowledge. 
Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) original processes have been enriched through some of 
the recently published relevant literature, discussed in the paragraphs immediately 
following. These have been grouped under the relevant five disciplines as defined by 
Senge et al (1990) to allow their findings to be used to identify the processes at 
work. It should be noted that these processes should be mutually supportive in order 
to be successful elements of a LO (Love et al, 2004; Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
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A large part of this thesis is to identify those processes promoted in the theory at 
work in the day to day running of a construction contractor and/or alliance. The aim 
of this chapter is to identify the key elements which are looked for and how they 
manifest themselves. 
2.3.1 Mental Models 
Mental Models are tacit assumptions around which the organization acts and which 
frame the manner in which the organization acts. Therefore the Mental Models within 
an organization are displayed during interaction even when they are not obvious to 
the organization itself. Organizational actions will be taken based upon these tacit 
assumptions. Whilst the correctness of the actions themselves is sometimes 
challenged before, during or after the event, the assumptions themselves are much 
more rarely examined. Within a LO, these assumptions can be constructively 
challenged without organizational defensiveness appearing (Senge et al, 1990, 
1994). 
An environment where experimentation is encouraged to a certain degree will signify 
ability for the individual and group to challenge existing Mental Models (Goh & 
Richards, 1998). A LO can be described as a ‘laboratory’ where people at all levels 
get to experiment to a certain degree (Holt et al, 2000). In addition, the failure of 
such experimentation is not perceived as failure, but as part of the learning process 
itself (Holt et al, 2000). 
A LO will continuously challenge its own Mental Models to ensure that it is continually 
doing the right things to achieve its vision. This will be evidenced by the challenging 
of the assumptions behind decisions. Such behaviour will manifest itself in day-to-day 
meetings through the use of dialogue and inquiry as opposed to discussion and 
advocacy (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
In practical terms, individuals will spend less time advocating and defending their 
position on an issue and more time exploring each others points of view about the 
issue (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). Ortenblad (2002) raises the obvious criticism that in 
order for Mental Model theory to work effectively, the assumption has to be that all 
members of the organization are able to interpret organizational routines in the same 
way to a certain extent and that such interpretation is unlikely in reality. Nonetheless, 
within a LO, individuals are freer to state what they are really thinking rather than 
what they think might be expected. This shift of expression is a key source of data 
and learning (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). It will be an enriching observation to note 
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whether all sections of the organization (e.g. management and delivery) view the 
operation and success of processes in the same way. 
Coupled to this challenge is the actual use of data. In order to challenge successfully 
or create a Mental Model, data should be collected rather than assumptions made. A 
LO will collect data and analyze it in as unbiased a way as possible to establish, 
insofar as is possible, what is the extent of a situation. In a non LO, it can be 
observed that the conclusion and Mental Model are reached first and then the data 
are selected to fit that model (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
Scenario planning is another commonly occurring Mental Model technique within a 
LO. Such planning involves examining various assumed scenarios of the future and 
examining the best ways in which to manage in those scenarios (Harrald & Mazzuchi, 
1993). This type of preparation has helped frame the Mental Models of some of the 
most successful organizations in the world. The technique allows managers to 
understand the logic within their decisions before they are faced with the scenarios 
for real (Senge et al, 1990, 1994).  
An organization skilled in developing Mental Models will also be recognizable through 
its approach to fiscal matters. A traditional approach to creating budgets would be 
the proposal of a number by one party which is then disputed by another party and in 
the end a compromise situation is agreed. It may be that both parties know that their 
position (and each others) does not represent reality; but everyone ‘plays along’ with 
the accounting game. A LO is more likely to ask those setting budgets to present 
their assumptions and areas of uncertainty to be dialogued in order to reach a figure 
(or more likely range of figures) which fit the likely scenarios (Senge et al, 1990, 
1994). 
Love et al (2004) discusses the importance of mindset within the LO in respect of 
gaining an understanding of it. He points to learning being a social process and that 
how the collective mind is developed through learning will influence the way in which 
tasks are carried out. He suggests that the appropriateness of the mindset developed 
will influence the success of the LO. Interpreting new challenges in the same ways 
will not allow the organization to evolve culturally (Argyris, 1993). Such 
understanding lead to the design of a line of questioning in the case study interviews 
about the social element of the organization and how that helps the organization 
learn. 
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Love et al (2004) also states that this social element entails the development of 
shared beliefs which overcome any existing mental barriers and allows mutual 
learning to occur. Such development would require the organization to manage the 
natural mental defences of the individual which will resist the change of the Mental 
Model to allow double loop learning and the development of the LO (Argyris & Schon, 
1978). The behaviour of the individual is then linked to that of the collective within 
the LO. 
Management needs to appraise individual behaviour critically to ensure that the 
appropriate Mental Models are in place to support the organizational vision. Such 
appraisal ought to be done through the examination of subconscious signals (Love et 
al, 2004); although there appears to be little information on how this could be done 
by managers who may not be experienced in such areas. Practices which come from 
the shared Mental Models should be reasonably visible, such as empowerment, 
mobilization and motivation. These practices should penetrate the organization from 
top to bottom (Holt et al, 2000). This position will be tested in the case studies where 
the consistency of employees’ views of the way each contracting organization 
operates will be observed. 
2.3.2 Personal Mastery 
Personal Mastery concerns the curiosity of the individual and can therefore be 
identified as present or absent in an organization by individuals’ attitude to personal 
development. In an organization which encourages Personal Mastery, people will 
actively pursue their own training which benefits their personal vision and that of the 
organization. When people are allowed to unleash their personal vision, they will be 
totally committed to keeping the learning alive. Such a notion, of course, assumes 
that the organization has given individuals the opportunity to understand and then 
articulate their personal vision. 
A LO will be recognizable by its members being able to articulate their own vision, 
how they are pursuing it within the organization, and how well their personal 
development is aligned to that vision (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). The key point from 
this discipline is that of opportunity. Research looking at the ability of the 
organization to become a LO must focus upon the opportunities afforded to the 
individual within. Senge et al (1990, 1994) makes strong points about the curiosity of 
the individual, but without opportunity such curiosity will surely be lost. Examples of 
such opportunities are sought during the case study research reported in this thesis. 
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Personal Mastery cannot flourish without the right approach by management. The 
manager should assist the employee with understanding what his/her own personal 
vision is and where his/her current reality is in respect of that vision (Senge et al, 
1990, 1994). Goh & Richards (1998) suggests that managers should take the role of 
coach and provide feedback to employees regarding problems and opportunities. 
Coaching enables a more empowering approach and allows employees to shape their 
own destiny within the realms of what will improve the organization. Ortenblad 
(2007) argues that the strength of LO theory is the flexibility it affords managers in 
its implementation.  
Such an approach by management must be an important enabler for the LO. It 
appears to link well to the ‘opportunity’ element noted earlier. It flows logically that 
there is the opportunity for Personal Mastery and then the encouragement to 
embrace the concept. Obviously management cannot force their employees into such 
an approach, but encouragement would have to be present if an organization wanted 
to be called an active LO. Within the case studies the element of flexibility in 
employee actions in terms of shaping destiny is examined. 
Love et al (2004) states that in order to be a LO, continuous learning at an individual 
level must be present. It is, despite the name, about the acceptance that you can 
never completely master things and that individuals accept this and commit to a 
lifelong learning state. Love et al (2004) also accepts that without individual learning 
there can be no LO. He takes the position that it includes routinized operations which 
are learned incrementally and non-routinized actions which are a source of radical 
learning as they require the individual to make sense of such operations. 
Cors (2003) notes the key weakness with the whole principle of Personal Mastery is 
that it assumes individuals are willing to undergo the potential suffering that is often 
part of personal development. This notion appears to assume that the organization is 
adept at identifying individuals who already have a high level of Personal Mastery. 
Goh & Richards (1998) emphasizes that the organization needs to support Personal 
Mastery by making available ‘training experiences’ rather than merely on the job 
training. The training should be of a type that develops behavioural capabilities rather 
than technical competencies which tend to have a shorter shelf life. The key point 
which links to Senge et al (1990, 1994) is that choice of whether and how the 
individual improves themselves is important. Ortenblad (2004) refers to this as a 
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learning climate where the important issue is the time and space for learning rather 
than the control of it. 
A lack of Personal Mastery will manifest itself by people compliantly attending 
whatever personal development programmes are suggested. Following these 
programmes, behaviour may alter for a short time but will soon return to what it was 
at the pre-training stage. This happens as the individuals being trained are not 
committed to the training they are receiving (Senge et al, 1990, 1994), or the 
training is offered at an inappropriate time. Formal training strategy is examined in 
the thesis case studies with reference to how this training feeds the Personal Mastery 
element of the organization. 
These positions of taking Personal Mastery away from the simple realms of ‘do what 
you do better’ into a behavioural realm is interesting. It suggests that the 
organization is developing its employees for real change rather than treating them as 
cogs in a machine. Given the pace of change in business in the UK, it appears to be a 
clear advantage to provide this type of learning to complement the tools and 
techniques type training which is most prevalent in the construction industry. 
LO theory suggests that without Personal Mastery, it is unlikely that individuals will 
assist in developing the organization’s Shared Vision. Appraisals which concentrate on 
Personal Mastery should therefore be a key identifier of a LO. By extension, Personal 
Mastery also suggests that motivation by fear or punishment will be negated. 
Personal Mastery will act as its own motivator as individuals will be working towards 
their own vision (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). From this position, the principles of how 
individuals are motivated, or motivate themselves, to learn is examined in the thesis 
case studies. 
A LO supporting Personal Mastery will also display a commitment to transparent 
communication processes. That is, there will be no barriers to people raising and 
solving issues to allow them to become more self aware and self confident. In 
principle, such a shift sounds simple, but Senge et al (1994) relates many anecdotes 
whereby senior individuals within organizations deliberately ignore the reality of 
situations. Rejection of reality manifests itself as issues which everyone knows exist, 
but which remain unspoken assumptions. 
Alternatively, the organization commits to speak only the acceptable rhetoric and act 
as though that represents reality (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). Within the herein 
reported case studies, this issue will be identified through the comparison of the 
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opinions of senior management compared to that of employees. In situations where 
the rhetoric does not match the reality, cognitive dissonance sets in and individuals 
under these circumstances cannot operate at their full potential. The outward 
appearance of a LO, therefore, will be one where issues can be freely discussed and 
solved by individuals on their route to realize their vision (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
The process of Personal Mastery involves individuals challenging their current 
assumptions. This sometimes occurs through dialogue with other members of the 
organization. The challenge to their assumptions can change their perception of the 
organization and the meanings to which they give observed events (Love et al, 2004; 
Senge et al, 1990, 1994). For this process to be successful, the individual has to be 
receptive to new learning and be given the opportunity to reflect upon it (Holt et al, 
2000). This reflection is looked for during the case study work. Although it is seen to 
be difficult to question directly, the level of reflection afforded is identified through 
the discussions on personal training and learning. 
Whilst the author accepts the theory which Senge et al (1990, 1994) proposes for 
Personal Mastery, it appears at first glance to be a little idealistic. The concept of 
‘truth’ tends to be emotive and can be a matter of individual opinion. Undiscussable 
issues are a reality of business and in some cases issues which are not raised may be 
left this way for good business reasons. For example, the discussion in the media 
about whether the current recession has been brought about by the endless debates 
about recession is, ironically, a debatable point. Therefore it would not be a wise 
move for a business to discuss any inconvenient truths publicly to the extent that it 
might bring about the downfall of the business itself.  
The structure of the organization needs to be correct to support Personal Mastery. If 
individuals within the organization try to pursue their own vision within a structure 
which blocks such an approach it is likely that they will move on from the 
organization to pursue their goals (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). A LO will redesign its 
structure in order to accommodate Personal Mastery and retain its most visionary 
thinkers. Personal Mastery is not something that can successfully be passed into the 
control of a human resources or training department (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). Goh 
& Richards’s (1998) work focuses upon the notion of the Strategic Architecture of the 
LO. He suggests that the organization should be flat, decentralized and with a 
minimum of formalized procedures. This position informed the later stages of the 
research, when it was noted that many of the excellent contractors possessed such 
structures. 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 27 
Drumm (1995) notes the potential problems with such architecture, not least the 
issues of span of control, lack of central control and accountability. He suggests that 
a lack of central control can be combated through the provision of central supervision 
providing support to strategic considerations. The wider spans of control for the 
managers should be enabled through the selection of managers with a wider 
knowledge and ability set and the ability to self motivate. In addition, better interface 
management supported by Information Technology will be necessary to make such a 
decentralized structure work. Such a consideration created the question in the case 
studies of Information Technology support to the organizational structure in order to 
promote learning within. 
A high level of Personal Mastery within the organization is also identifiable through 
the interdependent orientation which its members display. Individuals do not display 
an attitude that they are subservient to the system; nor do they feel they have total 
influence over the parts of the system by which they are affected. They display an 
understanding that they are part of a greater system which they can affect, but that 
affects them equally. Their behaviour reflects this understanding that they are an 
active part of a system which can provide their personal vision whilst they assist the 
system in achieving its goals (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). The position here suggested 
that the research underpinning the case studies herein reported must examine 
individuals freely exchanging knowledge and influencing change within the 
organization. 
The structure and system are points which pervade much of the LO literature across 
each of the five disciplines. Interestingly, none of the research appears to suggest a 
best practice structure for a LO to follow. Goh & Richards (1998) is the only one who 
appears to come close, as noted above. This is probably sensible as there will be 
many drivers which dictate the organization’s structure. What is clear is that those 
within the structure need to feel that it is conducive to their Personal Mastery if this 
element is to be a success. The lack of a rigid LO structure was useful in allowing 
freedom to understand why the case study organizations adopted their structures. 
Taking these perspectives from Cors (2003), Goh & Richards (1998), Love et al 
(2004), Ortenblad (2004; 2007) and Senge et al (1990, 1994), the key themes which 
present themselves as the main building blocks to the Personal Mastery element of 
the LO may be identified. A commitment to lifelong learning from the individual 
appears to be the catalyst for this element. This in itself, however, is not enough for 
an organization to possess a high element of Personal Mastery. The organization as a 
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whole must at the very least support such individuals and this is examined in the 
case studies by way of a direct semi-structured interview question. 
2.3.3 Shared Vision 
From Senge et al (1990, 1994), it is clear that a Shared Vision cannot be dictated by 
management and that all members of the organization must be given the opportunity 
to contribute to its development. It is also a given that the vision will not remain 
static; as the organization changes and the individuals who are part of it change, so 
will the Shared Vision change. In order for an organization to work towards its vision, 
the commitment of each individual is paramount. Commitment is at the crux of the 
Shared Vision principle, as individuals who have a vision, be it organizational or 
individual, thrust upon them are unlikely to give it their full commitment (Senge et al, 
1990, 1994). 
An organization which has a clear Shared Vision will tend to demonstrate that vision 
through a community-like atmosphere. When Shared Vision is present or being 
created, there is the presence of individuals freely discussing their personal vision 
and how it fits within the organization. Informal networks will be apparent around key 
issues within the organization, almost like communities of practice, although 
participation will be willing and voluntary rather than coerced. Such networks will 
tend to be more powerful at bringing about necessary change to the organization 
than can any managed change programme (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). Goh & 
Richards (1998) takes the position that a Shared Vision will link to employee 
empowerment. The taking of decisions by employees will enable them to support the 
organization’s vision through their own actions rather than how they are instructed to 
act. These positions developed the questions utilised in the interviews for the herein 
reported case studies on the cultural background of the organization in an attempt to 
understand whether there was some consistency between the excellent contractors. 
There are many criticisms of the Shared Vision approach that Senge et al (1990, 
1994) proposes. A Shared Vision negates the unique experiences of the individuals in 
the organization (Fenwick, 1998). Fielding (2001) argues that the theory excludes 
the possibility of a difference of visions by relying heavily on the dialogue process. In 
addition, the theory assumes that all conflict between visions can be resolved through 
the discovery of common interests (Brown, 1996). It suggests a free and open forum 
where disagreement, even with that of senior management, can be voiced openly and 
is encouraged (Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000). It was therefore necessary within the 
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case studies herein reported to enquire about the alignment of visions between the 
individual and the organization. 
Raiden & Dainty (2006) uses the term ‘organizational consciousness’ to describe how 
the organization creates a collective vision in order to drive change. She suggests 
that this comes from the alignment of culture with organizational strategy and policy 
which drives a spirit for continuous improvement within the organization. Coherence 
between the formal organizational structure and informal culture, and between 
organizational goals and individual employee needs is central to Raiden & Dainty’s 
(2006) view of the LO. The subject of coherence of culture and structure is therefore 
a direct question in the case study research underpinning this thesis. 
Love et al (2004) too suggests a link between organizational culture and Shared 
Vision. Love et al’s (2004) view is that of synergy developed through collective 
actions and shared understanding. Given a Shared Vision between separate parts of 
the organization, learning from one part of the organization can be disseminated 
easily across others (Goh & Richards, 1998). Culture is an interesting link to Shared 
Vision and this issue surfaces many times in the case studies herein reported despite 
there not being a direct question about the notion. The questions within the case 
study centred more on the functionality described in the literature such as the 
dissemination of learning. 
It is also important that the sharing of learning and learning itself becomes part of 
the day to day process of work. The shared environment must be one where 
procedural revolution is kept to an absolute minimum. Love et al (2004) further 
points out that the structure of the organization must be such that it supports this 
state of affairs. He postulates that this would require finding a delicate balance 
between too little centralization causing a lack of direction and too much 
centralization resulting in overambitious targets. This was a further position which 
informed the line of questioning on the structure of the organization for the herein 
reported case studies. 
A Shared Vision should be obvious during case study research as employees ought to 
be able to articulate the concept. In addition, they will freely state that they are 
committed to it and that they were a part of its creation. If individuals were not 
around at the creation of the Shared Vision, they will still be able to say that they 
have an influence over its continual updating. Senge et al (1990, 1994) appears to 
suggest that employees are excited about being part of the team because they can 
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align behind the vision. The commitment to the organizational vision and how it was 
updated informed development of the case studies reported in this thesis. 
Furthermore, an organization with a Shared Vision will have a leadership model which 
operates at the co-creating end of the leadership spectrum according to Senge et al 
(1990, 1994). This will mean that a significant amount of leadership will have to be 
shown by the employees themselves. Individuals will be less reliant upon the titular 
leader for a telling and selling type of leadership (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). This 
should be one of the easier to recognize manifestations of a LO which can be 
identified through case study examination. The question of non-titular leadership is 
asked in the semi-structured questions in the case studies.  
2.3.4 Team Learning 
Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) position on learning is that no one type of learning is 
superior to another and both single and double loop learning are needed within the 
LO. The type of learning to best be employed depends upon the task itself and the 
environment in which it is undertaken (Love et al, 2004). It should be remembered, 
however, that Team Learning in itself is not a destination and does not have the goal 
of improving individual skills. It is more about making the team align better, function 
as a unit and think synergistically. Therefore, there is no single outcome of Team 
Learning, such as reduced delivery times, but an alignment of individuals which 
becomes self sustaining (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
Armstrong (2000) critiques Team Learning on the grounds that the incentive to share 
knowledge with other individuals in times of high or looming unemployment is low. 
This is due to the presumption of competition for scarce positions within the 
organization. Ortenblad (2002) extends this criticism to a more radical point by 
suggesting that the theory therefore assumes permanent positions within the 
organization for all employees. 
Organizations which employ Team Learning will display a greater element of dialogue 
than those that do not. This will come through in the form of meetings which do not 
hinge mainly around the traditional model of debate and decision. Team members will 
tend to use more dialogue, and the exploration of individuals’ assumptions, in 
reaching decisions. In doing this, individuals will first accept that they have differing 
views of a topic and examine the nature of the origin of those views (Senge et al, 
1990, 1994). This position led to a case study question on the value of meetings 
within the excellent contractor organizations. 
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Furthermore, such dialogue will tend to be open between all levels and professions. 
There is a notable absence of ‘them and us’ or suspicion between different groupings 
within the same organization. Ideas will tend to be discussed on merit rather than on 
an advocacy basis based upon the rank and influence of those who champion the 
ideas. There will be an absence of one-upmanship during meetings and discussions 
(Senge et al, 1990, 1994). Chinowsky et al (2007, 2007a) views this as a cultural 
issue with receptiveness to new ideas and the support and encouragement for all to 
get involved in the ideas and change process being they key issues. The question of 
identification of good ideas is explored by some of the questions in the case studies. 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) espouses several techniques and tools for excellent 
dialoguing, including the use of facilitators and good listening techniques. It is beyond 
the scope of the research herein reported to examine the presence or the use of this 
range of techniques. The aim of these techniques is to prevent the advocacy 
approach to discussing options and solutions and to encourage an inquisitive 
approach instead. Therefore, there will be no in depth examination of these 
techniques in this section as they are clearly set out in Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) 
work. 
Suffice to say that a LO will use one or more of the dialoguing techniques suggested. 
What can be examined is whether any of the techniques are being employed and 
whether they are indeed driving Team Learning. This is researched in the case 
studies herein reported through the observation of team meetings. 
Team Learning will also manifest itself in the absence of ‘pointless’ meetings. Teams 
which have learned to function effectively will have gone through a process by which 
they will have screened the performance of their meetings. This process will ensure 
that only issues important to the individuals and the team are discussed. Those which 
serve little purpose other than to take time and energy from the team are removed 
from the process. Meeting attendees may call for periods of reflection should 
meetings reach an impasse, thus avoiding the need for strong advocacy when 
opinions are divided. Meetings will therefore appear to flow well and work to the task 
from the point of view of an observer (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). The value of 
organizational meetings is therefore explored by the case study questions. 
Furthermore, an organization with an advanced level of Team Learning will have few 
or no ‘undiscussables’. These are issues which everyone knows exist, but collectively 
decide not to discuss even though they may be the key to the progression of the 
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organization. Often, a formal exercise has been carried out in order to collect data 
about these undiscussables which has been externally facilitated in order to bring 
them to the surface and manage them out. In LOs, the culture pervading ensures 
that there are no undiscussables of note (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
Other researchers (c/f Chinowsky et al, 2007, 2007a; Goh & Richards, 1998) have 
taken the slightly less dynamic perspective in that they suggest that the organization 
should remove barriers to communication. This is probably a more realistic approach 
than that of Senge et al (1990, 1994) as there are likely to be undiscussables at all 
levels of society to a certain degree. Given the depth of the case studies being 
undertaken it was not possible to identify the ‘undiscussables’ issue in the case study 
organizations. To identify such issues was beyond the scope of the herein reported 
research. This is a minor limitation to this thesis but not material to the 
understanding of the workings of the organizations in question. 
A LO’s individuals will also tend to be clear about their role within the team. This role 
is not one assigned by rank or profession, but by an individual’s position with respect 
to a particular proposition or action. Senge et al (1990, 1994) describes four clear 
roles which people adopt at various times depending upon their position on a subject. 
They are: Mover – the person who initiates a position or direction; Opposer – the 
person who acts as a sceptic and challenges the mover; Followers – those who follow 
either the mover or opposer; Bystanders – those who critically asses and reflect upon 
the others. He makes it clear that all roles are necessary in order for a successful 
learning team. 
It ought to be that when researching a LO, those team roles will be clearly visible and 
supportively functional within the team environment. In addition, the roles will not 
appear rigid and people will shift easily between roles depending upon their 
perspective on an issue. A LO will value the diversity of its teams and be aware of the 
way in which diversity improves the team. This type of diversity is an acceptance that 
without respecting the fact that individuals are more than just people who work for 
the organization, they will not be fully a part of the organization. Furthermore, it is 
clear that individuals must be made aware of their own personal filters when dealing 
with others and how that might affect their reactions. 
The acceptance and self management of this element is a key part of an excellent 
learning team. Senge et al (1990, 1994) discusses this notion as being the 
abandonment of the expectation of how someone will speak and act and treating 
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them how they actually speak and act. This position again links well to the cultural 
perspective of Chinowsky et al (2007, 2007a). The issue of ‘culture’ is another 
explored in the case studies herein reported during the observation of team meetings 
and the messages from the interviews. 
Acceptance of diversity will extend to the way in which individuals are asked to learn 
within the team. A LO will accept that individuals learn in different ways. Such an 
organization is therefore likely to provide a number of learning options to its 
employees to ensure that they get the most out of their individual learning 
experience. Senge et al (1994) provides an overview of these learning styles without 
going into the detail of how they might manifest themselves within an organization. 
The case study research reported herein contains questions on how personal 
development is supported within the organization. 
Raiden & Dainty (2006) examines Team Learning from the perspectives of ‘flexibility’ 
and ‘continuous transformation’. Given the construction industry’s project based 
nature, the first tier contractor will often have to deal with different customer-specific 
specifications on each project it undertakes. In addition, each project almost requires 
the setting up of a temporary mini-organization around the project itself. These 
projects will be delivered through a variety of vehicles such as traditional competitive 
tendering and contracting, framework agreements, Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
and Joint Ventures (JV) to name a few of the more popular ones. Coupled with the 
relatively uncontrollable physical environment under which the organizations work, 
this situation means that first tier contractors have to learn to react to and solve 
problems as a team as they arise. 
In addition, Raiden & Dainty (2006) incorporates the learning process as taken from 
Nevis et al (1995) and Huber (1991) as another LO process. This Team Learning 
process relies heavily upon double loop learning at its core. The new meanings 
uncovered by individuals during their Personal Mastery journey are disseminated 
through the whole team. This dissemination of knowledge changes the organizational 
norms and thereby assists a change in the culture (Love et al, 2004; Senge et al, 
1990, 1994). The process therefore becomes one of collective reflection and reaction 
to the situations encountered which then become part of organizational memory 
(Love et al, 2004). 
Single loop learning happens when members of an organization respond to their 
environment by detecting errors and correcting them whilst maintaining existing 
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organizational norms. This type of learning will not encourage any further inquiry or 
reflection. The focus is on solving problems without examination of the behaviour or 
the mindset that produced the problem. 
Double loop learning not only deals with existing processes but also involves the 
modification of organizational culture, policies, objectives, strategies and structure. 
Double loop learning involves changing the organization's knowledge base, 
competencies and routines (Holt et al, 2000). By contrast, the concept of being able 
to implement single and double loop learning within the same organization is viewed 
by some as being too idealistic (Ortenblad, 2004). 
There is also discussion on how a LO can be outwardly recognized without going into 
the underlying processes in great depth. This is useful to the case study element of 
this thesis as it informs the initial signals to identify. Raiden & Dainty (2006) suggests 
that a LO can be identified by its ability to reconcile the often conflicting elements of 
organizational and individual development; and formal structure and informal culture. 
She puts forward three elements which the employees might experience by being 
part of a LO. They are: challenging work; support and provision of opportunities for 
learning; and partnership between vocational education, formal training and informal 
Human Resource Development (HRD). 
These three points are interesting and potentially logical manifestations of a LO. It 
will be potentially enriching to the studies herein reported to understand how and 
whether these things are mentioned during the author’s case study phase and in 
what context they relate to Team Learning processes and added value to the 
customer. 
From the literature, it is clear that Team Learning is something that must be driven 
as part of the LO. The point about no one type of learning being superior is useful as 
it is not so descriptive as to exclude the different forms of learning that might be 
needed in different business situations. Given the varying complexity of business 
problems that may be seen to exist within the construction industry, such flexibility 
gives the best scope for the creation of a Team Learning approach which can cope 
with these situations. Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) position of more dialogue than 
discussion is a little less practical. Particularly given the current economic climate, it 
appears unlikely that the relative ‘niceties’ of dialogue are to be preferred over 
discussion. Nonetheless, it still appears from the LO literature that a move towards a 
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more dialoguing form of meeting should at least be a part of an organization 
attempting to be a LO. 
The more practical points from the literature such as making Team Learning a 
journey, facilitating the movement of knowledge through the organization, and 
importing learning from without the organization appear to have a better chance of 
being a part of a tangible LO in the construction industry. They represent 
implementable processes that can be included within any organization almost 
regardless of the pervading culture. This understanding helped shape the questions 
asked in the interviews by providing a practical grounding to some of the more 
theoretical parts of Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) writings. 
Furthermore, Raiden & Dainty’s (2006) perspectives are useful in that they are also 
relatively practical. A commitment to flexibility and the transformation of the 
organization can be implemented and identified. The key question from these points 
is that the flexibility and transformation are focussed in a way that transforms the 
organization to better respond to or manage its environment. The changes coming 
from these processes must demonstrably make the organization industry leading. In 
addition, the double loop learning process which is required for these changes can be 
identified through the three indicators Raiden & Dainty (2006) suggests. 
2.3.5 Systems Thinking 
A lack of Systems Thinking may seriously inhibit any move towards the state of the 
LO as Senge et al (1990, 1994) describes this discipline as encompassing the other 
four. A key element of Systems Thinking is the commitment of senior management to 
the LO approach. Senge et al (1990, 1994) and Love et al (2004) both state that 
whilst Systems Thinking has to be embraced by the organization as a whole, senior 
management must lead by example. They will need to implement a cultural change 
whereby senior managers lead by example. 
An organization which understands system thinking will demonstrate it through their 
problem solving and opportunity taking processes. They will tend to map the impact 
of the issues and the proposed changes required to deal with these issues. They will 
try to model and anticipate the impact of these issues on the organizational systems 
directly or indirectly linked to the changes. The obvious criticism of this suggestion is 
that this might also be described as simply good management practice within a non 
LO rather than evidence of an ingrained Systems Thinking culture. Ortenblad (2007) 
notes that one of the weaknesses with Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) work is that it is so 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 36 
all-encompassing that it almost becomes difficult to identify anything that might not 
be part of a LO. 
As such, when researching for this thesis, it was important to gain an understanding 
of to what extent Systems Thinking was part of the organizational culture. In 
addition, in developing a best practice model for the LO in the UK construction 
industry, the real examples of Systems Thinking were seen to be worthy of 
consideration. Such examples were envisaged as those that lead to more intelligent 
decisions at every management level based on the operation of the whole business. 
It was considered that there would be fewer decisions made in isolation which impact 
negatively upon other departments. Such considerations may also be seen to extend 
to understanding the impact of their decisions upon their supply chain and client base 
(Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
Appelbaum & Gallagher (1997) suggests that Systems Thinking should be used to 
develop systems that make the organization more flexible and responsive to change. 
He suggests that many organizations do not live as long as people due to their 
inability to adapt to change. He includes the negative perspectives of a lack of 
Systems Thinking and what this means for the survival of the organization. Such 
issues generally involve individuals or groups within the organization ‘hiding’ behind 
the current system and using it to justify their actions. In this thesis’ case studies it 
was considered to be useful to identify how much of this type of behaviour exists 
within the best performing contractor organizations. This insight will provide an 
understanding of the ‘absence of LO negatives’ alongside the presence of positives. 
The application of Systems Thinking will result in an organization that is still far from 
perfect in the decision making stakes. There will, however, be an absence of repeated 
mistakes and there will be less evidence of internal departments blaming each other 
for making their jobs more difficult. In addition, there will be less ‘quick fixes’ 
employed as it will be understood that these are likely to cause as many problems as 
they solve. Senge et al (1994) lays out five archetypes of how such fixes tend to 
backfire on organizations and how to diagnose and repair the consequences of such 
fixes. Again, as part of this thesis, evidence of such approaches will be examined in 
order to construct the best practice model for the construction contractor. 
Systems Thinking is the understanding of the subsystems of the organization and 
how they interrelate and act individually and collectively to produce the results 
created by that organization (Holt et al, 2000). Raiden & Dainty (2006) describes this 
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understanding as ‘connectivity’ within her research and that it is found lacking within 
the organization which she examined. Raiden & Dainty (2006) states that the 
organization she was studying was divided into separate profit centres. This 
organization was only viewed in its entirety by those at top management levels. Her 
research conclusion was, however, silent on how this structure in fact creates the lack 
of unity she describes. Senge et al (1990, 1994) is not prescriptive about the ideal 
structure for Systems Thinking and therefore the LO and Raiden & Dainty (2006) 
does not link back to previous research to explain how she reaches her conclusion. 
Within this thesis, therefore, an open position about the best structure for a learning 
construction organization will be maintained when proceeding into the case study 
phase. 
In addition, the organization should use Systems Thinking in order to align itself 
better with its internal and external environment (Appelbaum & Gallagher, 1997). 
Appelbaum & Gallagher’s (1997) position assumes an open system theory of the 
organization as opposed to a closed system. The open system is a necessary starting 
point of the LO as the organization must understand how it is connected to its world. 
The stance is critiqued by those who argue against the dichotomy of the internal and 
external environments, but Appelbaum & Gallagher’s (1997) perspective is the most 
useful to adopt for this thesis as the organization is the subject of the study rather 
than its place in part of the wider environment. 
Love et al (2004) proposes that in order to transform the performance of the whole 
organization the critical path runs through senior management redefining the roles, 
responsibilities and relationships of all individuals within that organization. Senge et 
al (1990, 1994) makes it clear that any such realignment must be done with a view 
to the operation of the organization as a whole rather than the operation of individual 
departments, and that all employees and not just management should be involved. 
Love et al’s (2004) approach ensures that all departments maintain a stake in the 
new organizational structure as a whole and therefore have a chance to adapt 
systemically.  
Love et al (2004) and Senge et al (1990, 1994) can both be accused of idealizing the 
process of business transformation. Both their perspectives are silent on the issues of 
unequal power and organizational politics which pervade organizational change 
(Ortenblad, 2007). Given that the herein reported research is of an exploratory 
nature, it is unlikely that such issues will be uncovered to any great extent. Therefore 
this oversight in the LO model will not be addressed within the scope of this thesis. It 
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will, however, need to be commented upon when developing the construction LO 
model. 
Employing Systems Thinking also has the effect of making the organization more self 
aware. Assuming that the organization has a Shared Vision by ensuring that all facets 
of the business are aligned behind it would be a natural step. As such, the potential 
to over focus on one element of performance will be reduced. Love et al (2004) notes 
that whilst the quest to prevent quality failures is a useful cause, it cannot be driven 
at the expense of other facets of the business. Such a conclusion may appear at first 
to be rather obvious and easy to fit into the wide ranging concept that is Systems 
Thinking (Ortenblad, 2007). However, the ability to avoid such business process 
myopia is examined in this thesis’ case studies given the potential problems it may 
cause to an organization. 
Learning loops are an important part of the Systems Thinking mix. It is unlikely that 
what is learned initially by an organization will be able to provide the ideal systems 
result. Learning loops provide insight into what has been learned, what its affect was, 
and what still needs to be learned (Holt et al, 2000). This suggestion would appear to 
be a practical application without which any organization would struggle to become a 
LO. The presence, or otherwise, and operation of learning loops is therefore 
specifically examined in the case studies herein reported. 
Systems Thinking appears to be the most practically implementable of all the five 
disciplines in its complete state. Taking decisions holistically is something that any 
business should be able to implement. Senge et al (1990, 1994) appears to have 
identified a key behavioural trait which may separate the excellent organizations from 
the weaker ones. Organizations where two, or more, departments have misaligned or 
have conflicting goals can end up hindering each other’s progress. An example in 
construction might be a contractor’s tendering department being targeted with 
winning contracts; the project management department being targeted with keeping 
customers delighted. If the tendering department wins so much work that the project 
managers become too stretched, they may be unable to achieve their targets. This 
would in turn drive down the contractor’s reputation and make it harder for the 
organization to win or retain customers. 
Furthermore, organizations should have a practical understanding of how their 
actions affect their environment. Some construction organizations can be 
contractually harsh with their supply chains, usually financially, which can cut the 
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number of suppliers who are willing to collaborate. Such a reduction in potential 
suppliers can then end up hindering them when their existing supply chain becomes 
stretched. This suggests that Appelbaum & Gallagher’s (1997) suggestion of 
understanding the organization’s position with respect to the environment also has a 
useful practical perspective for business excellence. This is a further area which is 
examined within the case studies in this thesis; that is, consideration is given to how 
the excellent performing contractor interacts with their environment. 
The quick fixes noted by Senge et al (1990, 1994) as potential sources of greater 
problems than the ones they are designed to alleviate is another useful area when 
examining the construction industry. In the current recession, many organizations 
are, for example, cutting back on training and development of staff. This protects 
capital reserves but may have the effect of deskilling the organization as a whole for 
when the industry expands. In addition, it may reduce the loyalty which individuals 
feel to the organization, which may make it harder to retain them once the job 
market reinvigorates. 
2.4 How the five disciplines informed data gathering 
Each of the five disciplines of the LO requires an element of unlearning and 
adaptation to change. Changing existing Mental Models is perhaps the one where this 
is most relevant. Particularly within an alliance environment, the organization must 
move away from the hierarchical and rigid structure to encourage this unlearning. 
Indeed, the greatest unlearning will be behavioural in nature due to the cooperative 
approach of an alliance environment (Holt et al, 2000). It is for this reason that the 
workings and structure of the organization are examined in the case studies. 
The experimentation perspective within this element is potentially interesting as the 
construction industry is not one seen to be particularly experimental with its service 
models. The traditional model for the industry has often been for experimentation in 
delivery to be driven from the customer position rather than the contractor. In 
addition, given the low margin returns, the allowance for experimental failure is slim. 
Therefore, whether this forms an integral part of a construction LO might have been 
questionable. It is however examined in the case studies. 
The use of dialogue is another questionable position from a practical perspective. 
Meetings within the industry are based around advocacy, possibly from the 
adversarial nature of the underlying contractual models. In addition, data only tend 
to be collected when required and when needed to support a particular position. So 
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whether data are being collected in order to challenge underlying business models 
within the industry is questionable at this stage. 
Scenario planning, however, appears to be a practical tool which can be implemented 
by organizations. Scenario planning involves learning about the future through 
understanding the impact of various driving factors (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). In 
fact, such tools may be used as part of the risk management process. Scenario 
planning is directly questioned during the case study interviews to establish the depth 
and breadth of the use of this management technique. 
The organizational mindset perspective is an element which would have to be aligned 
in any organization if it was to change its Mental Model. It is also one that could be, 
and indeed appears already to be, driven by senior management to create tangible 
change in industry organization. Contracting organizations do change the way they 
project their culture to the industry. Such changes may be able to influence the 
assumptions under which the organization acts. Such assumptions and actions are 
revealed in the case studies through the use of various cultural indicators, such as 
the language used to describe the ways of working. 
The organizational mindset changes within the construction industry may be practical 
through the changes in programme and project delivery structures. The move which 
the industry is undertaking currently from adversarial contract based delivery to an 
alliancing model is a practical example of mindset change. The growing popularity of 
alliancing signifies that the industry may indeed be trying to unlearn its past and 
move to a new mindset. Therefore this perspective may be a more useful one for 
changing Mental Models within the industry and thus the nature of business 
relationships is discussed in the case studies. 
2.5 Related discipline – The ‘chaordic’ organization 
The chaordic organization is a concept taken from Raiden & Dainty’s (2006) paper on 
the LO in the construction industry. Within this work, it is suggested that tier one 
construction contractors fit the quoted description of a ‘chaordic’ organization (p 64), 
described by Raiden & Dainty as: 
“A complex and dynamical organization that operates in a complex, non-
linear dynamic environment of which it is a central part.” 
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The concept comes from a combination of chaos and complexity theory taking heavily 
from the principle that individuals employed by an organization act upon that 
organization and its systems whilst at the same time being an integral part of the 
organization and its systems. Raiden & Dainty (2006) goes on to state that much 
recent research has established the UK construction sector as dynamic and complex, 
the makeup of which is largely custom built individual projects. 
In addition, the industry suffers from more widely fluctuating demand than other UK 
sectors which impacts upon geographical need for resource (Raiden & Dainty, 2006). 
The outcome of such fluctuation is that temporary organizational structures prevail 
which can often be remote from central leadership and management. Furthermore, 
whilst things never quite happen in exactly the same way on any given project, there 
is enough commonality of input, process and output to prevent the organization from 
entering disarray (Raiden & Dainty, 2006). 
Raiden & Dainty (2006) goes on to say that the style of working and market 
landscape coupled with the high usage of a temporary and subcontract workforce 
creates a requirement for management to be more highly skilled and experienced in 
order to achieve project success. It would not be unreasonable to extend this 
proposition such that an organization facing such situations may have to become a 
LO to survive. The impact of the fluctuation of the industry and therefore the 
organizational structure and the effect this has on the business is discussed in some 
depth during the case studies herein reported. 
2.6 Defining excellent first tier contractor performance 
This section of the literature review is an analysis of how the recent literature has 
defined excellent contractor performance. This is not a central element of the LO 
research and as such is only touched upon in this chapter. The main reason for the 
analysis is to provide a framework for the customer interviews described later in 
chapter 4. As such what follows in these sections refers to the data gathering phase 
rather than serving as an analytical review of the literature around construction 
contractor performance. 
In order to establish with the customer group which are the better and worse 
performing contractors, initial definitions of what elements represent excellent 
performance were used to frame the interviews. The following was seen to be a list of 
the contractor performance headings which come up in industry research (Egan, 
1998; 2002) most frequently and which are used to define performance in the 
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research undertaken for this thesis. Each of these elements are tested during initial 
interviews with customer organizations to establish the final full definitions used 
within this thesis. The following is provided at this stage by way of a guide: 
2.6.1 Time 
An oft-stated bane of the industry is that projects rarely finish within their originally 
planned timescales (Egan, 1998; 2002). A contractor who can consistently deliver 
projects on time or can deliver them more quickly than his/her peer group could be 
highly valued. The quicker a customer can have his/her asset, the quicker he/she can 
generate income and profit. Lam et al (2007) provides an argument as to how time is 
best considered as the completion of projects within timescale, the reduction of the 
number of overruns, and the average duration of types of project. 
2.6.2 Quality 
Another area of variable standards in the industry, as noted by Egan (1998; 2002) is 
quality. The industry has been criticized for poor finished qualities of product. A 
contractor who can provide a quality product which requires a minimum of ‘snagging’ 
should be a high performer in his/her clients’ perception. Snagging is an industry 
term for defects correction that is carried out post the handover of the product to the 
customer. The quality of product tends to be the key point for which customers will 
return to a contractor. Lam et al (2007) advances two definitions of quality from 
previous works which is examined to provide guidance during the interviews. The 
word quality is an emotive and imprecise one and this area is the one most clearly 
defined by the contemporary research for discussion at the customer interview stage. 
2.6.3 Capital cost 
Capital cost is often viewed by customers, wrongly, as the only differentiator between 
contractors in the construction industry (Egan, 1998; 2002). It is, however, still a key 
element of contractors’ performance and those who can deliver at lower cost than 
their competitors provide added value to their customer. In addition, capital cost is 
no longer the only financial consideration; contractors who can deliver a product 
which is economic to operate will also add value to their customer. Chan & Chan 
(2004) proposes that customers will also consider certainty of cost and absence of 
variations as key performance elements. Such understanding informed the shape of 
the customer interviews conducted for the purposes of the research herein reported. 
2.6.4 Innovation 
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An area criticized as being lacking in the industry for some time (Egan, 1998; 2002), 
innovation is a key issue for many of the author’s clients. If they cannot see excellent 
ideas and improvements, no matter how small, coming from their contractors then 
they may look elsewhere for services. Thus questions relating to innovation also were 
included in the interviews conducted for the purposes of the research herein 
reported. 
2.6.5 Customer relationship 
Customer relationship concerns the ease of working with a contractor. It has been 
observed that contractors who are achieving their ‘hard’ Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) can be replaced by the customer because of poor or aggressive customer 
relations/soft skills from key members of their team. Relationships can often depend 
upon how good a cultural fit a contractor is for a customer. Chan & Chan (2004) 
discusses such psychological success factors and draws upon earlier writers’ works to 
provide examples. Chan & Chan’s (2004) examples helped inform the discussions 
with the customers about contractors’ emotional commitment to the programme of 
works. 
2.6.6 Health and safety 
Health and safety is very much a focus of the industry since the passing of the 
Construction Design and Management (CDM) regulations in 1994 and their updating 
most recently in 2007. A poor health and safety record on site may reflect badly on 
the customer and customers do not wish to have their name associated in the press 
with major incidents on site (Egan, 1998; 2002). There have been many news 
articles in relevant industry publications such as Building Magazine in recent years 
referring to such incidents. Beatham et al (2004) points out that these incidents often 
form a key element of contractor performance criteria as there is a legal requirement 
to measure safety. This understanding provided a frame of reference to discuss the 
impact of health and safety upon the perception of contractor performance in the 
interviews conducted for the purposes of the research herein reported. 
2.6.7 Sustainability and whole–life cost 
Sustainability is a cause celebre in the national media at the current time and is also 
rising to prominence within the construction industry. Industry press, such as 
Building magazine, frequently notes that construction customers are increasingly 
aware that to be able to meet their own environmental commitments, their 
contractors must also be so inclined. One customer has recently stated during 
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organization meetings that he believes that company accounts will one day have to 
measure turnover and profit per carbon usage in addition to financial terms. The 
contractor who could bring design and construction solutions which improved the 
sustainability and whole-life cost position for their customer tends to be well valued 
(Egan 1998 & 2002). Lam et al (2007) proposes a mechanism for measuring this 
element which is examined further for the customer interviews undertaken for the 
purposes of the reported research. 
All of the above elements appear in the Constructing Excellence forum’s 
recommended set of KPIs (www.constructingexcellence.org.uk/zones/kpizone). This 
group includes many of the larger construction customers in the UK and therefore 
their output should be a reliable initial barometer as to what represents good 
performance from the customer’s perspective. Many larger customers already have 
adopted the above constructs as supply chain standard KPIs. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The contribution to knowledge and practice made by this thesis is to start to fill the 
void between the theoretical works which have framed the concept of the LO (Argyris 
& Schon, 1978; Senge et al, 1990, 1994) and the mainly positivist studies which 
have followed (Bhatnagar, 2006; Garcia-Morales et al, 2007; Jimenez-Jimenez & 
Cegarra-Nevarro, 2006). The theoretical works have created a detailed framework 
upon which the model LO is constructed; whereas the positivist studies have shown 
that organizations which possess the LO processes and are close in makeup to the 
theoretical model LO tend to perform better on such items as turnover and profit. 
This thesis provides an understanding as to whether these processes really are in 
existence within contracting organizations. In addition, there will be a greater 
understanding of what direct impact a LO has upon the way the organization 
performs from the customer’s point of view rather than the point of view of the 
accounting data. The reason for choosing this approach is that figures such as 
turnover and profit could be distorted by wider economic conditions which may drown 
out the impact of the LO processes. Customers’ perspective of performance may be 
less reliant upon the market and more reliant upon the organization possessing LO 
processes. 
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3 Research Design and Approach 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research outline which was planned at the start of the 
research. It sets out the reasoning behind the original methods and what was 
anticipated would be discovered. It then demonstrates how and why the approach 
changed as the research progressed. This chapter has been included so that insight 
may be gained into how the research actually changed during its course as various 
problems, opportunities and learnings were encountered. 
This chapter is divided into six key areas which give detail as to how the research 
was structured. Section 3.2 provides an outline of the research methods and key 
steps carried out within this thesis. Section 3.3 describes the initial work done in 
establishing a preliminary framework for excellent performance with respect to 
construction contracting organizations. Section 3.4 outlines the approach taken to 
researching the customers in order to understand fully what excellent performance 
means to them and to find out which organizations provide such performance. 
Section 3.5 is about establishing a framework of LO processes, but does not go into 
much depth as the bulk of this framework is established in the literature review in 
chapter 2. Section 3.6 then describes the case study process for researching the 
nominated contractors. Finally, section 3.7 describes the use of data coding and 
analysis – NVIVO as the data analysis tool for the research reported in this thesis. 
Section 3.8 provides the research design and approach leading into data collection 
and analysis. 
3.2 Outline of the research methods 
At the outset of the research an outline plan for the steps necessary to answer the 
research question was developed. Table 3.1 below, entitled process matrix of key 
milestones, and designed for the purposes of this thesis, shows the milestones that 
were anticipated during the research herein reported and the concomitant actions 
required to achieve those milestones. 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 46 
Table 3.1: Process matrix of key milestones 
Milestone Action Required 
Establish a preliminary model for 
excellent contractor performance from 
the customer’s perspective 
Examine key writings such as Egan (1998) and 
(2002) to establish key performance indicators for 
construction industry contractors. 
 Examine other contemporary literature about 
contractor performance in the construction industry. 
Agree contractor performance criteria 
from the customer's perspective (to 
inform the customer semi structured 
interviews) 
Speak to Constructing Excellence Forum members 
regarding the performance criteria uncovered. 
Establish what excellent contractor performance 
really means to them given the key writings cited. 
Interview customers to the UK construction industry 
who interact with a number of ‘first tier’ contractors 
on a consistent basis and who view their capital 
construction spend as a significant part of business 
expenditure. 
Researching the customers – semi 
structured interviews 
Speak to Forum members and customers noted 
above to gain nominations for case studies. 
Nominations to be gained for contractors who 
perform excellently and poorly against performance 
criteria previously agreed. 
Establish a framework of LO processes 
(to inform the contractor case studies) 
Examine key writings to establish LO processes. 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) are the base texts used 
for this exercise. 
  Examine other contemporary literature about LOs 
and their financial performance (current positivist 
research). This provides research to follow that has 
already established how to identify LO processes. 
Prepare data analysis and coding  Set up NVIVO coding structure in preparation for 
case study examination of contractors, based upon 
emergent themes from literature. 
Researching the contractors – case 
studies 
Research key members of the contractors 
nominated to establish the presence and maturity 
of LO processes. 
Carry out comparative study of case 
studies 
Make comparison between the case study 
organizations with respect to the presence and 
maturity of LO processes, thereby creating a 
theoretical model for the excellent performing 
construction contractor. 
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This chapter describes in more detail the steps and actions shown in table 3.1 and 
expands upon where changes were made to the initial approach. These changes were 
either from a practical perspective following the discovery of a more useful method of 
achieving the required output; or from an affected perspective, where events 
external to the control of the researcher required a change in approach. 
3.3 Establishing a preliminary model for excellent contractor 
performance 
There was first of all seen to be a need to establish a preliminary model for excellent 
contractor performance because a benchmark against which such performance could 
be assessed was required. In addition, this model was required in order to inform the 
customer interviews. An extensive literature review was carried out in order to 
develop an initial framework which would be used as the basis of the customer 
interviews. This was not done to bias the interviews towards a certain model for 
excellent performance, but simply as a prompt to be used in the interviews. It was 
anticipated that the customers would depart from the initial model and speak about 
what to them was really important. 
This approach was chosen as it gave the researcher a framework based upon recent 
research already carried out and thereby a starting point from which new knowledge 
discovery could springboard. In addition, it was envisaged that it would enable the 
customers interviewed in the next phase to establish firmly in their own minds what 
excellent contractor performance means to them before they came to nominate 
excellent performing contractors for case study purposes. 
3.4 Researching the customers 
3.4.1 Selection of Participants 
Once the excellent performance models had been created, the customer interviews 
were the next step in the research. Initially, these were designed to be mainly for the 
nomination of excellent performing contractors for the case studies to follow. The 
establishment of a model for excellent performance was a secondary element of the 
research compared to the LO work itself. As it turned out, these customer interviews 
would uncover just as much of a contribution to understanding as the contractor case 
studies. 
A purposive sampling approach was chosen for the customer interview element of the 
research (following Cresswell, 2007). Purposive sampling involves the deliberate 
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selection of members of a population based upon the researcher’s prior knowledge of 
that population. In this case the population was all customers placing work with the 
UK construction industry. Given the size of this population and the specialist nature of 
the information required, a random sampling approach of any description was out of 
the question. A random approach would have potentially included, for example, 
members of the general public employing a local builder to construct a garden wall. 
The author wanted to obtain as rich a data set as possible from the smallest possible 
number of interviews. 
As suggested by Guarte & Barrios (2006), it is accepted that purposive sampling can 
be a source of bias due to the researcher selecting participants who would give the 
responses wanted. Therefore, the decision was taken to approach an educated 
industry body to nominate the customers for research. The original strategy was to 
approach the Constructing Excellence Forum to establish from their members what 
excellent performance meant. Unfortunately, this was not possible due to the vast 
amount of research already being undertaken by that body. As such, they felt that 
they would be unable to give the research the support it deserved. 
As this research required the understanding of what excellent performance meant to 
construction customers, this step could not be abandoned. The author has critically 
examined some of the previous works on the LO in the construction industry (see 
chapter 2) and had critiqued that work on the basis that they were almost exclusively 
inward-focussed. The author’s analysis was that most of that research was based on 
an assumption that the LO was a beneficial concept without discovering whether the 
organization’s customers noticed any change in performance (Love et al, 2000; 
Nesan, 2004). 
Therefore it was decided to approach the larger organizations within which the author 
had existing contacts. Customers with large programmes of construction works were 
chosen as they were seen to be likely to have a lot of experience of dealing with tier 
one contractors and were considered to be the most likely to understand what 
excellent performance to them means. In addition, some were members of the 
aforementioned construction industry body. Given the size of their construction 
investment, the views of these customers can therefore be treated as being as valid 
as any other. 
Approximately thirty customers were approached and six finally agreed to be part of 
the research. Thus, a snowball sampling approach was also utilized, following Welch 
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(1975). This means that those customers most interested in excellent contractor 
performance and the potential of the LO have probably been identified from this list. 
Such identification has always been the aim of the initial phase of the research. The 
six customers interviewed cover six sectors of the UK construction market. These 
organizations will not be named within this thesis due to the confidentiality 
agreements signed between the participants and the author. For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, the following customers pseudonyms are used, and these are listed 
alongside their nominated contractor for ease of reference: 
Customer Organization - Excellent Contractor 
Minnesota   - Chicago 
Houston   - Tennessee 
Miami   - Indianapolis 
Oakland   - Kansas 
Pittsburgh   - Cincinnati 
Washington   - Dallas 
Fortunately, the six customer organizations who originally accepted were from 
sufficiently diverse sectors (finance, communications, information technology, retail 
and utilities) to allow the author to accept them without the need to approach further 
customers to diversify the sample. Therefore, the possibility of obtaining data 
representative of the industry views was greater and the trustworthiness of the data 
was improved. In addition, the number of participants, six, was viewed as being 
sufficient to give a wide range and depth of view. There was seen to be a wide 
ranging discussion in the literature of the number of participants considered 
appropriate for a study of a type similar to that herein reported. The number of 
participants for such research ranges from two to fifteen (c/f Cresswell, 2007; Flick, 
2006; Silverman, 2006; Yin, 2003). As such, the author was satisfied with six 
because this satisfied the suggested number range and covered sufficient market 
sectors to be reasonably representative of the industry as a whole. 
Most specifically, heads of property services departments were asked to participate in 
the initial phase of this study. They were approached as they were considered most 
likely to be the people who make the decision of who is included in their supply chain. 
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They were also seen to be most likely to have the best overview of their programme 
of construction works and its overall performance. They were also considered to be 
those organizational members most likely to be able to understand which of their first 
tier contractors provides the best performance. 
3.4.2 Semi structured interviews 
There is a range of interviewing techniques available to a researcher working within 
the chosen post-positivist framework. Those techniques include structured interviews, 
semi structured interviews, and unstructured interviews (Flick, 2006; Silverman, 
2006). From this array of interviewing techniques, semi structured interviews were 
chosen for the following reasons. 
The goal of the interviews used in the herein reported research was to identify a 
model for excellent tier one contractor performance, and which organizations are 
seen as is providing it (and therefore who would make the best case studies for the 
furthering of this research). Given that this piece was an entirely deductive piece of 
work, it was envisaged that the present framework for excellent performance held 
within the previous research could be utilized and a set of pre planned questions 
derived therefrom. In addition, the author could explore any areas of interest which 
arose during the interview and was therefore not constrained by the excellence model 
or the questions. It was decided that this was the best way to discover what was 
truly important to the participants and to avoid biasing their responses. 
Following the guidance in Silverman (2006), face to face interviews were chosen over 
the other options of questionnaires, focus groups and telephone interviews. A 
questionnaire approach was rejected as it was considered that it would not be able to 
capture the depth of information required for this element of the research. An open 
question questionnaire that would capture the same depth would require an 
unfeasible amount of writing on the part of the respondent and was considered to be 
too time constrained for the participant. Further decision making processes are 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
In addition, the author wanted to be able to see the reactions of the respondents to 
certain areas such that it would be easier to understand what to them was really 
important. It is acknowledged that this may be apparent from the words spoken, but 
it was felt that personal observation would enrich the information gleaned from the 
words alone. Furthermore, in the author’s experience, it is easier to gain rapport and 
the confidence of the interviewee when sitting in the same room as opposed to over 
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the telephone. It was therefore decided that the likelihood was that more information 
would be forthcoming in a live environment. 
A focus group approach was rejected as the research was targeting one specific 
individual within the participating customer organizations. Heads of property services’ 
teams may have been able to add more depth in a focus group environment. 
However, the author wanted to know specifically what was important to the person 
making the strategy decisions on construction and therefore it was concluded that 
there was no need for the input of their team. In addition, the strategy of keeping to 
one level of participant was also seen to ensure that the level of influence of the 
participants was constant, thus increasing the rigour and trustworthiness of the data 
(Garcia-Morales et al, 2007). A telephone interview approach was rejected on the 
practical basis that they could be difficult to record without expensive equipment. 
The participants were given an informed consent statement (see Appendix A) which 
made it clear that they had full control over this element of the research in terms of 
location (Flick, 2006; Silverman, 2006). The suggestion was advanced that the 
interviews took place at their own offices. This suggestion was made so that the 
author would cause minimum disruption to the working day of the participant. In 
addition, participants had control over the direction of the interview to a certain 
extent in terms of what information they divulged. The author had to accept the 
limitation that some information which the participants were in possession of may 
have been withheld due to confidentiality issues. There was also the possibility that 
participants gave answers that they thought the author wanted to hear rather than 
what they really wanted to say. Given the number of interviews, and the ability to 
cross-check answers against each other, this risk was considered minimal. 
The participants were briefed on what the research as a whole was about and what 
precisely would be their contribution. The questions (below) were pre-issued 
verbatim, to the participants in order to allow them to gather their thoughts about 
the subject in advance of a meeting. In addition, the participants were informed that 
they would receive a copy of any papers written on the subject of excellent contractor 
performance which included information given at their interview. Such information 
gave them an idea of what they might receive in return for their contribution. 
Silverman (2006) discusses the ethics of ‘reward’ for participation in order to secure 
more participants. This offer was, however, merely an exchange of information in 
which both parties, researcher and participant, would receive knowledge from their 
participation. 
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3.4.3 Interview background (performance criteria) and questions 
The case studies have been developed in conjunction with interested academics and 
customer representatives (following Garcia-Morales et al, 2007). This approach 
ensures that the questions are significantly rigorous for the study and that they 
discover the issues most relevant to customers. It is accepted that having the 
influence of industry leaders in developing the case studies may encourage them to 
add things which they are interested in rather than what is relevant to the study, 
thereby possibly adding bias (Garcia-Morales et al, 2007). This limitation was 
guarded against in this research through an element of controlled research 
development by way of literature review and academic supervisor influence. 
Below in Table 3.2 entitled excellent performance factors, developed for the purposes 
of this thesis, is a list of tier-one performance criteria around which the customer 
interviews were shaped. The list represents an initial inventory of factors of excellent 
performance in UK construction contractors from the point of view of the customer 
and was gleaned from various research papers published over the last ten years. The 
list represents the key individual factors where excellent performance is expected 
which translates into overall excellent performance. It should be noted that the 
research itself included below is not solely UK based. 
Participants were provided with the following list in advance of the semi structured 
interview in order to prepare them and stimulate the interview. Participants were 
asked to keep these factors in mind during the interview, but were told that they 
could depart from them, or set them aside completely if they so wished. This freedom 
gave the participants a greater amount of control over the interviews than if they had 
been fully structured. The factors and questions are as follows: 
Table 3.2 Excellent performance factors 
Time performance (Yeung et al, 2008) 
 Time overall (Bassioni et al, 2004)
 Time predictability (Bassioni et al, 2004)
 Of design (Martin, 2004)
 Of construction (Martin, 2004)
Cost performance (Yeung et al, 2008) 
 Cost overall (Bassioni et al, 2004)
 Cost predictability (Bassioni et al, 2004)
 Of design (Martin, 2004)
 Of construction (Martin, 2004)
Quality performance (Yeung et al, 2008) 
 Conformance to specification (Yeung et al, 2008)
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 53 
 Functionality (Lam et al, 2007)
 Defects (Martin, 2004)
 Aesthetics (Lam et al, 2007)
Relationship (Chan et al, 2006) 
 Top management commitment (Yeung et al, 2008)
 Trust and respect (Yeung et al, 2008)
 Effective communications (Yeung et al, 2008)
 Claims & disputes (Lam et al, 2007)
 Professional image (Lam et al, 2007)
 Drug/alcohol test results (Crane et al, 1999)
 Team satisfaction (Lam et al, 2007)
 Cultural alignment (Chan et al, 2006)
Flexibility (Bassioni et al, 2004) 
 Impact upon customer business (Chan & Chan, 2004)
 Ability to manage ‘chaos’ from other sources (Lim & 
Mohamed, 1999)
Innovation (Yeung et al, 2008) 
 Learning demonstrated (Lam et al, 2007)
 Value management (Crane et al, 1999)
Health, Safety & Environment (Martin, 2004) 
 Health (Lam et al, 2007)
 Accident rate (Lam et al, 2007)
 Waste (Lam et al, 2007)
 Environmental complaints (Chan et al, 2006)
Source: developed for the purposes of this thesis 
3.4.4 Interview questions 
The following questions then loosely formed the structure of the interviews with 
respect to the factors in the table above: 
 How would you rank and weight the above performance factors when you are 
assessing the performance of your current (or selecting new) first-tier 
construction contractors? 
 How have you arrived at these factors? 
 What do you understand the semantic interpretations of these factors, which are 
most important to you, to actually be? 
 How would you assess performance against these factors for new and current 
contractors? 
 What would you consider excellent performance against these measures to look 
like? 
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The excellent performance factors themselves were developed from the previous 
research, as referenced. At the interview stage, it was made clear to the participants 
before the interview formally began that this framework should not be considered a 
boundary. Participants were encouraged to speak about the issues that really 
mattered to them rather than feel tied to the factors listed. The list was merely to 
give the participants a prompt, which was based upon academically tested previous 
research, should they require. They would also, however, possess the freedom to set 
aside the text and speak from the heart if they so wished (following Yin, 2003). 
The results of the interviews follow within the results and analysis chapter, chapter 4. 
However, the culmination of the interviews was a recommendation from each 
customer organization of the tier one contractor which provided the best example of 
excellent performance based upon the criteria important to each customer. The 
reason that this step was left until last and that the nominations for case studies were 
acquired in this way is that the exploratory research undertaken for this thesis is 
attempting to uncover whether a LO in the UK construction industry provides 
excellent performance through their processes. In order to understand whether this is 
the case, it was deemed necessary to first understand what excellent performance 
actually means to those who purchase from the construction industry. 
This approach has also been taken in order to give this research a practical 
application. Much of the research to date has been quite theoretical with little 
emphasis upon what is the business driver for being a LO. This research is focussed 
upon what the actual benefit to the customer is of seeking out and employing a LO, 
and how best to recognize such an organization. 
3.4.5 Interview procedure 
Each of the six customer representatives was interviewed once, with each interview 
lasting approximately fifty minutes. The interviews were conducted at the business 
premises of the client, which enabled some clients to show the author pieces of 
confidential information which could not otherwise have been viewed. Before 
commencing the recordings, two copies of the confidentiality statement were signed 
by both researcher and participant. One copy was retained for the participants’ own 
files and one copy remained in the possession of the researcher. 
In addition, it was made clear to the participants that the interview would be digitally 
recorded, transmitted to a third party transcriber and transcribed for my use. It was 
also made clear that no-one other than me, the participants and my thesis supervisor 
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would have sight of the transcription. Nor would the digital recording be made 
available to anyone but me and my thesis supervisor. The option was given to the 
participants to completely withdraw from the interview if they so wished at any point 
in the research process. 
The questions were posed largely as set out above, but given the freedom the author 
had given to the participants, many of the interviews quickly departed from the text. 
The issues that arose are noted in the results and analysis in chapter 4 . 
Furthermore, a broad question requesting any further points, opinions or questions 
surrounding excellent contractor performance was posed at the logical conclusion of 
each interview. This question occasionally yielded some further opinion and insight 
into customer views of their suppliers, which is also captured herein. 
Some questions were asked in a different order than set out in the list above due to 
the natural flow of the interview. This was not deemed to be an issue as the order in 
which the questions were posed was not considered to be a key element of the 
output. In addition, the author found himself answering almost as many questions as 
the participants. This was due to clarification issues, contextual issues, or the 
participant wishing to understand what the author felt represented best practice in 
the industry from the current literature. 
Where this latter scenario was the case, the author was careful to only put such input 
into the interview once all the interview areas had been covered so as not to bias the 
participants’ responses. This was handled by diverting such questions, as the author 
felt they might influence the participants’ responses, into an ‘any questions for the 
interviewer’ slot at the end of the interview. This in itself became an interesting 
discussion section which the author reviewed carefully to establish whether any 
useful statements which had not been ‘put in the participants’ mouths’ could be used 
in the research. 
Just before this section, the author allowed an open section of ‘any further points the 
participant wished to make’. This was to cover any further areas not covered by the 
questions but that were important to the participants. It also afforded the participants 
the opportunity to revisit or augment any comments made earlier in the interview. 
As soon as practical after the interview, the audio recording was transcribed and 
anonymized through the use of pseudonyms for the organizations named in the text. 
Copies of this text were then sent to the participant for review, potential alteration, 
and finally approval. No participants withdrew from their interviews, although some 
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made amendments to their transcripts to either remove business-sensitive data or to 
revise any estimations or approximations made during the original interviews. Such 
amendments were considered to be part of the ethical guidelines followed for 
participation and were not seen to detract from the quality of information obtained. 
3.5 Establishing a framework of LO processes 
Establishing a framework of LO processes was seen to be a step necessary for 
carrying out the case study work on the nominated contractors. The process followed 
was to use the framework of the LO as the basis for the case studies. The research 
then centred around attempting to identify and classify LO processes present within 
the excellent performing contractors. 
It was decided at the outset of the research that the framework for LO process was 
likely to come from the seminal work of Senge et al (1990, 1994) and the work that 
has followed from others. The framework would therefore be based upon the ‘five 
disciplines’ set out by Senge et al (1990, 1994), assuming that it could be reasonably 
mapped on the construction industry. 
The processes for examination were drawn from previous constructs utilized in recent 
research. Those processes are discussed in more detail in the literature review and 
data analysis chapters. The research is aimed at advancing the recent research from 
its current, positivist perspective which has looked mostly at statistical correlation 
relating business performance to questionnaire answers (c/f Bhatnagar, 2006; 
Garcia-Morales et al, 2007; Hsu & Pereira, 2006). The research herein reported 
comes from a post-positivist perspective to understand whether LO processes 
influence the organization’s performance from the point of view of the customer. 
It became clear during the literature research element of the herein reported studies 
that the model would indeed fit the industry. As can be seen from the literature 
chapter there appears not to be a vast amount of work on the LO in the construction 
industry. The research which has been done, however, has either followed Senge et 
al (1990, 1994) or has tried to depart from it and actually ended up merely 
enhancing it. Therefore, there was no real departure from the originally planned 
strategy for this element of the study. 
The questions used for the case studies developed from the literature research can be 
seen in Appendix B 
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3.6 Researching the nominated contractors 
3.6.1 Selection of Participants 
The sample population for this element of the research is the UK construction 
industry supply chain ‘main contractors’; although only those with whom the 
customer has direct contractual relationships. These are commonly referred to as first 
tier suppliers within the industry. The reason for this restriction is that part of the 
value added through the supply chain may come from the interactions between 
customer and supplier (Egan, 1998; 2002). Given the nomination approach to 
sampling from this population, this can therefore be deemed to be a snowball sample 
(Creswell, 2007). This sample was seen to follow logically from the purposive 
sampling used to identify the customer organizations. 
A snowball sample was deemed the most appropriate approach for this work as the 
author needed to identify the best performing contractors in the most convenient 
manner. It is accepted that snowball sampling has the potential to introduce bias, but 
given that only excellent performing contractors are required for this research, it was 
considered to be the most appropriate technique for this work (Flick, 2006). 
While it is accepted that sub-contractors will also add value to the customer, they 
were excluded from the population for the purposes of this study. This decision was 
taken for two reasons. Firstly, to focus the research on one level of business 
respondent. Secondly, it was anticipated that sub-contractors would be less likely to 
form strong relationships with the construction customer due to their general need to 
contract through the first tier contractors. 
Those main contractors nominated by the customers were examined through case 
studies to establish to what extent they were employing the LO processes noted 
earlier. The strategy of keeping to one level of participant – main contractors only – 
was seen to ensure that the level of influence of the participants was constant, thus 
increasing the rigour and trustworthiness of the data (Garcia-Morales et al, 2007). 
This approach was seen to parallel the customer interviews which were kept to one 
level of participant in the same way. 
It has been argued that each case study should be bound in time and place (Creswell, 
2007). As such, in this thesis, each case study was bound by the confines of the 
organization in question. Therefore, only individuals under the direct payroll of the 
main contractor being examined were chosen for interview. It was accepted that 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 58 
bounding in such a way assumed that the organization was a closed system (Burrell 
& Morgan, 2006). 
The contractors nominated by the customers were contacted and informed of the 
nature of the research and that they had been nominated as excellent performers. 
This was initially either done by the author or the nominating customer 
representative. The customers who made first contact generally did so because they 
were trying to emphasize their support for the research to the contractors. The 
telephone was chosen as first point of contact as it was considered more personal 
then e-mail and provided the opportunity to respond to any initial questions from the 
contractor. For each contractor, one or two key contact names were freely given by 
the nominating customer along with relevant contact details. 
The potential problems and ethical issues of gaining access to organizations for the 
purposes of conducting field research (Alcadipani & Hodgson, 2009) was noted. As 
such, the same process was followed for making contact with each organization. The 
potential ethical dilemma was that the contractors may have felt compelled to take 
part in the research due to the involvement of their customer. At all times the 
contractors were made aware that participation was entirely voluntary and that they 
could withdraw at any time without penalty. This was made explicit in the informed 
consent statement, a copy of which can be found in Appendix A. 
The initial telephone call to the contractor was followed up with an e-mail 
confirmation of the conversation and a copy of the research proposal paper written as 
part of this research study. This information was promised as part of the initial 
telephone conversation and it allowed the contractor to gain a full understanding of 
what the research was about and what it was trying to achieve. This e-mail was 
followed up with a further telephone call from the author to clarify any further 
questions and to gain confirmation of agreement to participate in the research. 
The actual participants for the case study interactions were senior members of the 
contracting organizations who work on the nominating customer’s programme. The 
reason for this choice was because the aim of the research was to identify those LO 
processes which impact upon the customer in question. It was further pertinent to 
understand whether they permeated the whole organization or were just unique to 
those particular customers’ service teams. In addition, it was seen to facilitate an 
understanding of the reality between what processes senior management were trying 
to put in place and what was the reality at the service delivery point. 
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There was a disruption to the contractor research during this engagement stage of 
the work. In the time between the customer interviews and the initial engagements 
the current recession started to impact upon the construction industry. All of the 
customers who were part of the research began to contract the size of their 
programmes of works in response to cost cutting measures required by their wider 
businesses. Such contraction in turn impacted upon the turnover and profitability of 
their first tier contractors to a greater or lesser extent depending upon what 
proportion of their business related to this one customer. In addition, given the 
market conditions, it was likely that other customers of these contractors also 
reduced their investment. 
There were impacts to an extent on all of the nominated contractors and all included 
in the research talked about the effects of the recession during the case studies. For 
example, all had to make redundancies and/or release consultant, contract and 
temporary staff. Whilst this information was not directly related to the study at the 
outset (the author obviously was unaware that such financial conditions would 
prevail), the ability to cope with the recession was commented upon. The methods 
used to cope with such disasters give an insight into the contractors’ abilities to 
scenario plan and cope with huge enforced flexing of workload. 
3.6.2 Case study procedure - generally 
In order to reduce the risk of bias, the research conducted for this thesis was always 
intended to be carried out on a range of organizations and/or alliances, but not at too 
in-depth a level. Yin (2003) provided guidance used as a starting point for the case 
study element of the research: interviews, documentation review and personal 
observation form the bulk of the research methods. The analysis of the case study 
material was on an embedded analysis basis, as suggested by Yin (2003). 
Carrying out multiple case studies across different organizations provided the case-
based themes, which was seen to give the research a greater credibility. By 
definition, the method was therefore one of a collective case study (Creswell, 2007), 
where several cases were brought to bear on a single issue. The potential problem 
here was that the study could become unwieldy and unmanageable. This problem 
was guarded against through good usage of thesis supervisors to ensure that the 
mass of data acquired did not become an exercise in quantity over quality; and 
through regular reviews of the thesis writing as it progressed. 
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The final procedure for the case studies assembled was based heavily around the 
process envisaged at the outset of the research. The following was the process put 
forward to each contractor in a second e-mail communication: 
 Digitally recorded semi structured interview with the CEO/principal of the 
organization – say one hour. 
 Digitally recorded semi structured interview with the lead customer (who 
nominated your organization) contact. This assumes that this is a different 
individual than the CEO/principal – say one hour. 
 Digitally recorded semi structured focus group with four professional members 
(e.g. project manager, designer, quantity surveyor, procurement) of the 
customer delivery team – say two hours. 
 Examination of your written processes and procedures – say one day. It was 
made clear that this element of the works would not impact upon their business 
operations. This step was deemed unnecessary due to the depth of the 
information gleaned from the interviews and the quality of the written information 
supplied during the visits to the contractors’ offices. 
 Observation of, and the opportunity to digitally record, one team meeting. During 
this meeting, the interactions between the business leaders were observed to 
establish how learning was exchanged informally within the organization. 
The timescales stated above were an important part of the overall strategy for two 
reasons. Firstly, the time available to devote to field research was limited by the fact 
that the author was in full time employment. Secondly, the people proposed for 
interview were likely to be busy and therefore unlikely to want to commit extensive 
time to the research when they needed to be running a business in a time of 
economic instability. 
The above time and process restrictions meant that a maximum of five visits were 
planned to each organization between February and November 2009. This meant 
maximum flexibility in arranging the visits which would allow them to be as 
convenient to each contractor as possible. The overall strategy was devised to 
balance the need to obtain research information with the need to make as minimum 
an impact as possible upon the contractors’ business. Such an approach was seen as 
more likely to receive acceptance of the research by the contractors. 
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The studies themselves took the form of embedded case studies (Yin, 2003). An 
embedded study was seen to be where the case study subject was not analyzed as 
an entire entity, but individual areas were studied separately with the potential to link 
the findings at a later stage. This approach was chosen due to the need to examine 
several individual units of analysis within an organization, such as the management 
team, the commercial team, and the project management team. The expected 
outcome was to identify key issues around the LO framework within each case and to 
understand common processes which transcended the individual cases and embedded 
studies. 
A further source of data discovered for the case studies was process documentation 
(Flick, 2006, Silverman, 2006; Yin, 2003). Official documentation detailing any LO 
processes was the easiest to find, but the most revealing documentation was that 
which supported the day-to-day delivery model. Items such as historic client 
feedback forms, client workload allocation and internal organizational charts can all 
demonstrate how the organization has evolved its service to the client. It can then be 
established to what extent this evolution has been in line with model LO 
development. 
3.6.3 Case Study Process - detail 
The detailed process for carrying out the case studies themselves was developed 
from Yin (2003). The five steps decided upon were as follows. The first element was a 
semi-structured interview with the principal of the nominated business. This interview 
was designed to gain an understanding of the workings of the organization from the 
perspective of the person at the top. It was accepted that in some cases, particularly 
very large organizations, it was not always possible to gain access to the principal for 
the purposes of the study. Where this was the case, the most senior person possible 
was interviewed. 
It is accepted that this does introduce the potential problem that having slightly 
differing levels of participant might introduce unevenness into the research. The 
author has attempted to guard against this as much as possible by approaching as 
senior a person as possible. Given that these individuals are all at or near the top of 
their respective organization charts, they should all be able to articulate the overall 
business vision relatively well. Given that the organizations in question are excellent 
performers, the author does not consider this too unsound an assumption to make. 
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The second step was a semi-structured interview with the main point of contact for 
the contractor team which dealt with the nominating customer. This was done to 
establish the link between the views from the strategic head of the organization and 
those of the strategic head of the customer delivery. The third step was a focus group 
with the customer delivery team. For this, the organization nominated individuals to 
be part of that group. Recognizing that such a method had the opportunity to create 
a biased response, a preferred cross section of individuals was suggested to the 
organization. This cross section included a project manager, a quantity surveyor and 
a designer – with other professions being optional, but with a preferred maximum of 
five in total. The fourth step was the observation of the same team (and possibly 
others) in a normal meeting which focused upon the nominating customer. This 
meeting was recorded with the permission of the team. The fifth step was an 
examination of relevant organizational documentation to establish a contextual 
background to the discussions based upon the common writings within the 
organization. 
In reality, all of steps one to three and five were carried out in all six contractor 
organizations, but only two organizations were able to accommodate step four. Given 
the relatively low level of new information gleaned from step four within the two 
organizations which could accommodate, this was not viewed as a major weakness in 
the research. 
3.6.4 Case study procedure - questions 
Case study interviews were originally intended to be conducted around three question 
groups: Gateway, Lead and Lag. Gateway questions were used to examine what 
processes existed within the organization in the opinion of the participant. They 
followed the format of: “What is your process/policy/procedure for achieving x?” This 
allowed an understanding of whether, even if the processes existed in written form, 
employees were aware of them and used them. Lead questions examined the nature 
of the processes themselves and sought to understand how these various processes 
actually worked. Lag questions seek to understand what are the observed effects of 
these processes. These questions are along the lines of “How does this process 
improve your performance in the area of x?”. Gateway, lead and lag questions are 
standard research procedure for the author in his employment and have proven to be 
an excellent technique in gaining an understanding of an issue or process. 
Note that these questions were all open, so as to draw out not only facts but also 
opinion and insight. Use of the word ‘why?’ was avoided unless absolutely necessary. 
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The wording of question can draw a defensive response rather than a constructive 
one. Yin (2003) gives guidance on this and other issues for carrying out a best 
practice semi structured interview and this guidance was used as a basis for the case 
study interviews. Views garnered from this line of investigation differed and provided 
a tapestry of insight into the workings of the organizations. 
However, once the literature review had been completed, it became clear that 
examining the LO elements from this three question depth would be too onerous for a 
single study. As can be seen below, the questions finally settled upon for the case 
studies were sufficiently open to give depth around the existence, operation and 
effect of the organizational processes. Had each of these questions been asked 
specifically in three parts, the interviews and focus groups would have become too 
unwieldy to manage. 
The questions asked in the semi structured interviews and focus groups were based 
around the Senge et al (1990, 1994) LO model and were as follows: 
Mental Models 
 How are employees encouraged to experiment within their service delivery to 
customers? 
 What is the organization’s process for evaluating and implementing new 
employee ideas? 
 What planning for potential upcoming scenarios is undertaken by the 
organization? 
 What is the organization’s innovation strategy? 
Personal Mastery 
 How are employees encouraged to commit to lifelong learning within this 
organization? 
 What support is available to those who do commit to lifelong learning? 
 How can, and do, employees raise any problem issues from their perspective and 
implement solutions within this organization? 
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Shared Vision 
 To what extent is there coherence between organizational goals and individual 
employee needs? 
 How is the organization’s vision kept up to date? 
 How do employees’ create internal networks or communities of practice? 
 How is leadership demonstrated by employees other than senior managers? 
Team Learning 
 How does the organization motivate employees to share tacit knowledge and 
create explicit knowledge? 
 What systems has the organization put in place to aid assist employees with 
knowledge sharing? 
 How does the organization import learning and experiences from outside the 
organization by learning from other organizations and industries? 
 How is the usefulness of internal meetings assessed with respect to what is being 
learned that can improve the business? 
Systems Thinking 
 How does the organization exploit the interconnections between processes and 
departments to improve the way the organization operates? 
 How do you ensure that individual roles and responsibilities within the 
organization are aligned to the overall business vision? 
 What learning loops are in place within the organization to ensure that lessons 
learned become implemented in service delivery? 
 What is the procedure for implementing business or process change/improvement 
within the organization? 
 To what extent is there coherence between the formal organizational structure 
and informal culture? 
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 How does the organization flex when confronted with changes in the business 
environment? 
 How is benchmarking and measurement deployed to improve the way the 
organization operates? 
The above questions were used during the interviews with the contractors’ 
CEO/chairman and the main customer point of contact. They were also used during 
the focus groups with the customer delivery team. The reason for the use of the 
same questions throughout was that the author wished to understand whether the 
processes being discovered truly permeated the organization. Furthermore, it was 
necessary to understand whether all members of the organization experienced the 
processes in the same way. In other words; whether the processes which 
organizational leaders professed as contributory factors to the organization’s 
excellent performance operated in reality. 
Gaining an understanding of the processes at these three levels allowed the author to 
create a framework for excellent performing contractors based upon what actually 
occurred within these organizations. This understanding was opposed to any model 
which might have been developed from their leaders’ potentially idealized views of 
the workings of the organization. The idealized view of the LO has already been 
written by Senge et al (1990, 1994) and others and remains an aspirational target. 
This research provides the reality of the current best practice model for the LO in the 
UK construction industry. 
3.6.5 Case study procedure - critique 
It is an accepted criticism that the approach of doing multiple case studies dilutes the 
depth of knowledge which can be obtained (Creswell, 2007). This criticism is 
defensible within the realm of this study as a great depth of knowledge about each 
case in itself is not considered critical to understanding the processes at work. What 
was required was saturation of understanding about what the LO processes at work 
are and how they influenced excellent performance to the customer. 
The aim of this research was not to provide an exhaustive insight into one particular 
organization’s implementation of the processes. Rather, it was to provide an overview 
of what LO processes were prevalent in excellent performing contractors and how 
they might be implemented by others to improve the performance of the industry in 
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general. In addition, the themes identified in the case studies were related to the 
literature which enriched the data and provided a framework for interpretation. 
Case study research has been criticized for lack of scientific rigour (Yin, 2003) and 
this can been seen in some of the contemporary research on the subject area. 
Savolainen & Haikonen’s (2007) work on Six Sigma and organizational learning’s 
effect on organizational performance purports to be case study work. It, however, 
lacks much insight within the article into the methodology and data behind the 
conclusions drawn. By contrast, the research herein reported provides as great an 
insight as possible given the restrictions of time, money and research methods. 
Semi structured interviews (Flick, 2006; Silverman, 2006) form the largest part of 
the contractor case studies, carried out from a phenomenological perspective 
(Creswell, 2007). By phenomenological is meant gaining an understanding of several 
individuals’ experience of working within their organization. The reason for this 
perspective was to obtain qualitative data from several individuals within each 
organization who have first hand experience of working with their service delivery 
processes. 
The intention was to establish, insofar as was possible, the reality of the extent to 
which organizations employ LO processes. This approach of bracketing out a single 
phenomenon and acquiring several individuals’ understandings of it in order for the 
researcher to understand the nature of the phenomenon can be more specifically 
described as transcendental phenomenology (Cresswell, 2007). Transcendental 
methodology includes reducing the research into significant statements and then 
combining them into themes. 
3.7 Data coding and analysis - NVIVO 
The qualitative analytical tool, NVIVO, was employed to code the data based upon the 
categories noted previously. The author could then more easily look for significant 
statements and recurring themes therein. This information could then be subdivided 
to give a textural (what is being experienced with respect to LO processes) and 
structural (how are the processes being experienced situationally and contextually) 
understanding of the individuals’ experiences. 
At the outset of the research, it was not assumed that the data collected would 
triangulate and support the same conclusions. Whilst data convergence was 
anticipated, there was the possibility that the evidence uncovered from the various 
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data sources would be divergent. This was an issue that the author considered at an 
early stage and was ready to deal with as the research progressed. 
The underlying strategy for the coding and analysis of the data was that of using the 
current theory to provide the framework (Flick, 2006; Yin, 2003) in a deductive 
approach. As can be seen from the areas of questioning, there already exists a 
theoretical model about the potential processes which influence performance taken 
largely from Senge et al (1990, 1994) and subsequent research stemming from this 
seminal work. Yin (2003) states that perhaps the most difficult elements of the case 
study approach are the coding and analysis of the data collected. As such, he 
proposed a simple initial approach taken from Miles & Huberman (1994) which 
contains six steps to get the data into order for further analysis to take place. It 
involves putting the data into different arrays and then creating a matrix of 
categories within which to place the various data collected. 
The theoretical headings which were used to formulate the interviews form the basis 
of the data analysis matrix and flowcharts. The data collected through the case study 
research was coded into the headings discussed in the literature review section. This 
approach allowed a code to be developed before commencement of the field research 
itself. In addition, such an approach helped keep a consistent framework running 
through the work. A deductive approach was chosen over an inductive approach for 
several reasons: firstly, given that the hypothesis was to test the presence of what 
was already a relatively well researched phenomenon in industries outside 
construction, it was felt that in order that this thesis could provide a level of 
comparison for the operation of the LO model in construction against other industries. 
Secondly, this thesis was based upon a theoretical discussion between the researcher 
and one of the participant customer organizations and therefore the research herein 
reported started with a theory and a hypothesis as its starting point. 
It is accepted that part of the field research behind this thesis involves the 
observation of the operation of processes within the subject organizations, and 
therefore there is an argument that an inductive research methodology would have 
been an equally valid approach. An inductive approach does have the advantage of 
being open ended and allowing greater exploratory freedom, but was rejected based 
upon the lack of key advantages, set out in the paragraph above, which a deductive 
approach provides. 
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The risk with taking a deductive ‘pre-coding’ approach, however, was that the author 
may try to shoehorn data into one of the LO process headings rather than accept 
early on that there may be other factors at work (Yin, 2003). This risk was reduced 
by the fact that the theoretical framework was partly based upon existing research 
which already suggested the existence of the processes under study (Bhatnagar, 
2006; Garcia-Morales et al, 2007; Skerlavaj et al, 2006). Following the establishment 
of a theoretical framework, the key categories were then placed into flowcharts and 
interdependency matrices and the frequency of occurrences of these themes could be 
mapped onto these charts. 
NVIVO was used as the primary case study database as much of the data collected 
was qualitative in nature. NVIVO lent itself to easy coding and recoding as necessary 
as the data were collected. The bulk of the qualitative data were the interview 
transcripts and documentation, which could be coded relatively easily. Therefore the 
content of NVIVO was coded not only by the subject headings noted earlier, but by 
the source of the information itself. This aided efforts to triangulate the data collected 
within the theoretical framework. 
Yin (2003) states that the database is an often ignored element of case study 
research which provides the background evidential data for the final report. In 
addition, the principle of being able to provide a chain of evidence which can be 
followed by anyone reading this work is adhered to as NVIVO allowed all data for this 
thesis to be visibly coded and linked (Flick, 2006; Silverman, 2006). Using NVIVO to 
provide this chain gives this thesis more visible credibility when read. Credibility is 
another key criticism of case study research (Yin, 2003) and the good documentation 
of the processes and research material should allow someone else to replicate this 
research should they so choose. 
The author must also accept that research bias is inevitable within this work. The 
author takes the position that it is impossible to be completely objective about all 
aspects of the research. In addition, the mere fact that a researcher interacts with 
individuals during interviews and focus groups may mean that they are influenced in 
some way. This influence may be seen to be particularly evident as the interviews are 
not conducted in a fully structured paradigm (Flick, 2006; Silverman, 2006). The aim 
of this aspect of the research is always to remain as independent from the subjects 
under study as possible. 
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3.8 Research design and approach leading into data collection and 
analysis 
The following chapters describe the data collection and analysis of the two stages of 
the research – the customer interviews and the contractor case studies. These will 
give the reader the practical application perspective of the research design described 
in this chapter. 
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4 Data Analysis and Discussion – The Customer 
Interviews 
4.1 Introduction 
Understanding what excellent construction contractor performance is from the 
perspective of the customer is an important area when attempting to improve the 
industry as a whole. Given that customers fund all works within the industry, it is 
important to keep abreast of what they expect from their first tier contractors. 
Previous works have largely centred around the achievement of quantitative KPIs and 
on the 'golden triangle' of quality, time and cost (Wang & Huang, 2006). In addition, 
much of the previous research has concentrated on large projects; whereas it is as 
important to understand excellent performance on a long running programme of 
works. Gaining such an understanding at programme level will inform contractors 
what ought to be their targets for continuous improvement over the lifetime of the 
programme. 
This chapter analyses what excellent first tier contractor performance looks like and 
identifies who is the provider. It details the findings of the customer interviews, and 
reflects these against the previous research. The last section discusses the 
culmination of the interviews, which was the nomination of those six contractors, one 
from each customer, who demonstrated excellent performance. 
4.2 Defining excellent first tier contractor performance 
This element of the research is divided into those factors which are minimum 
performance requirements to prevent customer dissatisfaction and those which are 
excellent or differentiating and create customer satisfaction.  
The factors have been divided by sections based upon the original framework used 
for the interviews. The analysis in each section demonstrates where this research 
either departs from, or enriches, the previous research reported in the literature. The 
overall aim of the data analysis in this chapter is to produce a relatively generic 
framework of excellent contractor performance based upon the views of the customer 
organizations interviewed. The original framework is retained to make the process of 
allocating the results in themes simple to understand (following Yin, 2003). 
Whilst the themes themselves remain as the framework set out from some of the 
previously reported research, it will be argued that the perspectives and the depth 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 71 
beneath the themes helps create a new paradigm. The results are this way grounded 
in the previous research, but extend and renew the thinking around these positions. 
This grounding in previous research improves the credibility of the study (following 
Yin, 2003). 
4.2.1 Minimum requirements of contractor performance 
4.2.1.1 Time performance 
Yeung et al (2008: 282) explores a highly complex set of quantitative analyses to 
reach the conclusion that time performance is a ‘variation of actual completion time 
expressed as a percentage of finally agreed completion time’. Martin (2004) too 
emphasizes the predictability of time as being the key performance element under 
the banner of ‘time’. 
Whether a programme focuses greatly upon time of output depends upon the 
customer's changing internal drivers. The strongest example of the importance of 
delivery time came from the customer from the retail market who suggested that 
having retail outlets open (or reopen) on time was of paramount importance. 
Opening or re-opening on time was of particular pertinence at the Christmas period 
where loss of sales could potentially be huge from a late completed project. 
Customers interviewed for the research herein reported wanted the certainty that the 
handover date would be achieved, but were also interested in projects being 
delivered ahead of time. Some customers were happy with such an outcome as long 
as they could then make use of their premises and/or gain a financial return out of an 
early delivered project. An early handover of the project for a retailer was viewed as 
a bonus as this translated into extra sales. Washington’s Property Director stated: 
“…suppliers that bring in the developments before time and assuming that 
quality and everything else is correct are pretty well regarded for doing 
that, if you can gain an extra sales week…” 
In addition, they needed to be kept informed of an early delivery date well in advance 
in order to be able to take advantage of that new date. Given such a customer 
perspective, it may be argued that although the compliance with an end date was 
seen to be required performance, consistently beating it, whilst keeping the customer 
informed, was viewed as excellent performance. 
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What emerges in this thesis and may be seen to extend the work of Yeung et al 
(2008) is that customers who stated that time was the key output actually welcomed 
time variation, in terms of achieving completion before the agreed time. Therefore, it 
may be argued that the key measure of performance was a combination of time 
predictability and reduction in delivery time. 
The research participants in the herein reported study also placed time as being the 
key output delivery factor ahead of cost and quality as customers were realizing the 
opportunity cost and potential gain of time saved in the construction process. This 
perspective also may be seen to extend Yeung et al’s (2008) work which appeared to 
focus upon the construction as the end in itself. It is here argued that a more 
commercially informed position is one which focuses upon a wider understanding of 
the impact on the customer’s business following the construction project. Time as a 
key performance element is therefore confirmed as a minimum performance output 
(of varying importance) by the customers interviewed for the purposes of this thesis.  
4.2.1.2 Cost performance 
Yeung et al’s (2008) research suggests that they key deliverable for cost performance 
is performance against original budget, as was concluded with time performance. 
Specifically he concludes that it is the metric of actual cost of a project as a 
percentage of the agreed price. Lam et al’s (2007) perspective is a little narrower 
being the completion of the project within the original budget. 
Again, capital cost was raised as an output deliverable by the customers interviewed 
for the research herein reported. The key difference found within this research was 
that performance against a budget was not always the key deliverable from the 
customers’ perspective. Customers interviewed did make the point that predictability 
of cost was a requirement for their measurement against how their projects had 
performed within their KPI suite. However, when actually selecting contractors, 
lowest cost was the key driver, due to the construction department being ‘managed 
by the accounting department’. The ‘lowest capital cost’ driver does demonstrate a 
slight duality in the performance suite. Given the results of the research herein 
reported largely aligning with the recent research (Chan, 2006; Lam et al, 2007; 
Yeung et al, 2008) it is not proposed to examine this element of performance further 
as there is little extension or augmentation available from the interviews undertaken 
for the research reported in this thesis.  
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Two points, however, were repeatedly made during the interviews. First, 
predictability of cost was important at project level to ensure funding was managed 
well within the customer organization. Second, the key driver at programme level 
was often cost reduction to ensure that a predictable saving could be tracked and 
returned to the business at points in the programme. These two points extend the 
recent research on the strength that the participants were discussing programmes of 
works rather than projects. 
4.2.1.3 Quality of product 
Lam et al (2007) describes quality as the degree to which the project’s established 
requirements of materials and workmanship are met. He also suggests that quality 
can be expressed in terms of compliance with technical specification, function and 
appearance. Martin (2004) expresses quality, at least partially, as the project’s 
freedom from defects and minimization of the impact of any defects upon the 
customer. 
Number of defects at handover point was perhaps the most consistent ‘output’ 
measure mentioned by the participants interviewed for the study reported in this 
thesis. It appears that the defect measure was important because all aspired to the 
position of having zero defects at handover point. However, from the interviews it 
appeared as if none of the customers was achieving such an outcome on their 
programme. It may be argued that such underachievement may be seen as likely to 
be due to the unpredictable nature of construction projects and the continuing issue 
that projects were not constructed under anything like controlled conditions. 
The aspiration of zero defects was indeed a useful goal for driving behaviours and 
was clearly at the forefront of construction customers’ minds during the interviews. 
The likelihood of achieving zero defects on a programme of construction works, 
however, was in their collective opinion, highly unlikely. What would, however, set an 
excellent performer out from other first tier contractors would be an organization that 
did not have defects caused by making the same mistake more than once. 
Interestingly, none of the customers interviewed currently measured their defects by 
the business impact of those defects. Although customers did confess that such 
impact would be perhaps the most important perspective on defects from their 
business’s position. Miami’s Property Director commented: 
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“…what we should probably do is say… I don’t know, if one snag, was the 
front door wasn’t there that would probably be more important than fifty 
snags you couldn’t see if you were a customer.” 
It was seen not to be done this way because of the difficulty of acquiring data to 
support a quantitative measure. Defects were generally measured by number and 
time to rectify by all participants interviewed. Whilst number and time outcomes were 
easier to measure it was unlikely to give the business the visibility of how they were 
affected by defects. 
It may be argued that such a disconnect was an interesting extension to Martin’s 
(2004) work given the later discussion in this chapter about excellent performers 
really understanding their customers’ businesses. It was discussed in the interviews 
that an excellent performer would make a deliberate attempt to avoid one defect that 
would impact negatively upon their customer’s business. If such avoidance was done 
at the expense of two very minor defects, an ironic result would be the contractor 
incurring a worse KPI score for an intelligent action designed to protect the 
customer’s business. Exploring such disconnects between popular KPIs and what 
genuinely matters to the customer’s business was beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but needs to be borne in mind when establishing the true nature of excellent 
contractor performance. 
4.2.1.4 Health, safety & environmental considerations; through employee 
health and site accident rate, reduction of waste and reduction of 
environmental complaints 
Chan & Chan (2004) discussed excellent performance in health and safety as the 
completion of a project without major accidents or injuries. He noted the limitation in 
the industry standard method of measurement. Calculating accident rates required an 
accurate record of the number of accidents and the number of workers engaged on 
the project or programme. Such rates were seen as difficult to obtain where a 
complicated sub-contracting system and a rapid flow of labour prevailed. 
Lam et al (2007) suggested that excellent performance for waste reduction could be 
identified by the difference between the amount of the total delivery of materials to 
the site and the amount of work completed. This metric appeared to be one of the 
more popular metrics used to measure waste in construction amongst the several 
employed across the industry. The finding was seen to be consistent with Chan et al’s 
(2006) position of demonstrating excellent performance through the reduction of 
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environmental complaints. Such complaints may be driven through the generation of 
excess waste. 
Again, those customers interviewed for the research herein reported viewed these 
elements as minimum requirements. Many of them were now legal requirements for 
compliance, although customers may put more stringent compliance requirements on 
their contractors than were required by law due to their own internal policies. Such 
requirements tended to be the case in the environmental element rather than the 
health and safety element, possibly due to the already very tight health and safety 
regulations (CDM Regulations) already in force in the industry. 
The elements of environmental complaints and waste reduction were discussed 
during the interviews, although not to the extent anticipated. Environmental 
complaints were generally considered from the perspective of the customer 
organizations’ own customers rather than the general public. In some cases these 
two groups were broadly the same. The key issue to the customers was again 
generally tied up in their contractors' understanding of their business, discussed later 
herein, rather than any quantitative measure. 
Waste reduction was only really discussed by one of the customers, which was a 
surprise, given that the customer organizations interviewed were known to have a 
waste reduction policy. The opinion was offered that in the future all listed companies 
will have to report figures against carbon impact as well as financial expenditure. One 
analysis of the lack of discussion of the waste issue was that it had now become such 
a ‘given’ for all organizations to need to reduce waste due to media and popular 
pressure, that it was almost at the point where there was no need for such specific 
discussion between contracting organizations. This view may explain why such a 
seemingly important aspect of contractor performance was not brought up during the 
interviews. 
From the analysis of interviews for this thesis, there was seen to be little, therefore, 
to extend the previous research in this area. 
4.2.1.5 An absence of claims & disputes 
Lam et al (2007) and Chan et al (2006) most recently placed a lack of disputes as 
being an indicator of excellent performance. In fact Chan et al (2006) suggests that 
such absence was a perceived benefit of using the partnering route to construction 
contracting. He noted that having researched various sectors of the industry, the one 
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(infrastructure) which used partnering most extensively was perceived as having the 
fewest disputes. He did not, however, define a dispute within his paper. 
Claims and disputes were stated as not recognized or not experienced by the 
participants interviewed for the research reported in this thesis. It was not that 
disputes were dismissed out of hand; rather it would appear from the interviews that 
good communication may have replaced the need for dispute and litigation in these 
customers’ large programmes of works. First tier contractors who preferred a litigious 
route to deal with contractual and project problems were not welcome members of 
their supply chains. Other customers did not mention claims or disputes at all. Such 
reticence may allude to there being an absence of disputes and claims, but does not 
really touch upon the level and effectiveness of communication. 
It may therefore be argued that this later finding may be seen to extend Chan et al’s 
(2006) work in that claims and disputes, once common in the industry, have moved 
through decline and to the point where they may now be seen to be the exception 
rather than the rule with the biggest customers. 
4.2.2 Differentiators and demonstrators of excellent performance 
4.2.2.1 Excellent relationships; through top management commitment 
Yeung et al’s (2008) perspective that key performance may be shown by the 
percentage of top management attendance in partnering meetings may be extended. 
From the interviews conducted for the study herein reported, it was difficult to see 
how Yeung et al’s (2008) measure demonstrated excellent performance. Wang & 
Huang (2006) advanced his research from a Chinese perspective where top 
management relationships (or guanxi in Chinese culture) were of paramount 
importance to the perception of success in construction. 
Percentage of management attending was seen to be an easily measurable metric, 
although having people in a room may not demonstrate commitment in the way it 
was described in the interviews for the study reported in this thesis. Attendees at 
meetings may not be committed, they may be disruptive in terms of trying to impose 
their views, or disinterested in terms of not demonstrating a cognitive and/or an 
emotional attachment. Therefore having the wrong type of people at top 
management level may actually remove effective performance from a contractor's 
delivery offering. 
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Top management commitment was discussed during interviews as an intangible 
quality provided by the better contractors which was not measured in any clear way. 
Washington’s Property Director asserted: 
“…top management commitment, absolutely, crucially important. If we can’t 
have a relationship with the principle director of that company…then quite 
simply it’s just not going to work…” 
The research reported herein uncovered the need to purchase first tier contractor 
management capability as part of the overall package provided. Customers saw such 
commitment as adding value through the management of practical delivery and 
planning. In such a delivery model the responsibility for the delivery of the 
programme rested with the first tier contractors rather than the customer. It may be 
argued that such an approach will require a greater deal of first tier contractor 
management commitment than if they were simply delivering projects which were 
allocated to them by the customer. 
This argument may then be seen to extend Wang & Huang’s (2006) position, even 
accepting that Wang & Huang’s (2006) position was from a different cultural 
background. Relationships and top management commitment did indeed appear to be 
key excellent performance indicators. Furthermore, top management need to bring 
not only commitment but also expertise for tangible benefits to accrue. 
4.2.2.2 Excellent relationships; through emotional intelligence 
Butler & Chinowsky (2006) sets the position that Emotional Intelligence (EI) and 
effective business leadership in the construction industry are positively correlated, 
and a model for EI is proposed. The model suggests five areas which leaders need to 
be proficient at in order to demonstrate high EI; these are: interpersonal skills, 
intrapersonal skills, adaptability, stress management, and general moods. Given that 
the work of Butler & Chinowsky (2006) is set in the construction sector, the model for 
EI used within this thesis will reflect this model. 
EI was raised as a major differentiator between first tier contractors in terms of 
management commitment. Miami’s Property Director identified those contractors who 
treated the programme of works given to them as merely as “…just another income 
stream…” and those who were seen to have an “…emotional engagement to what 
Miami stand for”. One customer suggested that similar engagement was one of the 
roots of first tier contractors understanding of what they want as a customer. 
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Furthermore, such engagement was seen to be a key input factor in creating 
excellent performance as the contractor could align themselves to delivering what the 
customer required from their overall service delivery package. It was considered that 
a less than excellent contractor would tend towards providing a standard service 
based upon what they were used to doing for other customers. 
Stating an emotional attachment as a differentiator between contractors was seen to 
be an interesting perspective as it suggested an emotional commitment was being 
made by the contractor’s management. Such commitment was seen to be an 
extremely difficult element to measure but emerged from the experience the 
customer had in dealing with the contractor. Given the emphasis that the participant 
placed upon their point during the interview, it was clear that such commitment was 
clearly something they were looking for in their first tier contractors. 
4.2.2.3 Excellent relationships; through trust and respect 
Yeung et al’s (2008) understanding of trust and respect was measured using a Likert 
scale of satisfaction scores. Chan et al (2006) noted trust and respect as being a 
critical success factors in a construction partnering environment. He suggested that 
trust was critical for commencing a project or programme with a reasonable budget 
and programme. Ngowi & Pienaar (2005) noted the link between the level of trust in 
a construction relationship and the level of co-operation or competition undertaken 
by the parties. 
Participants in the study reported in this thesis were noting an increasing ability to 
trust their first tier contractors with the delivery of the programme. In addition, they 
were becoming trusted to comply with key outputs without the need for customer 
intervention. For one participant, trust was seen to be a key element of excellent 
contractor performance. This participant was the same customer who stated that he 
was starting to impart trust to his first tier suppliers to deal directly with his own 
stakeholders on his behalf. Excellent performance in the trust area had removed a 
potentially wasteful communication step, thereby adding value to all parties. 
It may be argued, therefore, that the research reported in this thesis may be seen to 
extend the recent research where trust reaches the point of customers not needing to 
examine and/or interfere in the delivery provided by their contractors. Trust and 
respect were seen to be what excellent performing contractors shared with the 
customer when the customer knew that his programme of works would be delivered 
without the need to worry. Oakland’s Property Director stated: 
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“Excellent performance to me is almost about not having to worry about 
whether those things [project delivery] are done.” 
4.2.2.4 Excellent relationships; through effective communications 
Yeung et al (2008) asserts that excellent communication is a requirement of excellent 
performance, suggesting a Likert scale measure of key stakeholders’ opinions of the 
effectiveness to differentiate contractor performance. Similarly, Chan et al (2006) 
suggests that effective communication is a primary strategic weapon in countering 
problems. He argues that the better communication that comes with a partnering 
approach helps to avoid disputes and contributes towards making partnering a more 
dispute free vehicle than traditional construction procurement. 
Participants in the study reported in this thesis discussed performance improvements 
being a function of good dialogue between customer and contractor. They spoke of 
the detailed engagement required to establish long term development plans with 
their first tier contractors in order to achieve the goals of both organizations. Creating 
a formal alliance with their first tier contractors was seen to involve communication at 
many levels. Further, some participants stated that there was a need to engage with 
their first tier contractors as soon as possible in the project process regardless of the 
level of communication at the programme level. 
Some participants further stated that effective and consistent communication was 
taken for granted within these construction relationships. In fact, many of the 
comments made about poor performers appeared to centre on the issue of 
communication. To some customers, the ability of the contractor to listen was a big 
differentiator between excellent performers and the rest. Miami’s Property Director 
suggested: 
“[poor performers] think they know what I want and say ‘yeah yeah yeah, 
we’re listening to you’ but they’re not really…” 
Ability to listen was an interesting perspective that appears not to have been 
discussed in depth in previous literature. The finding also strongly alludes to two way 
communication being a real differentiator, whereas previous research has tended to 
focus more upon how the contractor transmits messages to the customer. 
Through excellent communication, excellent performing contractors were seen to 
show an aptitude for quickly understanding and aligning themselves behind the 
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message coming from their customer. As stated earlier, the output priorities may 
change (often from between quality, time and cost) through the life of a programme 
of construction works depending upon the needs of the customer. 
Assuming that the customer was informed from a construction perspective and was 
able to articulate the message about what was important to them, the excellent 
performer was seen to be able to pick up that message and deliver accordingly. The 
excellent performing contractor was as much about customers giving the correct 
message as the contractor themselves interpreting that message. Other customers 
had stated annoyance at contractors who joined their supply chain and tried almost 
to dictate what should be important to the customer rather than listening to that 
message. It may be argued that such an outcome may again be seen to allude to the 
importance of two way communication. 
One element of communication from contractor to customer which was seen to 
emerge as an indicator of excellent performance was the propensity to challenge the 
customer organization to improve what they were doing. Washington’s Property 
Director stated that contractors who acted as ‘yes men’ when the customer was 
making an obvious error were not excellent performers, adding:  
The ones that have got the balls to stand up and say ‘actually 
Washington that’s wrong, you’re doing that wrong, that’s stupid, that’s 
building cost in’. The ones that simply just do what we say we don’t 
place a huge amount of value in that…  
Lack of assertion was seen to be distinct from dictating what was important to the 
customer; it was seen to be more along the lines of acting as a consultant to help the 
customer deliver what was important without making a mistake whilst so doing. The 
finding again highlights the importance of a link between top management 
relationships and open and trusting communication. 
From the interviews, it appeared that communication between customer and 
contractor had moved from being a vehicle for avoiding negatives such as disputes 
(Chan et al, 2006) to a proactive vehicle to provide consultancy. The view of more 
enlightened customers of ‘contractor as consultant’ was mirrored by the contractors. 
In the contractor case studies the point was made that the ‘old order’ of the Architect 
receiving most deference from the customer and the contractor receiving almost 
none was long gone. 
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4.2.2.5 Excellent relationships; through attitude and cultural alignment 
Lam et al (2007) talks about satisfaction being a primary success criterion in terms of 
the happiness of the project participants. Lam et al’s (2007) position extends across 
all stakeholders from the customer to the subcontractors. Chan et al (2006) refers to 
a commitment to a ‘win-win’ attitude, but also refers to the commercial pressure 
which can compromise such a partnering attitude between customer and contractor. 
Such satisfaction or attitude in itself was not raised in the interviews for this thesis. 
What was uncovered from Oakland was that excellent performing contractors possess 
a ‘commitment to constant dissatisfaction’ as indicated by the Property Director: 
“…I’d also expect them to be committed to constant dissatisfaction; this idea 
that they may do a great job tomorrow, how can I do it better the day 
after?”  
This comment suggests that satisfaction is viewed by customers today as a journey 
with perhaps no ultimate destination. One participant made it clear that excellent 
contractors are those who know that no matter how well they have done something, 
they should always be dissatisfied with it and look to perform better next time. This is 
not to suggest that customers wish their supply chain members to be unhappy in 
themselves. 
One key observation here is that the perspective of the customer of satisfaction is 
that of 'programme outputs' which differs from Lam et al’s (2007) position of 
satisfaction being happiness in the job. It is entirely possible that the two are one and 
the same, but further investigation of such a link is beyond the scope of this 
research. It does however suggest that attitude towards performance itself is another 
element which customers are now looking at when considering excellent 
performance. Such a view takes a step further from Chan et al’s (2006) ‘win-win’ 
perspective, taking it more toward the tangible. It is not viewed as customers only 
wanting to work with first tier contractors who are the same as them in their outlook 
to business, but clearly it can help. There are several key attributes which have been 
mentioned during the interviews: a strong sense of integrity, the desire to create 
transparency in terms of their performance and their business, commitment to 
constant dissatisfaction, a strong desire to learn from other people, and an ingrained 
culture of relationship building. 
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On the cultural side, Chan et al’s (2006) position is that partnering for construction 
excellence relies partly upon a shared culture and approach to business without 
organizational boundaries. His proposal is that these should be brought out at initial 
partnering workshops which are likely to go smoother if the correct contractors are 
selected to begin with. He goes on to state that the whole industry needs to develop 
a better culture to focus upon delivering continuous value improvement. Kagioglou et 
al (2001) takes internal contractor cultural change as assessed through employee 
feedback as an internal performance success factor, but does not link it back to the 
customer’s culture. 
The customers who organize their first tier contractors into an alliance delivery route 
mention the desire to learn and relationship building consistently. These customers 
understand that their first tier contractors are part of a community, or even several 
communities. How those communities work as stand alone and interlinked 
communities is vital to them successfully delivering the output of their programme. It 
appears that appropriate attitudes and behaviours are keys to making long term 
programmes and alliances successful. 
It has become clear from this research that customers are looking increasingly for 
attitude and behaviour as deciders when they are hiring individuals for their 
organizations. There has been a departure from hiring on pure competency as there 
is an understanding that with the correct attitude and behaviour, competency can 
easily be trained in. 
This was a clear position set out by the interviewees and it appears that rather than 
looking to develop the correct cultures in workshops; customers are actively looking 
for contractors who come to them with these qualities already demonstrated. Such 
behaviour is becoming evident in customers’ hiring of first tier contractors, as the 
questions being asked are beyond the traditional procurement question of ‘how many 
similar projects or programmes have you delivered?’ Obviously delivery is still 
important, but without the required attitude and behaviour they will not carry as 
much weight in the current market place. Excellent performance is therefore also 
being defined as an organization staffing its delivery team with key personnel with 
the required attitude and behaviour. 
Following on from the attitude and behaviour perspectives, characteristics such as 
consistency of message, purpose, and ‘business personality’ were also directly 
mentioned by customers as characteristics of excellent performance during the 
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interviews. These issues centre around the potential disconnect between the message 
given out by the business leaders of first tier contractors and those who actually 
provide the service to the customer. Customers who take on first tier contractors 
based upon the message about what their organization can deliver can be 
disappointed by what the organization actually provides. Oakland’s Property Director 
stated that: 
“…I have learned about suppliers, there tends to be, in some instances a big 
gap between the people you get coming in talking to you about what they 
can do and the people they then send along to deliver…” 
The extension to the previous research (Chan et al 2006, Kagioglou et al 2001, Lam 
et al 2007) is that excellent performance in attitude and culture is simply about 
organizations keeping their promises. Oakland’s Property Director asserted: 
“…delivery and accountability are not negotiable. They have to do what they 
say they do. They have to keep their promises.” 
Perhaps this assertion could be seen as a worrying identifier of excellent performance 
as it suggests that the norm is for the construction industry to promise more than it 
can deliver. The disconnect appears generally to be between the delivery levels 
promised by contractors’ senior management and the actual delivery provided by the 
organization. This ‘credibility gap’ appears to suggest a break in communication 
within the contractors as organizations. Either management are not grasping the 
complexities of what the delivery staff have to do, suggesting a two-way 
communication problem; or there is a culture of over-selling within the industry. The 
excellent performing contractor, therefore, will have to ensure that no such credibility 
gap exists. 
4.2.2.6 Professional image or the maintenance of the customer’s image; 
requiring an in depth understanding of the customer’s business 
The recent research has been relatively quiet on the subject of the image projected 
by the contractor whilst he/she is working for the customer. Lam et al (2007) and 
Chan et al (2006) touch upon it as a potential KPI or performance measure but do 
not discuss in great depth. This is an interesting oversight given the high priority 
customers interviewed for this research gave to ‘image’. 
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This suggests that a predominance of construction customers are understanding that 
those organizations they contract with that are visible to the wider public are being 
associated with them in the eyes of the public. Miami’s Property Director advised: 
“…[the contractor] produced a 3D visual of what this new Miami was going to 
look like for ourselves. They built a little hut, almost like a bus shelter inside 
the hoarding, put a flat screen TV in there and they were putting on a loop 
what the Miami was going to look like…for [Miami’s] customers”  
If their construction contractors create poor publicity for them then there is the 
potential that this could impact upon their own business. This discussion during the 
interviews tended to lead into a point of view about excellent performing contractors 
being those that most deeply understand the customer’s business.  
Beyond providing delivery of a construction programme, the excellent performing 
contractor will tend to take account of the customer’s wider business. Miami’s 
Property Director stated: 
“I want [contractors] to be retailers first and actually know how to build a 
Miami second…” 
A key deliverable will be for the contractor to safeguard the customer’s reputation 
and interaction with his/her own customers. Interaction is especially important if 
those customers are the general public, even more so if the interaction is in a face–
to–face environment, such as high street retail. Some construction customers are 
even going as far as to educate fully their first tier contractors on their own strategy 
for interaction with their own customer base. 
What these construction customers consider as their own customer base varies from 
the public, to large external organizations, to other departments within their own 
organization. The business risk to the customer of allowing this interaction between 
his/her contractor and his/her stakeholders is acknowledged. Therefore, excellent 
contractors will be those who understand their customer's business well enough to be 
able to handle that interaction to the same standard as the customer him or herself. 
In addition, allowing this interaction enables the customer to extend the interaction 
with their first tier contractors so that all understand the goal to which the 
programme of construction works is aligned. It also removes a potential problem 
intervention from the customer if they can trust their contractors in this way. 
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The element of understanding of the customer’s business has been greatly 
emphasized by participants from retail outlets who stated that excellent performing 
organizations needed to be retailers first and contractors second. The point being 
made is that whilst the construction works are necessary, the customer wishes to 
maintain their own image with the public. Image maintenance becomes difficult 
during such works as Miami believes that some contractors give the impression to the 
public of being “…hairy arsed builders…”. What construction customers require is a 
contractor who will act as if they are an extension of their own business and maintain 
the same pride in that business. Oakland’s Property Director asserted: 
“The issue for me is the ability of the provider of the service to understand 
what those [Oakland business] fundamentals are…” 
An understanding that first tier contractors are an extension of their customers’ 
business appears to be the one area where first tier contractors can bring innovation 
to bear as well. Customers interviewed for this research became visibly animated 
when talking about such issues. Contractors who seem to always go beyond the call 
of the contract and project scope to ensure that the customer's stakeholders are 
delighted appear to be most highly regarded. Customers generally have no KPI for 
contract exceeding behaviour as such things are described as hard to measure. Given 
that customers used examples of this type of behaviour to illustrate to the author the 
gap between excellent performing contractors and the rest, indicates that the lack of 
a current defined measure or protocol is interesting and may be worthy of future 
exploration. 
4.2.2.7 Flexibility – through being able to minimize the impact of 
construction upon customer business and the ability to manage 
‘chaos’ from other business sources. 
Given that flexibility was mentioned by many participants in this thesis research as 
being one of the top behaviours they needed from their contractors, makes it 
somewhat surprising that it does not feature very much in the recent research. Chan 
et al (2006) mentions a lack of flexibility being a problem to implementing partnering 
arrangements, but Chan et al’s (2006) view is from a public sector customer 
perspective. Atkinson (1999) discusses the management of projects in itself requiring 
flexibility, but does not examine it in depth. Crane et al (1999) has flexibility and 
responsiveness as part of mid level (between outputs and relationships) performance 
profile measures. Beatham et al (2004) discusses the ‘Satisfaction of Service’ KPIs 
developed by the top intelligent customers of the construction industry which 
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included flexibility within its measures. Further research reveals that the website for 
this set of KPIs (www.soskpis.com) no longer exists so it is difficult to establish what 
happened to this tool. 
According to participants, flexibility and agility, whilst becoming central requirements 
of excellent performance, are elements that cannot be delivered immediately. Almost 
as if trying to turn a juggernaut, customers appear to understand that a period of 
time is required between their change in message and the change in direction from 
their excellent first tier contractors. Customers have stated that if they explain what 
they want done differently on the programme they expect excellent performers to be 
able to respond within a reasonable time. 
Conversely, a prolonged inability to respond to a changed message may result in 
churn, which shows how important this performance factor is to customers. Flexibility 
and agility are also required in order for the contractor to be able to successfully flex 
to the ebb and flow of work during a long programme of construction works. 
Flexibility is clearly necessary as some of the customers' programme spends are 
being reduced significantly during 2009, for various reasons. From the interviews, it 
is clear that the ability to flex when workload increases significantly is also required of 
excellent performers. 
The fact that flexibility appears to be in the forefront of customers’ minds gives 
credence to a statement made during the interviews: If you measure first tier 
contractor delivery by the more ‘traditional’ measures of time, cost and quality – you 
are only measuring a snapshot in time. Which of the three is at the forefront will 
change as the customer’s own business drivers change and good flexibility is what 
will give the ability to respond to that change. It could be speculated that what has 
caused the problems reported as endemic in the construction industry (Egan, 1998, 
2002; Latham, 1994) is the tendency of customers to select suppliers on lowest cost 
tenders based upon that snapshot in time. 
At the point of tender, the contractor who priced lowest was offering to do the work 
at that point at the lowest cost. However, this price will give no guarantee that as the 
programme requirements change, cost will be the main driving factor, or that the 
contractor selected on that basis will be able to react to change successfully. 
Oakland’s Property Director stated: 
“…if you explain what you want to try and do differently and you give people 
a period of time to respond, if they can respond then you retain them.”  
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There is also no guarantee that the lowest initial tenderer will be the cheapest 
contractor following any programme change; even if cost is still the greatest driving 
factor from the perspective of the customer. This might be a particular issue where 
the contractor has design responsibilities and can influence the extent of scope as 
well as the price of the individual scope items. 
The position set out in the previous paragraph gives further weight to the opinion 
that looking at a set of KPIs will only give a thin slice in time view of the performance 
of a contractor. Therefore the only way to identify continually excellent performing 
contractors is through looking at input factors rather than outputs. 
The excellent performing contractor will also understand that no customer actually 
wants a construction project; they want a finished product with as little hassle 
incurred as possible in getting there. Construction customers have noted during the 
interviews that the construction of their business premises is subservient to the 
operating of the business itself. Therefore the potential savings made by employing a 
contractor on the basis of price alone may be more than offset by the impact upon 
the customer’s business. Miami’s Property Director said: 
“…running a Miami is like running a marathon every day, it's really quite a 
tough thing to do. And my team are in there, doing heart-and-lung surgery 
while you're still running the marathon!”  
The above quote gives context to the fact that excellent first tier contractors  have to 
flex their service to take account of their impact upon the operation of the day-to-day 
business of their customer. Business impact is an interesting point, because 
construction price is still a highly ranked performance measure with customers 
(rather than, say customer revenue protection). The ranking of cost is 
understandable as certainly in the current business environment, all departments 
have to be attuned to the need to save capital; and it is an easy measure to obtain. 
Measuring business impact, is somewhat harder. 
The minimization of the impact upon the customer’s business of the programme of 
works themselves is not one which emerges in recent research to any great extent. 
Chan & Chan (2004) and Atkinson (1999) talk more about the positive impact of the 
finished product upon the customer, which is not an insignificant element, but not 
one noted as a differentiator of excellent contractor performance during the 
interviews. This omission was due to the customers interviewed for this research 
being informed construction-wise which was seen to give them an understanding of 
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the business impact of the project and programme before making the investment 
decision. 
The ability to minimize impact on the customer’s business of the construction 
programme was one of the most highly discussed measures of an excellent 
performing contractor. This ability appears to link well to the need for the excellent 
performing contractor to have a good understanding of the customer’s business. 
The customers interviewed also had an appreciation of the difficulties and complexity 
of construction and that ‘problem’ projects sometimes occur. Washington’s Property 
Director stated that: 
“…we accept the fact that there might be some difficult jobs for contractors 
and some jobs are more difficult than others…” 
The fact that such projects occasionally occur does not affect the opinion of 
customers about their contractors. What appears to be more important is how they 
manage and deal with such projects when they do occur. In addition, there is the 
issue of how they learn from them and how such learning might prevent such 
projects from occurring or having a negative impact when they do occur. Customers 
are making allowances for their first tier suppliers to deal with the 'chaos' of 
construction and those that can are the excellent performers. 
Again, an ability to deal with chaos is not a KPI itself, albeit it does appear to be 
considered against the hard KPIs if they are being used to evaluate contractors. For 
example, a ‘problem’ project may cause a contractor to miss a quality, time, or cost 
KPI, or possibly all three during a period in the programme. The interviewed 
customers talked about accepting such things as part of the nature of the business 
rather than penalizing contractors because a KPI may have been missed. In addition, 
they appear to understand that such projects and the management of them are 
where the key learning which can be used to improve the whole programme often 
originates. 
Crane et al (1999) notes that process measures generally struggle to take account of 
the context or environment within which the process takes place. Lim & Mohamed 
(1999) talks extensively about understanding external factors when evaluating the 
performance against any goal. These perspectives are clearly becoming part of the 
educated customer’s requirements when evaluating the excellent performers. 
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Customers are also starting to appreciate the ability of the excellent contractor to 
deal with chaos that may come from within the customer organization itself. The 
ability to deal with the customer's wider business flexing or even stopping the 
programme of works altogether is necessary for the excellent performing contractor. 
Customers recognize that managing chaos was a very real issue, likely because the 
construction programme tends to be a support element to the customers’ main 
business. If other business considerations dictate a change, the construction 
programme will have to respond. The issue has come to the fore in recent times due 
to economic pressures, meaning some customer organizations were being forced to 
shrink their construction programmes. 
4.2.2.8 Innovation through learning demonstrated and the ability to value 
manage the project solution 
Yeung et al’s (2008) perspective on innovation is that the cost saving resulting from 
innovation is the key measurable. Yeung et al’s (2008) perspective assumes that cost 
is the most important output to the customer. However, given that one of the key 
points of the herein reported research is that the main driving output of the 
construction programme can switch between time, quality and cost, such a 
perspective for innovation requires widening. Beatham et al (2004), for example 
examines from the EFQM model which looks for continuous improvement through 
innovation and learning. 
Yeung et al’s (2007) position appears to be more akin to value management which 
was not mentioned in any great depth by the interviewees in this research. 
‘Designing out waste’ can mean cost, but it could also mean time or elements of 
design that compromise the function or functional requirements of the finished 
product. This understanding reinforces the point that the excellent performing 
contractor needs to understand the goals and the business of their customer. 
Those customers who do still carry out the bulk of measurement at an output and/or 
project level do appear to understand the power of learning as a performance 
differentiator. Customers are starting to demonstrate an understanding that output 
measures are fallible due to the uncertain nature of construction works. Customers 
acknowledge that mistakes will be made during projects and that these can be 
created by the customer themselves. Kagioglou et al (2001) suggests that the ability 
to learn from experience as an organization is a measurable part of a 
process/performance measurement scorecard although it must be driven in alignment 
to overall vision and strategy. 
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Innovation is viewed by the participants in this thesis research as a way that a first 
tier contractor can add value to the construction process that is beyond the contract 
or project specification. In this way, innovation can be viewed as a key differentiator 
which does not always have its own KPI. Some have described innovation as the 
ability of the first tier contractor to think on their feet when encountering issues on 
site. Alternatively, innovation can manifest itself as being able to give input at the 
design development stage which assists in designing out waste at a project level. 
Innovation in terms of wholesale changes in the way things are done appears to 
come from the materials or building technology arenas rather than the first tier 
contractor level; according to, for example, Washington and Miami, who are starting 
to employ timber frame technology as an example. 
The above position on innovation extends the recent research of Beatham et al 
(2004) and Kagioglou et al (2001) suggesting that innovation cannot simply be 
measured in financial terms. Although financial assessment of innovation is still a key 
area, the ability of contractors to innovate ‘on their feet’ links with the previous 
section which notes that the ability to deal with chaos is an excellent performance 
indicator.  
4.2.2.9 Self management and stability 
Construction customers with large programmes of works are looking to be able to 
have the confidence that their suppliers will deliver their programme requirements 
without the need for intervention. Customers of today’s UK construction industry 
expect their first tier suppliers to be able to react to changing drivers through the life 
of their programme as a matter of course. Albeit that, from the case study with 
Oakland, it appears such an approach requires the supply chain itself to demonstrate 
that it is still providing the best outputs available from the market to the customer. 
The stability of delivery without the need for intervention is not just a representation 
of excellent performance, it is a necessity should customers need to destabilize and 
change other parts of the capital delivery process. Such change may include their 
internal processes/business, the wider supply chain, or their relationships and 
methods of interaction with their own stakeholders. It is very difficult to continue to 
operate with more than one element of your business model destabilized at any one 
time according to Oakland’s Property Director, who commented that: 
“…any organization doing what we’re doing now in Oakland have got three 
constituencies: your employees, your customers and your supply chain. I 
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couldn’t have changed the supplier structure…without having a reasonable, 
stable customer relationship. Because in my view you can only run with one 
of those destabilized…”. 
The reality of business is that change is continual and that such destabilizations are 
necessary and may need to be managed often during the flow of a multi-year 
programme. 
Construction customers are also starting to look beyond the perspective of the 
delivery of construction projects. The advent of delivery vehicles such as alliancing 
has brought forward the need for the first tier contractor to display management 
capability. Customers are buying the contractors’ ability to manage practical delivery 
more effectively than they can themselves. The excellent performer will therefore 
display excellent management and planning ability at a programme level and will be 
almost capable of acting as a consultant to the customer as well as a ‘builder’. This 
ability is an example of extra added value which customers expect from their 
excellent performers.  
‘Contractor as consultant’ is an area that has received little, if any, attention in the 
construction industry research, even though self management of a programme of 
works might seem to be the logical extension of the current trend for alliancing. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this issue in great detail, it is 
clearly something that more advanced customers are looking at from their first tier 
contractors and represents a future line of investigation for the industry.  
4.2.2.10 Self driven business analysis and improvement 
Customers are becoming happier to employ first tier contractors who will open up 
about their strengths and weaknesses honestly with the proviso that they can also 
demonstrate their improvement strategy and timetable. The understanding of where 
strengths and weaknesses lie should be demonstrated through a research process of 
the contractor’s own initiative in an honest attempt to examine themselves against 
their peer group. This perspective of excellent performance makes logical sense as 
any contractor who states that they are the best at everything is unlikely to be being 
honest with themselves. Oakland’s Property Director commented: 
“If I was going to appoint a first tier contractor and they came in to see me 
and they could tell me, and they were happy to tell me, warts and all, how 
they stood against the rest of their sector, that’s what would impress me.” 
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In addition, it allows the customer real comfort that the business he/she is dealing 
with is not content with its status quo and is looking to actively improve itself. Self 
improvement is a demonstration of excellent performance as it is the first step in 
being able to improve contractor performance to their customers – commencing with 
knowing where they are to begin with. A demonstrable ability on the part of the first 
tier contractors to challenge themselves to improve their position is another key area 
of excellent performance. Oakland’s Property Director stated: 
“…if [the contractors] weren’t at the top of the game they’d be able to 
explain to me why and what they were doing to get there. That’s the most 
important thing to me.” 
Self improvement is a further expected behaviour that should be self generated by 
contractors without input from the customer organization. First tier contractors 
should be demonstrating that they are continuously adding value through their 
business interactions with their customers beyond simply what any KPI suite may 
state. Such proactivity is becoming a required state of the excellent performing first 
tier contractor, as noted from the above quote. 
Customers, such as Oakland above, know that understanding what contractors are 
doing to improve their own business gives the best insight about how they operate 
and how they ought to be managed. Such knowledge allows the customer to assist 
the contractors in adding increased value to the delivery process. Excellent 
performing contractors will have such a demonstrable plan in place for improving 
their own business. Customers are becoming accustomed to working only with 
organizations who can actively demonstrate an ambitious desire to improve 
themselves. 
The notion of honesty and integrity about strengths and weaknesses brings into 
question the traditionally accepted procurement process of the UK construction 
industry. The process traditionally requires contractors to jump through preset hoops 
to demonstrate that they are excellent at everything. Responses to procurement 
questions rarely come with a list of organizational improvement areas volunteered by 
the tenderer. Customers who understand that it is not possible for any one contractor 
to be excellent in every area compared to their peer group will be looking for more 
intelligent procurement responses from tenderers. 
 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 93 
4.2.2.11 Self driven widening of the service offering 
In many instances, the customer’s department which interacts directly with the first 
tier contractors may only be responsible for the delivery of capital construction 
projects. Many first tier contractors are extending their market offering to such areas 
as facilities management, waste management, and management consultancy; to 
name three popular examples. 
A first tier contractor who shows an aptitude for understanding the wider business of 
their customer may develop the ability to provide services to wider departments 
within that customer organization. The research behind this thesis has demonstrated 
that such a procession of events not only demonstrates an excellently performing 
first tier contractor, but also shows faith in that contractor from the customer 
organization. In some cases, this development is actually suggested and driven by 
the customer. The ability to then successfully deliver this paradigm shift in service 
delivery becomes excellent performance in itself. Customers may view such 
broadening of service provision as excellent performance due to the bundling effect of 
services and the potential economies of scale that can generate. Washington’s 
Property Director indicated: 
“…what we might have then in year one is building a small Washington, year 
two building a big Washington in steel and then year three they build a big 
Washington in wood. So what you do is you look to create that capability 
over one or two or three years…” 
Some customers have excellent performance criteria at the business strategic level. 
Excellent contractors are viewed as those who can expand their business offering 
strategically in line with their customer’s business expansions. With such contractors, 
a multi year plan can be put in place for the first tier contractors to achieve which can 
involve establishing the ability to take on different types of projects. Either this or the 
contractor can be expected to develop the ability to deliver similar projects in a wider 
geographical location. Washington’s Property Director suggested a need to: 
“…get used to working in that region, get used to establishing a supply base, 
maybe go and employ a project manager who lives in that region…” 
Performance against such a strategic plan can be benchmarked and can be used as a 
quantitative measure of an excellent performing contractor. 
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The contractors selected for such development by customers tend to be selected, 
however, on a subjective basis which hinges upon the relationships and the ‘ability to 
work together’ which the customer experiences with the contractor. Washington’s 
Property Director stated that: 
“…it’s more subjective that objective, you get close to these guys and these 
companies by working with them on a day to day, week to week basis.” 
This assertion suggests a qualitative input driving a quantitative output for 
excellence, which is similar to a scenario discussed with Oakland during their case 
study). An enabler of such a strategic growth plan therefore is the senior 
management relationship and commitment to the plan which is a key driver to the 
process. Relationships and commitment are not a measured element, but customers 
do insist on having key contractor personnel in place with whom they can work. 
Customers employing the strategic growth plan also state that compliance with and 
performance against output KPIs was used as a way to divide up future workload. 
This compliance however would simply allow contractors to expand their workload 
within their existing sphere of competence. This was seen to be an excellent example 
of the difference between complying with ‘output’ KPIs demonstrating good 
performance and being rewarded; and excellent performance against the 
‘satisfaction’ elements which really impresses the customer and results in true 
business changing rewards. 
Furthermore, compliance with measured KPIs is treated by customers as merely a 
signifier that a contractor is ready to become part of a more strategic group. The 
contractor can then be assessed and potentially progressed from a strategic 
performance perspective. Customers have stated that there have been contractors 
being managed and interacted with at the strategic level who have fallen away from a 
strategic group level. Such falls are often due to poor performance against their 
measurable items, demonstrating that the basic output deliverables of the 
programme are still required for a contractor to remain part of the programme at all. 
These organizations which fell foul of output KPI performance have had to re-
examine their business model before attempting to return to the level of strategic 
partner.  
Customers are becoming increasingly aware that such improvements will not be 
delivered immediately upon appointment of contractors. Drawing benefits from 
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excellent performing first tier contractors requires a relationship of two to three years 
according to Oakland’s Property Director, He said: 
“…we’d get up to optimum productivity from that supplier, optimum 
relationship position some time after you’ve outsourced. So I’d say it takes 
two to three years to get to optimum performance”. 
This awareness demonstrates that customers are willing to exercise patience in the 
development of their first tier contractors. The short term focus on delivering time, 
cost or quality whilst still important is becoming a given element of contractor 
performance. Customers are realizing that the way to achieve the necessary outputs 
is spending the time to manage the excellent performance driving inputs. 
4.2.2.12 Sharing learning 
What has also become clear from this research is that contractors working together 
on large programmes of work need to exchange learning that drives excellence. 
Oakland’s Property Director asserted that: 
“…there’s increasing evidence that [the suppliers are] talking to each other. 
There’s some very tangible evidence that they’re exchanging best practice, 
because they are standardizing…”. 
If one contractor on a large programme is performing excellently and others are 
falling behind then this adds less value to the customer than if all are performing 
excellently. Therefore, excellent performers are those who learn and share learning 
with their peer group to advantage their mutual customer. If there is performance 
improvement by all contractors on a programme, they can take this improvement 
and spread it to other customer work streams. This way all contractors who take part 
in learning and sharing gain something whilst the customer also gains. 
4.2.3 Role of the customer 
The above excellent contractor performance aspects should not go without a mention 
of the role of the customer in the construction programme. The comments that came 
from the customers were that they have to be giving the correct messages about the 
above issues. Oakland’s Property Director stated: “If you’re constantly talking to the 
supplier about the carpet tiles, then he’ll focus on the carpet tiles” Customers 
understand that excellent performance will only be delivered following excellent 
leadership from the customer themselves. If customers do not act in such a way that 
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demonstrates and encourages excellent performance, they are unlikely to receive it 
from their supply chain. 
4.2.4 Overview of the results and analysis 
The aim of the data analysis for this section of the research was to identify and 
understand the common ground under which customers of the UK construction 
industry viewed excellent first tier contractor performance. The focus of this analysis 
was, therefore, the factors themselves rather than the organizations or the 
participants in the interviews. Such focus was seen to be in direct contrast with the 
later case study work where the focus was initially upon the case itself to inform the 
common processes. 
From the interviews with the customer organizations, several interesting elements 
emerged in terms of what excellent performance from their first tier contractors 
looked like. The interviews revealed that many of the traditional performance 
measures, such as time, quality, cost, and health and safety were treated as required 
performance in the current environment rather than indicators of excellent 
performance. 
These factors were still generally seen on KPI scorecards. KPI scorecards were 
commonly used to measure all aspects of output performance on programmes of 
construction works. Such standard KPI suites can be found on the Constructing 
Excellence website at www.kpizone.com. The analysis of the interviews suggested 
that excellent scores against these factors were now seen to be the minimum 
requirement to continue to work for large customers. 
These KPI suites of output factors appeared to be used in today’s market as factors 
for contractors to ensure against the dissatisfaction of their customer. In other words, 
those who were not seen to perform well against their KPIs were those who tended to 
find themselves not working for the customer for very long. This was a view 
expressed explicitly by the customers interviewed. The suites were not used in order 
to identify organizations for immediate dismissal from their programme, but to 
identify problems and to ensure that rectification quickly followed. 
Some customers had established their KPI suites so that measures which ensured 
against dissatisfaction and factors which drove satisfaction were both recorded. 
Again, there was seen to be a set of factors which were to be complied with as a 
minimum, and which were generally output factors. The excellent performance 
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factors were more consistent with input factors, such as high performing teams, 
learning, cultural issues and team integration. The customers who had these two 
level KPIs in place appeared to understand that improving input elements would also 
drive the output measures. These input elements appeared to be what set excellent 
performing contractors apart from their peer group. 
With such a two-tiered approach, customers tended to place the statistical output 
(prevent dissatisfaction) measures at a project level, and the qualitative/input (create 
satisfaction) measures at the programme level. The programme level indicators 
appeared to be the ones which were dealt with at a very senior management level by 
all parties concerned. The fact that the input issues were dealt with at programme 
level suggested a further understanding that those first tier contractors who nurtured 
the input drivers were the excellent performers at programme level and at the output 
level. 
KPIs which measured the regular construction programme outputs were still 
maintained by all customer organizations that participated in the interviews for the 
research herein reported. Issues such as time, quality, cost and health and safety 
were still measured rigorously and were still seen to be of great importance to 
customers of the construction industry. What was uncovered was the extension 
beyond these KPIs to rating first tier contractors by the more ‘leading’ or ‘input’ 
factors. These factors may not be measured in the statistical sense, but were seen to 
be a demonstration of the difference between the ordinary service delivering 
contractors and the excellently performing ones. 
4.3 The nominated excellent performing contractors 
The culmination of the customer interviews was always intended to be the nomination 
of the one contractor by each customer who demonstrates the above qualities more 
than any other. Each customer interviewed had several first tier contractors working 
for them and each was asked to nominate just one for case study purposes. This 
approach was chosen to ensure that in each case, only the premium performer was 
being studied from each construction programme. 
The contractors nominated as excellent performers were very different in terms of 
their structure. This fact in itself brought richness to the research as the variety of 
ways of constructing an excellent performing organization could be examined. The 
differences in research subjects’ structure took the research slightly beyond the 
original premise of understanding to what extent LO processes were employed within 
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contractor organizations. There was also seen to be the opportunity to understand 
how LO processes were employed within the various different types of contracting 
organization and whether there was any significant advantage to any of those 
organizations. 
One contractor nominated was an instantly recognizable name in construction 
contracting and one of the largest contractors operating in the UK. Another was a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) JV operating as a legal entity in its own right and 
consisting of employees of two legally separate companies who had been transferred 
through the TUPE regulations into the JV. 
A further nominated contractor was part of an alliance of a handful of small regional 
contractors which had framed themselves through their collaborative interactions as a 
single entity delivering a national programme of works. Two were medium sized 
contractors acting in a regional capacity which, in both cases, simply stood out from 
the larger peer group of contractors that were providing the customer with their 
nationwide programme of works. Although as discussed in the Research Design and 
Approach chapter, the alliance was dissolved due to decline in workload and one of 
the members going into administration. 
The range of delivery methods suggests initially that there is no one best model for a 
contractor to adopt in terms of the vehicle itself. This question of the best delivery 
vehicle is made particularly pertinent by two comments made during the customer 
interviews. One customer stated that he found it difficult to state that any of his 
contractors were actually ‘excellent’ and that the one he nominated was the best 
performer out of the group that he employed. The nominated contractor is the largest 
of the group and the most recognizable name nationally. 
Another customer stated that in his experience, the best performing contractors are 
ones who concentrate on the sector in which their key customer operates. This 
suggested that learning created from operating within many sectors either does not 
happen, or does not appear to be transferred adequately through contractor 
organizations. Based upon this particular customer’s comments it appears that having 
a presence in many sectors actually decreases performance. 
Both of these perspectives were surprising given the literature that had been 
examined on the LO. Senge et al (1990, 1994) particularly suggests that the ability 
to learn from varying experiences and share them across departments in the 
business is a key element of the LO. Sharing indicates that having a larger number of 
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‘touch points’ would be an advantage to learning. A failure in this way suggests a lack 
of Systems Thinking (Senge et al, 1990, 1994), and in turn suggests that an 
organization learns best when it is perceived and managed as a whole system of 
interdependencies rather than as individual silos. These two points made by the 
customers are explored as part of the Systems Thinking questions which are an 
integral element of the case studies. 
The further question that the variety of nominated contractors raises is whether the 
extent of alliancing effects the LO performance. One of the factors raised in the 
recent research (Maqsood et al, 2007) is the ability for organizations to be able to 
learn from their peer group. Maqsood et al (2007) discusses ‘learning chains’ albeit as 
vertical chains (i.e. coordination down through the contractual chain) as opposed to 
horizontal chains (i.e. coordination across a peer group of contractors), but the 
principle is the same. Those who can successfully share knowledge between 
organizations will have an advantage over those who cannot. 
The JV delivery route is also interesting because individuals who are part of the case 
study may struggle to align themselves to the JV and their original employer. This 
interesting alignment perspective is explored in the Shared Vision (Senge et al, 1990, 
1994) element of the research. 
In the following paragraphs, more detail on the case study organizations themselves 
is given, but at no time will information be given which would enable the contracting 
organization to be identified. Rather, names used are pseudonyms. Therefore, no 
reference to the exact metrics of the organization is given, only guidance as to the 
size and industry area of specialism. This information is provided to demonstrate the 
variety of the industry covered by this work and to support the proposition that it is 
sufficiently representative of the construction industry as a whole. 
4.3.1 Case study one – ‘Tennessee’ 
The first case study, nominated by customer Houston, conducted was on the largest 
of the nominated contractors, a relative household name in terms of contracting 
entities. For the purposes of this research, this contractor will be referred to as 
‘Tennessee’ throughout. It is a relatively large player in the construction market and 
operates in a variety of sectors with a turnover approaching £1,000million per 
annum. The public face of the organization from their website and literature is that of 
a contractor who is a member of the community as well as an employer. In addition, 
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they appear proud of their roots and the life story of the organization is prominently 
displayed in the foyer of their head office and on their website. 
The regional director, who was interviewed as part of this research, stated that he 
was often happy to participate with this type of research as he had been grateful to 
those who had supported him during his researching days. He had been with the 
organization for many years and genuinely believed that his organization was 
different from other contractors in the way that it put trust, the community, ethics 
and respect for the individual and environment before accounting considerations. The 
organization states the belief through its literature that in acting in such a way it will 
deliver a profit and grow as a business. 
4.3.2 Case study two – ‘Cincinnati’ 
This case study organization was a JV of two legally separate contracting organization 
who had come together in order to bring their relative strengths to bear in providing 
service to a single customer, Pittsburgh. Both organizations were medium sized 
organizations with an engineering construction base. This setup gave the author 
cause to consider how best to tackle such a case study. For example, for the 
purposes of the JV, the effective Managing Director (MD) was the head of the JV in 
the customer facing role, albeit he was employed by one of the two parent companies 
and was answerable to the management and culture of one of the organizations. 
This meant the author had to approach this case study slightly differently from the 
others. The opportunity to get a feel for the culture of the organization was not so 
readily available, being co-located within the customer’s premises and alongside 
other contractors. The JV in question was part of an alliance of the customer and 
these other contractors which was designed in such a way that the alliance had a 
single identity. This meant that field observations were of less relevance and use than 
with other case study organizations. 
In addition, processes and procedures adopted were those of the customer and 
alliance rather than specifically that of the JV. This meant that the research had to 
focus more upon the influence of the JV over those procedures and how they 
delighted their customer by improving those procedures. This approach was seen to 
be different from the other case studies which focussed upon the operation of internal 
processes employed in order to delight the customer. Furthermore, any processes 
internal to the JV would have come from one of the parent organizations and 
therefore they needed to be examined in that light. 
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4.3.3 Case study three – ‘Indianapolis’ 
Case study three was a small contractor and perhaps the most focussed of the 
organizations nominated for research, nominated by Miami. It possessed the 
narrowest customer base of all the organizations in this work. It felt, however, that 
this was a strength in terms of quality of customer service as Indianapolis might have 
been at risk in terms of potential exposure to market fluctuations. This organization 
concentrates almost exclusively on the retail sector, which is clearly another risk to 
their business due to the potential of a single sector entering recession. Indeed, 
casual discussion with the MD of the organization confirmed that they had been 
probably the hardest hit by the prevailing economic conditions of all the organizations 
studied. 
The impression received from this organization during the study was very much one 
of a ‘family’. Indeed, this word comes up frequently in the transcriptions of the 
interviews and case studies. All people spoken to during the studies, or informally, 
spoke of the need to ensure that people working for the organization were right for 
the organization culturally as well as professionally. The MD had clearly agonized over 
the need to make redundancies during the prevailing recession and discussed 
informally his personal pain at having to impact so negatively upon the lives of people 
he had come to know personally. The only positive thing for Indianapolis from the 
prevailing recession was that they had been able to better focus their remaining 
workforce towards the culture they felt was right for the business. 
What really struck the author was the fact that redundancies had been made and the 
remaining workforces had taken a double digit percentage pay cut, but that the only 
person to mention the pay cut was the MD. Even in casual discussion, there was no 
hint of bitterness or resentment towards the organization or the customers who had 
reduced their workload. If anything, the individuals researched within this case study 
came across as being prouder to work for their organization than any of the others. 
This sense of pride and belonging appears to have a good deal to do with this 
organization’s propensity to deliver excellent performance to their customer base. 
It is beyond the scope of this research, but it would have been interesting to 
understand whether the collective adversity faced had driven them to band together 
more strongly, or whether such a culture was prevalent as a matter of course. As this 
research represents a ‘slice in time’ view of these organizations, the author will not 
have the opportunity to discover this specifically. There appears, however, to be an 
area for future research embedded in this contemplation. 
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4.3.4 Case study four – ‘Dallas’ 
Dallas is similar in makeup to Indianapolis in terms of the size of organization, focus 
and markets served, and was nominated by customer organization Washington. Its 
customer base is relatively narrow, but not as narrow as that of Indianapolis. This 
means that they have not suffered as badly during the recession as Indianapolis. 
They are, however, historically relatively regionalized in their customer base, 
although as emerges in the case study this reality is evolving. 
It became clear that the MD was very proud of the organization and very willing to 
discuss the organization at length. His interview was easily the longest of all 
conducted in the case studies. In addition, there was a clear level of passion in the 
way he discussed the organization. This organization also demonstrated a strong 
commitment to the customer who had nominated them, despite the inevitable 
recessionary drop in workload coming from that customer. It had in fact been the 
most supportive (in their opinion) of the customer in terms of looking for ways that 
they could weather the storm together. Their MD suggested that others in the 
customer’s supply chain had taken more of a ‘sob story’ approach and complained 
that the reduction in workload would cripple their business. The MD felt that this was 
already standing Dallas in good stead for the anticipated upturn in work. 
It will be interesting to observe from afar as the recession ends and growth returns 
as to whether this organization continues to grow at a quicker and more sustainable 
pace than its peer group. 
4.3.5 Case study five – ‘Chicago’ 
Chicago is the only ‘sole supplier’ involved in the case study research, because they 
were the only main contractor working on the customer’s programme of work, that 
customer being Minnesota. Their performance was deemed to be so good by their 
customer that they have never needed to bring in competition. The customer has 
instead adopted a model of ensuring that Chicago’s performance is benchmarked 
against industry norms using the input of a third party consultant. 
In addition, Chicago is probably the most ‘specialist’ of all the contractors interviewed 
in that it operates mostly within one sector of the industry. It is a relatively small 
organization with a turnover of just under £100million which operates almost 
exclusively in the UK. As is noted later in this thesis, Chicago operates perhaps the 
riskiest model in terms of business operation due to their alignment with a relatively 
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small number of key customers. One customer, Minnesota, represents almost 40% of 
its total turnover, which is an obvious business risk should that customer cease to 
trade with Chicago. Minnesota is a private organization in the technology field and 
not, say, a government body; for which a contractor might be comfortable having a 
40% exposure due to relative customer stability. 
In terms of expansion of the service offering, Chicago is working internationally 
employing an affiliate network rather than operating under its own identity. In 
addition, it is moving further into Facilities Management (FM), something which it is 
using to innovate its construction offering to the wider market, as discussed later 
herein. 
4.3.6 Case study six – ‘Kansas’ 
Kansas is by far the smallest of the contractors studied for this thesis, employing only 
around 100 direct employees. It is also relatively unique to this research in that it is 
the only one of the contractors which acts as a materials supplier to the same extent 
that it is a contractor. In addition, Kansas is almost as specialist in its field as Chicago 
is in its field, meaning it too is in a more business risky position than some of the 
other organizations in this research. Kansas does have the most enviable geographic 
location, with its offices being in the same city as the head office of nominating 
customer Oakland. It was not explored in this thesis whether Kansas felt that this 
position gave it any advantage over its peer group. 
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4.3.7 Summary of the six contractors 
The below provides an overview of the different nominated contractors in metric 
terms, where known. 
Table 4.3.7 – Summary of the six contractors 
Name Nominating 
customer 
Construction 
industry sector 
nominated in 
Turnover 
(if 
known) 
Direct 
Employees 
(if known) 
Offices (if 
known) 
Tennessee Houston Communication £800 
million 
2,300 25 
Cincinnati Pittsburgh Civil 
engineering 
Unknown 
(Joint 
Venture) 
Unknown 
(Joint 
Venture) 
Unknown 
(Joint 
Venture) 
Indianapolis Miami Retail £200 
million 
200 2 
Dallas Washington Retail £280 
million 
1,500 13 
Chicago Minnesota Information 
Technology 
£90 
million 
Unknown 2 
Kansas Oakland Financial Unknown 80 1 
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5 Data Analysis and Discussion – The ‘Mental Models’ 
Element of the Contractor LO 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter, and the four following, represent the outcomes of the construction 
phase of the interpretive process suggested by Denzin (1989) and Sheehan (2000) 
and here applied to the Mental Models discipline of the LO model. The responses from 
the contractor case studies were analysed with respect to their changing the Mental 
Models within their organizations. Senge et al (1990, 1994) proposes changing 
existing Mental Models which may be based upon outdated processes or hierarchies 
as being essential to the LO. In order to assess the presence of changing Mental 
Models, the research herein reported looked for the contracting organizations to be 
able to engage in culture change, working practices (through experimentation and 
innovation), and to be prepared to adapt and change the way they deal with the 
business environment through scenario planning. 
The participants themselves were not asked to create their own definition of Mental 
Models or its constituent elements. The experiences analyzed within this chapter have 
been developed from the case studies and ordered into the headings highlighted 
above based upon the model proposed by Senge et al (1990, 1994). The author had 
brought his own interpretation of how the various sub-disciplines go into constructing 
the five disciplines suggested by Senge et al (1990, 1994) in assembling the overall 
model from the participant responses. This was not viewed as a limitation in the 
research, because this level of interpretation had been a feature of previous LO 
research (Ortenblad, 2007). 
5.2 Culture Change 
Before discussing culture change, it was necessary to provide an understanding of 
organizational culture. For the purposes of this thesis, a useful definition of culture 
can be taken from Lakomski (2001). He defined organizational culture as the 
instrument used by management to shape and control the beliefs, understandings, 
and behaviours of individuals, and thus the organization, to reach specified goals. It 
can therefore be reasonably extended that culture change within the organization will 
be the alteration of these existing beliefs, understandings and behaviours. This 
alteration may be necessary either to improve the ability of the organization to 
achieve existing goals, or to move towards new goals. 
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Senge et al (1994: 267) provided the following definition of culture in respect of 
Mental Models: “An organization’s culture can be seen as its members’ collective 
Mental Models…” 
He went on to assert that in order to create change within the LO, the organization 
must be able to address and change its culture through changing these collective 
Mental Models. Therefore, the case studies in this thesis have been examined for 
evidence of the willingness and ability to address culture change. 
5.2.1 Tennessee 
Tennessee stated that it had changed the way that the central core of the 
organization shared information. This was done specifically to lead a culture change 
of knowledge sharing and to alter the mindset of the organization. The MD stated: 
“We picked this up quite a few years ago now as an issue. With the sort of 
headline behind it “Nobody bloody tells me anything in this company.’” 
The mindset change was an expansion of individuals’ views of working for a local 
office to viewing themselves as working for something greater. Jackson (2000) noted 
that systemic problems can emerge from a lack of understanding of the ‘whole’ by 
the individual. Senge et al (1990, 1994) discussed the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
scenario being a symptom of this condition. 
Culture change was viewed by Tennessee as a long term (five year) plan and was 
targeted at removing the ‘the way things are done around here’ attitude. Individuals 
were encouraged to challenge why things were done at all which established the 
value of actions to the business. 
In addition, Tennessee had changed the mindset in the organization from viewing 
itself as a builder working for professional consultants to being a provider of 
professional service itself. Tennessee’s MD suggested it operated every bit as 
professionally as the customer’s consultants, saying: 
“…the professionalism within our own company was on a much higher 
standard than some of the professionalism that we encountered…” 
Tennessee therefore felt every bit justified in this mental model, particularly as it 
suggested this mindset as an industry wide shift in the UK. 
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Tennessee’s position fits with Cors (2003) who suggests that managers need to 
challenge employees to think constantly and creatively about the needs of the 
organization to give employees the stewardship to challenge the organizational 
‘steady state’. Tennessee was approaching the end of its journey and reported to 
have passed the resistance to change phase and have entered the acceptance phase 
of cultural change. 
5.2.2 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis, on the other hand, was still attempting to create culture change within 
their organization. It was trying to move from a model where the titular leaders were 
encouraging ideas from their teams to a point where ideas start to flow as part of the 
normal course of things. Until now, management had incentivized the flow of ideas 
and this was something it did not want to have to do in the future. To do so, it was 
trying to become more relaxed and informal about the way managers interact with 
non management personnel. 
Indianapolis was trying to initiate ideas from the point of view of encouraging the 
person who lays the bricks to feed back expert knowledge. Thus, Indianapolis was 
trying to move away from the more traditional hierarchical view that the experts 
were the designers and those doing installation were “…lower than low…” who need 
to be controlled. The aim of this approach was to even out the perception of each 
role’s level of importance to the overall project. Ortenblad (2002) noted that creating 
the culture within the organization to generate learning was much more of a 
challenge than the traditional model of controlling individuals. 
Indianapolis, in line with Ortenblad’s (2002) position, was struggling with such 
culture changed because of the way their professionals were educated. Its position 
was that the current system which supplied new graduates into the industry teaches 
them to position themselves in terms of what their profession was and to draw clear 
boundaries. Indianapolis believed that this leads to an initial uncooperative approach 
from team members when they first join the organization. Indianapolis was trying to 
change this existing culture for one of more collaboration. In particular, it was looking 
for different design areas, such as Architecture and Engineering, to collaborate on 
developing innovative design solutions, suggesting a ‘collective’ approach to learning 
(Ortenblad, 2001) similar to a symphony orchestra of different instruments learning 
to play together. 
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Indianapolis had more success in changing the culture of the relationship with their 
customers. What it had done was to move its relationship from being a contract and 
letters relationship, to being truly one where Indianapolis and customers sat 
alongside each other. This change had been helped by having an educated customer 
in the form of their nominating customer, Miami, who had encouraged and welcomed 
this approach. The Miami team suggested: 
“We do things with Miami's that we wouldn't do with other people…” 
Indianapolis suggested that this encouragement had been a big part of improving the 
trust and communication over time between themselves and their customers which 
had led to more successful projects. This approach was in line with Flood (1998) who 
suggests that discourse was the best vehicle for culture change. 
In addition, Indianapolis had had success in changing the cultural acceptance that 
construction sites were dirty. It has strived to provide clean, tidy and efficient sites 
for all the trades working at those sites. The tidy approach had extended to trying to 
ensure that those sweeping the floors on site were instilled with a sense of pride 
about the level of cleanliness of the site. Such order was likely to lead to a more 
efficiently working site. Indianapolis’ MD stated:  
 “…why should a building site be a dump? You know, why should people 
work in mud, in dirty, unlit sites with bad canteens and no proper drying 
space? You know you have drying space but why shouldn’t it be factory 
conditions?” “…the plasterer is plastering the wall and if he's in the dark and 
walking in mud because he's got mud in the room, how on earth is he going 
to get the plastering great?” 
There have been some struggles in terms of extending this culture to more senior 
recent hires and subcontractors, but the recession had actually allowed Indianapolis 
to trim back its workforce and supply chain to a core of people and organizations who 
have embraced their culture changes. 
5.2.3 Chicago 
Chicago was working to change the blame culture within the industry through their 
interactions with the customer. The Minnesota delivery team was starting to 
understand that customers were becoming weary of their construction team 
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members, such as consultants, contractors, and suppliers, not taking responsibility 
when things go awry on projects: 
“…you know everyone is pointing fingers at everyone else, no one takes 
responsibility…” 
Chicago had started to take it upon itself to understand its customers, particularly 
Minnesota, better than anyone else in the supply chain and thereby take the 
responsibility lead. This had led to them taking responsibility for making sure 
everything was as they knew the customer liked it. 
Chicago’s position was similar to the learning supply chain as set out in Maqsood et al 
(2007) where the entire chain attempts to be better than its peer group as opposed 
to organizations in the same chain competing against each other. Chicago’s approach 
impressed Minnesota as a customer and Chicago suggested that other customers 
were beginning to approach their projects in the same way as Minnesota. Reichstein 
et al (2008) postulated that much learning and innovation in the construction 
industry flows from interaction with ‘intelligent’ customers. 
5.3 Experimentation 
Experimentation can be defined as the ‘learning by doing’ element of challenging 
existing Mental Models. Such areas as using a new team structure, employing a new 
process, and adopting a new belief in service delivery would fall under this definition 
(Bessant, 2005). Chinowksy (2007) defined experimentation as an essential element 
of the LO; it was discussed by Senge et al (1990, 1994) as being one of the ways in 
which the existing Mental Models of an organization can be challenged. Areas of, and 
approaches to, experimentation, and in the following section innovation, have been 
identified within the case studies as examples of LO thinking. 
5.3.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati encouraged experimentation with a “…let’s have a go and see if it works…” 
attitude towards ideas. Generally, they were ideas imported from other sectors within 
the business, so it was not taking the risk that such an approach might suggest. It 
suggests that one of the key issues here was that those carrying out experimentation 
were supported by the business which provided them with a safety net should things 
not work out. 
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Maqsood et al (2007) asserts that experimentation was one of the five supporting 
elements to learning and innovation. Cincinnati noted that experimentation did, 
however, have to have the support of the customer which unfortunately was not 
always forthcoming. This issue was not dealt with in the aforementioned research. 
Chinowsky et al’s (2007a) and Maqsood et al’s, (2007) assumption in this area 
appears to be that of an organization free to experiment on its own terms. 
Furthermore, Cincinnati was prepared to flex its rules in order to ensure that it helps 
the customer to best effect. The focus group agreed that small areas such as 
constricting design and pricing programmes were relatively minor: 
“…if I was to stick by the rules, that what I should [say is] ‘No, that's three 
months.’ But we've always tried to sort of help…” 
But demonstrate an empowerment at the delivery level to depart from the rigid 
standards in order to deliver excellent performance. At this level it was stated that 
although such services were provided, the customer was not always willing to 
reimburse the extra cost incurred whilst providing the extra service. 
This was still an area of concern for Cincinnati, albeit its relationship with its 
customer Pittsburgh was good enough that it withstands these relatively minor 
issues. It was noted that this type of approach was not taken with customers where 
the relationship was not strong enough, or that the customer culture was not 
supportive enough of the potential mistakes which may occur when flexing an 
understood process.  
Delivery level experimentation within Cincinnati extended to the installation of new 
technology, but this had tended to be at the behest of the customer according to the 
focus group: 
“…[customer] came down yesterday and said ‘I've got this new technology 
I'd like you to trial’…we'll have a look at that and see what we can do, put it 
on one of the jobs…”. 
This experimentation was made possible by the quality of Cincinnati’s people to gain 
an understanding of new technology and how it could be made a successful part of a 
project. It was useful to again note the departure from the assumptions of previous 
writers (Chinowsky et al, 2007; Maqsood et al, 2007) that experimentation was free 
from the need for support external to the business. 
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5.3.2 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis’ employees have the freedom to experiment with their service to their 
customers particularly as Miami expects it. Miami runs a Centre of Excellence for its 
contractors where such experimentation was meant to be brought to the table. The 
Centre of Excellence is a knowledge exchange forum where best practice processes 
and technology can be (and is expected to be) exchanged between Miami key 
suppliers, for the benefit of all participants. This did not reveal whether Indianapolis 
had become excellent at experimentation due to becoming a LO or whether their 
customer had led them to the point they were at now. Although the Miami director 
did view its contribution at this forum as unique to this forum: 
“…we have a centre of excellence for Miami and my agenda’s totally 
different to everyone else’s…” 
It did suggest that Indianapolis was adept at working in communities of practice 
(Maqsood et al, 2007) which supports peer to peer knowledge exchange. 
Experimentation from Indianapolis’s perspective was moulded through understanding 
Miami’s time-cost-quality triangle (El-Rayes & Kandil, 2005). It understands that with 
time being the key driver within Miami, it was likely that changing something that 
actually increased capital cost but reduced the time taken to execute the project, or 
part of the project, will be accepted. An example of this from the Miami director was 
the modular build units: “…we know Miami's been very keen on components of 
modular build…” which Indianapolis had started to install which get delivered on the 
day they were meant to be installed, adopting a ‘just in time’ principle (Akintoye, 
1995). 
Indianapolis’ innovation position was tempered through one individual in the focus 
group mentioning that their customer, Miami, was willing to let them “…experiment, 
as long as it works…” which was an interesting comment suggesting that Indianapolis 
did not have carte blanche freedom to experiment and make mistakes. Holt et al 
(2000) made it clear that in order to be a true LO mistakes must be treated as 
learning opportunities. 
It was, however, suggested that Indianapolis’s own MD was generally displeased if 
the products they produce were the same each time. It was stated that his attitude 
was: “…don’t stand still, continue to evolve, continue to change.” This statement 
appeared to indicate that when experimentation occurs there was potential to not get 
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it right every time. Senge et al (1990, 1994) continually tied the need to become a 
LO with the need to change and adapt to the changing environment. In addition, he 
postulated that those that can create the change were those who were working within 
the organization and were empowered to do so. This insight suggests a duality of 
drivers within the construction LO. 
Indianapolis did acknowledge the risk associated with experimentation in the 
construction arena. Doree & Holmen (2004) and Sidwell & Budiawan (2001) set out 
the difficulties and risks of innovation and experimentation under a traditional 
contract-led customer-contractor construction relationship. Under a traditional 
contract, the contractor might be expected to carry disproportionate risk which would 
discourage experimentation. Indianapolis did, however, tend to try and work with its 
customers, particularly Miami, to ensure that a proportion of the risk and reward for 
experimentation was understood and placed with Miami: 
“We do things with Miami that we wouldn't do with other people. Because 
they appreciate that we're taking a risk on certain things…” 
In order to do this, Indianapolis had made itself adept at carrying out risk to reward 
analyses for the benefit of their customers. This approach had only been possible due 
to working for such an educated customer as Miami. 
The more risky experiments that were not successful were described by Indianapolis 
as: “…failing innovatively…”. This comment suggests that it was drawing learning 
from failures and thereby making the term failure a bit of a misnomer in these cases, 
similar to the situations set out in Ajayi & Smart (2008) and Kreigsmann (2005). 
Indianapolis was also safe in trusting that Miami will not use a contract to attack 
them for such failures when both parties understand that experimentation was taking 
place. 
5.3.3 Chicago 
Chicago was trying to encourage experimentation within their service, particularly 
with respect to quicker project delivery. Faster delivery had been relatively 
successful, but had largely been driven through customer necessity. Furthermore, it 
had improved its site setup through experimenting with the layout of the hoardings. 
This had been driven from Chicago’s desire to improve its image in the eyes of the 
customer and public, something which the industry had struggled with for many 
years and with which it was still struggling (Galloway, 2009). 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 113 
5.3.4 Dallas 
Dallas’ MD encouraged its project managers to experiment through senior 
management asking the “Why are you doing it that way?” questions to challenge the 
assumptions behind decisions (Cors 2003; Senge et al, 1990, 1994). In addition, 
Dallas’ ‘Align’ team was designed specifically to look for solutions to customer 
problems before their projects reach site. When working for Washington, the delivery 
of the product was treated as an absolute, but how it was delivered and how 
problems and opportunities were treated was a matter for Dallas’ project managers. 
These project managers were then encouraged by senior management to reflect upon 
what went well and what did not which aids learning from the experimentation 
carried out (Senge et al 1990, 1994). 
5.4 Innovation 
The definition of innovation for the purposes of this thesis was distinct from that of 
experimentation, in that it can be defined as a more deliberate developmental 
process. Bessant (2005) noted organizational innovation requiring the following four 
phases: Searching (or scanning the environment), Selecting (the decision process), 
Implementing (translating into something new) and Learning (from the previous 
three steps). The output of the innovation process must be purposeful, as stressed in 
Na Lim et al (2010: 569), who defined innovation as: “the purposeful search for new 
knowledge and the systematic application of this knowledge in production”. Pellicer et 
al (2010: 104), however also defined innovation by its “…success once introduced to 
the market” which emphasises the need for innovation to have a business-enhancing 
outcome in the construction industry and not just a business-enhancing purpose. 
The above distinction is necessary as in order that innovation provide excellent 
performance to the customer, the result must be success from the perspective of the 
customer. Therefore innovation which is not successful in the market place cannot be 
termed as successful LO processes within the context of this thesis. 
5.4.1 Tennessee 
Tennessee’s MD prided himself in taking its lead from the more innovative industry 
bodies, such as ‘Movement for Innovation’. It had followed the model of this body in 
order to drive excellence within the organization: 
“So lo and behold, T4E which is Tennessee for Excellence”. 
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The model had prizes for innovation, but it suggested that the approach really 
changed the culture to help them become a more innovative organization. 
Tennessee’s approach, however, was tempered by the realization that there was not 
always the need to ‘push the boundaries’ when providing service in the construction 
industry. Oftentimes, the tried and tested approach was what was required and 
innovation, when driven, was done so in a focussed and needs driven basis (Ivory, 
2005). 
Tennessee also noted that its move into more innovative states had followed the lead 
from their customer base. This was particularly the case for customers who have 
acquired senior personnel with experience from outside the construction industry and 
brought them in to manage their construction programmes according to the MD: 
“…the ideas that he had coming from the car industry he brought into the 
[customer names] scenario.” 
These personnel appear to bring the drive and ideas from their previous careers and 
attempt to drive the same thinking within the construction programmes. This 
outcome suggests that organizations such as Tennessee appear not to have an 
‘innovation epiphany’ but were brought to innovation gradually through interactions 
with the most advanced customers. 
5.4.2 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati’s approach to innovation was wider and more proactive than that of 
Tennessee. Being a JV organization, it carried out regular ‘trawls’ of the parent 
organizations through its leader, who commented: “Basically, cast your net out, trawl 
in, have a look at it…” to establish what had been developed during customer service 
and then bring such innovation in centrally. In addition, Cincinnati had listened to the 
ideas of graduates coming into the organization and thus improved their induction 
processes. The graduate process had given visibility to the fact that innovative ideas 
were heeded within the organization no matter where they came from which 
appeared to have encouraged the flow of ideas. Interestingly, few of the writers on 
innovation in the construction industry note recruitment as a source of innovation. 
Gray & Davies (2007) noted the necessity of human resources to recruit skills to 
support innovation, but not that individuals can be tapped directly for innovative 
ideas. 
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What Cincinnati was trying to get away from was the scenario where highly 
experienced people can inadvertently kill off innovation by pointing out things that 
have not worked in the past. What it was trying to foster was the attitude that 
something may not have worked last time, but how can it be made different so that it 
did work this time. This was something Cincinnati’s leader acknowledged he had to 
get better at encouraging. 
“…people suggest things and they say "It won't work." And it seems negative.” 
At least Cincinnati’s director had acknowledged a problem to be addressed and 
designed out, which demonstrated progress towards Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) 
‘leader as designer’ scenario. 
5.4.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis had implemented a consolidation centre where materials go to be stored 
and recycled which helps to reduce space requirements and waste on site. In addition 
it had pioneered the use of 3D modelling, which Indianapolis considered had given it 
an edge over the competition in terms of being able to demonstrate what the finished 
product will look like to all stakeholders, its MD noted: 
“I can see that we will be at a point where we will be 3D phasing, 3D 
building the jobs, 3D pricing the jobs” 
Other innovations introduced include the pioneering use of site accommodation and 
storage space to reduce the overall space they occupy on the customer’s site whilst 
carrying out works. Indianapolis appears to be the only contractor in this research to 
be implementing innovation without the need for customer prompting, as suggested 
by Gray & Davies (2007).  
Indianapolis’s success with practically implementing innovation, however, had been 
curtailed by the recession. The mental focus had moved away from ‘changing the 
game’ for their customers to securing turnover. It was still very open to new ideas in 
all elements of the business. Indianapolis suggested that if someone came up with a 
more efficient way of sweeping floors the directors would listen and try to implement 
such innovation. Indianapolis MD prided himself in Indianapolis’ mental model of 
being a service provider: 
“building is just 50% of what we do. That's our day job but it's the other 
bits that make us different” 
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This assertion would suggest that Indianapolis had developed, more than some of the 
other contractors in this research, a service provision and customer orientated 
approach as called for by Reichstein et al (2008). 
An example of innovation was the ‘Retail Diary’ which was used by Indianapolis to 
monitor the disruption levels they caused to Miami whilst they were on site. It then 
turned this information into better informed decisions on the phasing of works on 
subsequent projects in order to minimize that disruption. Miami had introduced a KPI 
in this area since this innovation had been implemented and Indianapolis had rolled 
the tool out across other customers with some success. This tool had allowed 
customers to make an informed decision weighing capital cost, time to completion 
and level/intensity of operational disruption in the overall investment decision 
process. The focus group noted: 
…we're actually conducting a 36 week job at the moment. We went back in 
I think with a short programme of I think 21 weeks, I think we went in 
with, which we could do. Disruption figures on the 36 weeks was 5-6%, 
disruption on the 21 weeks was 35%. So... and they seriously thought 
about doing it in that smaller period… 
Innovation was a two-way issue to Indianapolis and they understood that the only 
reason that they can innovate at all was that they have customers that were 
receptive to innovation (Gray & Davies, 2007). Indianapolis’ MD knew that Miami was 
prepared to listen and usually implement customer advantageous ideas: 
“…if we believe that there is no flexibility within our client we wouldn’t 
even entertain [innovation]”. 
Some of Indianapolis’s innovation was rolled out across the rest of Miami’s supply 
chain which suggested that it was highly valued by their customer. 
5.4.4 Chicago 
Chicago’s greatest innovation had been the creation of ‘warranty support 
management’. This was a FM support service which had taken on the role of 
providing warranty during Chicago’s construction projects’ defects liability period. 
Contractors were usually liable under contract to correct any discovered defects in 
the projects for 12 months after the project was completed. Chicago had found, as 
many other contractors had, that project teams were not efficient at returning to 
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sites to correct defects. As such, it had changed the mental model of ‘defects’ to one 
of an ‘after sales service supply chain’ as you might get when purchasing a product 
such as a new car (Saccani et al, 2007). Chicago’s MD was clear about the drivers for 
this change: 
…what we've done is every construction project now, at the end - once it 
achieves practical completion it is handed to our FM Company to look after 
the warranty - our warranty obligations through the defects liability period. 
Now that's been a very interesting transition for us. 
…we did it because project managers are useless at coming back after the 
end of a project and doing something about something that's gone wrong. 
And you can actually wind up losing a client because you know, because 
he's gone and screwed the wrong coat hook on the back of the chairman's 
door or whatever it might be. Having successfully delivered a £10 million 
job you then screw it up in the last two months because you don't attend to 
something. 
Chicago’s mental model of the defects liability period appeared to be unique in the 
industry and no similar examples could be identified in recent research. 
Despite this breakthrough, Chicago confessed to not having a formal innovation 
strategy. The MD suggested that he was always ‘tinkering’ and was trying to 
encourage a culture of tinkering within the organization by constantly asking people 
why they were doing things a certain way and whether there might be a better way 
of doing those things. He did this because he suggested that Chicago as an entity 
was better at design innovation than process innovation, which was where Chicago 
was now focussing. Simply changing the mental model to be similar to the ‘Lean’ 
implementation environment of manufacturing (Mao & Zhang, 2008; Sacks & Goldin, 
2007) was still an innovation step away, as the MD noted: 
“…I go onto a site and I see the electrician on that site with all his materials 
at one end of the site, and him working down the other end, probably on 
the mobile phone most of the time. And he's kind of wandering over to his 
little store and picking up a new something and wandering back to where 
he's working and screwing it on, and I just think, this is ridiculous if you 
were in a factory and someone was doing that you'd do your nut. But 
because it's a construction site it sort of seems to be okay.” 
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Those in the focus group were less committal about innovation within Chicago who 
simply felt that good ideas should be channelled through line management. However, 
throughout the discussion, the focus group appeared to be searching for an answer 
which was not easily to hand covering technology, design, process, and planning. 
This seeming uncertainty supported the theory that experimentation was stifled by 
tight timescales (Ivory, 2005). Chicago’s focus group noted that tight timescales were 
a major factor under the Minnesota contract: 
“…timescales were getting shorter and shorter and we did the project in a 
ridiculous amount of time – something like a sixteen week project taking ten 
weeks…” 
Given the opportunities suggested in the quote in the previous paragraph, there was 
certainly still scope to further innovate and change some Mental Models in Chicago. 
5.4.5 Dallas 
Dallas’ MD accepted that the construction industry was not well viewed in terms of its 
ability to deliver to customer requirements: 
“…all the government’s KPIs would suggest that half the clients aren’t happy 
with the end product.” 
For this reason, Dallas had attempted to set itself apart from this perceived culture 
through the use of its ‘align-plan-deliver’ system. The system ensured that Dallas 
could take a design which had been diluted from the customer’s original vision after 
being influenced by the consulting team and realign it with that customer’s vision, 
planning and delivering the project to that vision. The align stage, suggested as the 
most important, was the stage where conflict was dealt with to try to ensure that the 
rest of the project proceeded more smoothly. 
Through the ‘align-plan-deliver’ system, Dallas had changed the mental model from 
that of being subservient contractor at the end of the design chain to being one of 
construction expert. Dallas’ scenario was therefore very similar to the case study in 
Holt et al (2000), which noted creativity as a key element in being able to problem 
solve. Creativity was a common theme running through the Dallas case study as it 
was suggested that their unique selling position in the market was their culture of 
creativity: 
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“…[Dallas’ director] would rather lose some money and have people making 
change and being innovative and trying new things and being responsible for 
their element of a project rather than take away all that.” 
This quote suggests that Dallas had worked hard at changing its culture to one of 
creativity. This contrasts against Dallas’ view of an industry backdrop of “…average 
performance, average process and average returns…”.  
The ‘Align’ team had to keep up to date with new materials and technologies that 
they might be required to plan and deliver on projects. This department and its 
activities were being supported by one of the directors who understood that Dallas 
had to become more innovative over time in order to keep competing: 
“…they will have a budget for new ideas. So usually £2,500. So if they say 
‘I’ve found something out and I need to go to a convention in Paris.’ They 
don’t have to ask me. I trust you to develop something that will actually pay 
that back, over time.” 
5.4.6 Kansas 
One innovation that it was currently being examined by Kansas was a potential 
merger with a consultancy organization to broaden its service offering. In addition, 
due to the fact that Kansas had its own joinery manufacturing arm, it looked for 
manufacturing innovations, albeit with consideration to the business impact of such 
innovation. Kansas noted that its work with Oakland had been particularly useful for 
finding innovation, ironically due to its repetitive nature (Manley, 2006). Kansas 
suggested that it can trial small innovations on one project which can then potentially 
be rolled into future projects. 
5.5 Scenario Planning 
Scenario Planning can be described as the process of constructing alternate futures of 
a business' external environment, with the goal of learning to use these alternative 
futures to test the resiliency of the current organizational action plan with respect to 
the organizational culture (Mason, 2003). Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggested that 
the planning for upcoming scenarios was essential to change the Mental Models of the 
organization’s responses to future problems and opportunities. This was part of the 
generative learning as opposed to reactive learning process. This area had received 
scant attention in the recent construction arena LO research, but given its 
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prominence in the work of Senge et al (1990, 1994) it was essential to understand 
this area from the perspective of the participants. 
5.5.1 Cincinnati 
For Cincinnati’s parent companies, scenario planning had come to the fore due to the 
impact of the 2008-2009 recession. The organization had planned for a range of 
impacts from best to worst and how to best prepare for the recession. This might be 
observed as ‘survival learning’ (Senge et al 1990, 1994) due to the fact that it was 
not undertaken until the recession was upon Cincinnati. Survival learning was 
necessary for any organization, but the LO must complement it with generative 
learning (Senge et al 1990:14). 
Cincinnati’s parent companies’ scenario planning had centred on the identification of 
a small number of key individuals who created the most value for key customers. 
These individuals had succession plans drawn up for them which involved incumbent 
leaders being tasked with establishing what their successors needed in order to be 
able to most easily step into their role (or another role if the individual so chose), 
Cincinnati’s team leader noted: 
“If I’m going to move in a year’s time, the succession planning across the 
patch, from a leader’s point of view, is essential.” 
This approach, however, did not fit into the definition of LO scenario planning as 
defined in the first chapter of this section as there was no establishment of 
alternative futures. 
Cincinnati’s parent companies did, however, ensure that customers were part of the 
succession scenario planning. Customers were educated to understand that people 
needed to evolve and move on in their careers. They, therefore, were already bought 
into the process and the person by the time any switch was actually made. This 
approach suggested a proactive engagement of the customer in their internal 
processes, which appeared to be becoming popular in industry (Wolfe et al, 2009). 
From a workload perspective, Cincinnati operated in a regulated industry with 
relatively predictable upswings and downturns in work and therefore scenario 
planning was part of good management. Cincinnati was still caught off guard, 
however, by projects arriving during a period where they should be in a downturn. 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 121 
The succession and workload approaches within Cincinnati suggested two issues 
worthy of consideration. Firstly that Cincinnati was not so much scenario planning as 
only planning for what was most likely to happen in the future. Secondly that there 
was not enough engagement with, or from, the customer to enable good workload 
planning. If, however, Cincinnati knew this to be the case, good scenario planning 
would have it using an off-the-shelf response to these ‘unexpected’ increases in 
workload. In fact, one of the participants at the focus group stated: 
“…whatever they throw at us we’ll sort it out. That’s what we do”. 
This was an admirable approach in itself, but suggested a highly reactionary approach 
to changes rather than a scenario planned one where various ‘end states’ might be 
anticipated (Mason, 1994).  
5.5.2 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis, similarly, did not seem to be advanced in the area of scenario planning. 
The responses in this area were very much along the lines of “…we’d cope…” from all 
participants. This was particularly evident when the question of a sharp upturn or 
downturn of work was discussed, for which there was no off the shelf plan available. 
Indianapolis did try to plan for the recession, but not for the extent of the impact it 
had. The situation had become more serious than originally thought due to its 
reliance upon the retail sector and Miami who were hit hard by the recession. 
Indianapolis’ position unfortunately suggested that management ability to break free 
from the ‘rules’ of the business (Mason, 1994) when planning was not prevalent in 
Indianapolis. It actually appeared that Indianapolis was stronger at scenario planning 
years ago than it was today. There was conscious effort to diversify their customer 
base beyond just Miami to enable Indianapolis to continue to grow if Miami work ever 
stopped coming. The focus group stated: 
“…we need to be, rather than a whole hand that is Miami, we need to be 
fingers that are clients.” 
It was this scenario planning that brought Indianapolis its current customer base.  
5.5.3 Tennessee 
Tennessee’s main scenario planning focus was around planning for the future based 
upon a range of best to worst case market scenarios on a three year rolling basis. 
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This scenario planning focused upon what the organization needed to look like in 
order to be able to best exploit the market and what mix of skills was required to do 
so. These scenarios were researched through live market research to keep the likely 
future scenarios as realistic as possible. Tennessee’s MD stated that the planning 
“…paints a picture of best case and worst case and most likely case of what 
the organization needs to look like in terms of size and skillset…” 
This assertion was the closest of all the contractors in this research to a model of 
scenario planning suggested by Chermack et al (2006), Mason (1994), and Senge et 
al (1990, 1994). 
For example, senior members of Tennessee’s government team speak regularly with 
those who place public sector work to the market to understand the potential 
upcoming workloads. This information forms the basis of the scenario planning for 
that team and with other teams doing similar; it was possible to have the basis of a 
rolling plan for the entire organization. 
5.5.4 Chicago 
Chicago’s scenario planning was focused in the disaster recovery arena. They have a 
pandemic scenario plan for example. Chicago was, however, more suspect in the 
scenario and workload planning and business arenas. It did not, for example, have a 
plan in place for the scenario of a key director suddenly leaving or becoming 
incapacitated. Nor did it have one for the potential scenario of their biggest customer 
suddenly not being able to provide them with any work. The attempt to plan for this 
position had not been carried out; rather the MD stated that attempts had been made 
to mitigate the risk: 
“…a particular company had to increase their spend with us to the point 
where they accounted for 40% of our turnover. And we knew that that was 
an incredibly risky position to get into. But what the hell do you do about it? 
You can't say to them, “Don't give us orders.” Because then someone else 
is going to get in and next thing is you'll have nothing…” 
Chicago was currently consolidating its position within the market through actively 
looking for further customers of a reasonable size. In addition, it was trying to 
strengthen contractual and relationship positions with existing customers. This 
proactivity demonstrated a level of mitigation of a scenario, but not a plan for its 
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occurrence; an approach that was again more along the lines of survival learning 
(Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
5.5.5 Dallas 
Dallas had recently started carrying out some ‘what if’ planning with their upcoming 
workload in terms of potential impacts on staffing and skill requirements. Its MD 
stated: 
“…if a number of these jobs do come off how would we resource it, would 
that mean you know taking on board more people from within the Group?” 
In addition, there were some scenario plans in place for the wider business. Dallas 
did however note that no formal scenario planning was done and that all such things 
were done as part of informal discussions or meetings. These scenario plans covered 
such things as senior directors leaving the business. Such exits were covered by a 
limited amount of job shadowing so that one directors role could be shared amongst 
the others in case of emergency. 
Dallas had the perspective that you cannot run a business where one person was 
indispensable and the business fails if they cannot be replaced. This was shown in its 
succession planning, where for example Dallas knew that one of their directors was 
retiring in less than two years. The MD was trialling a number of internal candidates 
to see who might be best for the role: 
“…I am going to set four or five in a little sprint and see who is fit.” 
The trials were completely open and once the decision was made, the reasons behind 
it would be made common knowledge so that all Dallas employees had visibility. In 
fact, their customers were aware of, and were supporting, the process (following 
Wolfe et al, 2009). 
Dallas’ key scenario planning was in its management of risk. It understood that 
customers such as Washington were not good at understanding, anticipating, 
planning for and managing risk on construction projects. It understood that this was 
a key part of its offering to the market and an area where it was important that their 
scenario planning was as accurate as possible as it effected the return it made on 
projects. Again, this scenario planning did not change the mental model of the 
organization and was therefore not LO scenario planning (Chermack et al, 2006) 
Dallas’ Washington team leader suggested that some customers consider carrying out 
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their construction programmes by purchasing a contractor and thereby not having to 
pay for external profit on the project and the risk management. He stated: 
“I can see how a client could think “Oh god their 3% they’re making I’ll have 
that” save themselves 3% on £500m. That’s worth having. But they’d lose 
that because they can’t manage [construction risk].”  
It was suggested that this had not happened due to Dallas’ ability to scenario plan for 
risk and manage it so well. 
5.5.6 Kansas 
Kansas had a plan in place to cut director salaries in the case of a downturn, which it 
needed to deploy when a downturn did in fact materialize. This was rolled down to 
middle management and eventually site staff as the recession took further hold. 
However, given the fact that all knew of the plan in advance, this news was received 
rather better than might have been expected. There were further plans on the table 
such as the stoppage of payment for travelling time.  
Kansas, like many of the other participants in this herein reported research appeared 
to be survival learning (Senge et al, 1990, 1994) rather than generative learning 
through scenario planning. Kansas did scenario plan, but it was at the most basic 
level of organizational strategy, to reduce cost in response to a financial crisis. In 
addition, it did understand that such planning gave only short term relief from 
economic pressure and that it would need to plan for the restoration of the status quo 
at some point in the future. Its ‘sharing of pain’ strategy allowed Kansas to retain its 
team and to plan for an upturn in work. The focus group discussed Kansas’ 
diversification of work being a scenario planning tool to guard against the impact of 
losing one of its current customers. 
5.6 Summary 
Within this Mental Models chapter, the analysis came from the case study work done 
on all six nominated contractors. It should be noted, however, that not all discoveries 
in all contractors were analyzed against all Mental Models elements. This was due to 
the differences in depth of demonstration of this LO discipline between the 
contractors. It is noted in the Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations 
chapter 10 that no one organization completely demonstrated all five of the 
disciplines of a LO as set out in Senge et al (1990, 1994) and that the analysis herein 
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drew together the better examples in each Mental Models sub-section from the six 
contractors and contrasts them against each other and previous research. 
This approach, whilst it provided what could be suggested to be a best practice 
example of the deployment of Mental Models within a contracting organization, 
provided a idealist ‘tapestry’ which does not represent the reality for any one 
organization. In addition, some points brought out where there are notable failings in 
the six contractors to adopt LO processes which provided a contrast within the 
analysis. The same approach to analyzing the research was taken in the following 
chapter 6 which examined the Personal Mastery element of the LO model within the 
six nominated contractors. 
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6 Data Analysis and Discussion – The ‘Personal 
Mastery’ Element of the Contractor LO 
6.1 Introduction 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggested that the organization cannot learn if the 
individuals within it do not learn. A LO with individuals committed to Personal Mastery 
will have individuals that demonstrate more than competence. Whilst they will be 
committed to, and receive support for, formal training, they will also hold a vision for 
improvement of the organization and create the ‘tension’ required to realize the 
vision of moving the organization towards this improved state. Thus, such individuals 
never ‘complete’ their learning journey, but are constantly on the journey. 
In order to assess the presence of Personal Mastery, the research looked for the 
contracting organizations to be able to engage in business change and improvement 
created by the individual. In addition, individual commitment to lifelong learning, and 
the support from the organization for individual learning was examined. The 
manifestation of Personal Mastery in the field (Senge et al, 1994) can therefore be 
observed as being individual commitment to personal development and individuals 
being empowered to create improvement within the organization. How these factors 
might manifest within the excellent performing construction organizations is analyzed 
in this thesis under two main headings. First, is the ability for individuals to change 
and improve their own environment. Second, is commitment to lifelong learning and 
concomitant support from their organization. 
Each of the elements mentioned in the preceding paragraph are analyzed and 
discussed through the reflection of the observations within the six nominated 
contractors. Reflection is done not only against the back drop of Senge et al’s (1990, 
1994) work, but broader work from within and without the construction industry. 
Whilst Personal Mastery as a discipline within the LO model from Senge et al’s (1990, 
1994) is not challenged within this chapter, it is important for credibility and rigour to 
analyze and discussion the findings against the detailed, and more recent works 
referenced herein. 
6.2 Change and improvement in the business environment 
Organizational change and improvement in the context of this thesis was that of the 
empowered individual employing his/her own Personal Mastery to effect change 
within his/her own sphere of influence (following Styhre, 2004). It reflects the 
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continual learning mode in which Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggested members of 
the LO live. This continual learning was what was used to create some change within 
the organization. 
6.2.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati encouraged its employees to create organizational change and 
improvement through the formation of project improvement teams. These teams 
were deliberately not restricted to certain disciplines in order to imbue all members of 
the business with the appropriate drive and the opportunity to be part of this 
movement. In addition, the organization tracked the ideas which came from such 
forums to ensure that they were evaluated and implemented and that the business 
impacts were identified. 
Cincinnati gave a simple example of this where a site operative had suggested an 
innovation that allowed them to keep trench ladders cleaner and therefore safer 
whilst in use. Cincinnati’s leader suggested: 
“…the guys have put a grid at the bottom. So when he got out of the tank 
where he’d been digging, he then stood on the grid, bashed his feet. The 
mud then just drops through to the bottom and as he walks up the ladders, 
there’s no mud clinging to the ladders.” 
Whilst in the scheme of things this improvement might be viewed as a very minor 
improvement from a business perspective, it was clearly at the forefront of the minds 
of those interviewed for the research herein reported. The grid innovation quoted 
above demonstrated the level of respect shown for those who do improve the way 
the business operates, no matter how small the contribution may appear to be at first 
glance. 
Such improvements at Cincinnati tended to be run as projects in their own right, for 
which people needed to be diverted from what might be considered their ‘day job’. 
Within a LO, however, business improvement was viewed as part of everyone’s day 
job (Senge et al 1990, 1994). Cincinnati therefore created a budget and a 
programme to deliver such improvements. Cincinnati’s leader stated: 
“…you have execution plans: This is how we’re going to roll it out. This is 
the risk. This is the budget.” 
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The project was then allocated a project manager – where possible the person who 
brought forward the idea. Such allocation ensured maximum buy-in and enthusiasm 
around the project, as postulated by Carboni (1995). A leader was allocated to each 
area of the business to support and advise the person managing the change (where 
that person was not the leader themselves). 
Cincinnati had what its employees see as an “…engineering background of problem 
solving…” culture. This, they opine, was because Cincinnati had an engineering 
background and engineers love to solve problems. They suggest there is, in addition, 
a “…culture of energy…” which came from the fact that the organization had two 
parent companies with such cultures. This means that people will take action quickly 
to solve problems and develop opportunities. The weakness of this approach 
exclusively was noted by Senge et al (1990, 1994) when he described Systems 
Thinking as accepting that the solutions of today were likely to cause the problems of 
tomorrow. Therefore simply having a problem solving culture had the potential to 
cause larger problems either elsewhere within the organization or in the future. 
What definitely was encouraged at Cincinnati was for individuals to bring a solution to 
the table if they bring a problem or opportunity. This approach encouraged an 
approach of “This doesn't work, but I think…” as opposed to simply “It doesn't work”, 
and looking for someone else to solve the issue. The approach moved individuals 
down the path of solutions thinking as opposed to complaining and required 
Cincinnati to encourage people to come forward with such issues in the first place. 
Cincinnati’s leaders ensured that their team understood that they were not going to 
be penalized for coming forward with such issues. It was much more likely that 
individuals would be penalized for attempting to conceal problems. In addition, there 
was no restriction on the level of person whom individuals should approach – there 
was a full open door policy. 
Cincinnati had extended this message to its supply chain to ensure that there was 
consistency of behaviour within the supply chain. The focus group noted: 
“We've stressed to them that if they think they've got a problem they 
should come and tell us.” 
There is, however, a question as to whether this approach was the best method to 
move ideas through the organization (Falconi, 1997; Shenhar 1993). Deeper research 
on the movement and implementation of ideas through Cincinnati might reveal the 
reality of this approach to improving the performance of the organization. Such 
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research was beyond the scope of this thesis and was noted as potential future 
research. 
6.2.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee had automated its business improvement system to make it as easy as 
possible for individuals to identify, recommend and become involved in business 
improvements. Its internal communication system had an interface which allowed 
individuals to send ideas directly to the business improvement coordinator. The 
business improvement coordinator could then work directly with the idea originator to 
evaluate and potentially implement the idea. In addition, this coordinator had an 
important risk management role to play in terms of making sure any good ideas in 
one area did not create problems elsewhere in the business. Such management was 
an example of Systems Thinking being used as an overarching discipline over another 
by tempering Personal Mastery for the overall benefit of the organization (Senge et 
al, 1990, 994). 
Members of Tennessee pointed out, quite correctly, that this process could just as 
easily be done if someone picked up the phone, and the presence of the automated 
process was not the key element. The real impetus for change was the underlying 
culture which encouraged and supported individuals to make the changes in the first 
place, as suggested by Carboni (1995). 
6.2.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis tried to emphasize that people who come forward with improvement 
ideas will be listened to, applauded and taken seriously. During the case study, the 
point was made that Indianapolis understood that saying ‘no thank you’ to every 
suggestion will soon stop the flow of ideas. Indianapolis’ MD suggested the key to 
maintaining the flow of ideas was to reinforce the belief that such ideas will be acted 
upon: 
“…[an employee has] got to believe that we'll at least take him seriously 
and adopt it. I think that's not just [Indianapolis], that's the client as well.” 
In addition, the directors understood that slow responses to ideas had the potential 
to stop the flow, and as such they were generally quick to respond to such things. 
Previous research had noted that without a genuine support for ideas, they will dry 
up (Falconi, 1997). 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 130 
Indianapolis was, however, struggling to enable the flow of suggestions and 
improvements from all quarters in the first instance. This was in spite of the very flat 
structure which was designed to encourage such suggestion flow; a flat structure was 
noted as successful in previous case studies (Lloyd, 1996). In fact, the focus groups 
felt that the flow of business changing ideas upwards was better than the 
management felt it to be. The focus group noted the following regarding 
communication: 
“…you heard it in the meeting. We communicate lots down. But we don’t get 
anything coming back up.” 
The focus group also suggested that the structure and the availability of 
communication channels were excellent for encouraging idea flow: 
“…it's a fairly flat structure but most people knew where to go with ideas.” 
This quote suggested a disconnection between employees’ views of the quality of 
their ideas and management’s view of the same ideas; although both agreed that 
management was voicing frustration about the lack of ideas coming through. 
Indianapolis, however, appeared to lack a transparent mechanism for evaluating 
employee ideas, which was considered to be an integral part of other cases (Lloyd, 
1996). 
At a project level, Indianapolis tried to empower its team to make decisions and run 
projects themselves without management intervention. Individuals suggested that 
they run ideas past senior management who generally approve them and then these 
ideas were implemented. It could be that the lack of management intervention and 
discussion made it appear to management as if there were not very many ideas and 
incremental improvements being made. The focus group defined it as a “moving 
process”. The focus group viewed the culture as being one of “…don’t be afraid to get 
it wrong…”, similar to the case study in Kriegsmann (2005) when it came to 
improvement ideas. This was acceptable as long as the customer was also on board 
with any ideas that directly affect him/her. This shift was a direct departure from the 
usual construction industry culture of never admitting mistakes and thereby avoiding 
a financial claim (Rooke et al, 2003). 
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6.2.4 Chicago 
Chicago was less empowered as an organization and business change tended to be 
fed back to management to implement. Their structure was flat such that the learning 
loop was a relatively straightforward and rapid process to implement. Chicago 
recently mapped their processes in order to enable process change to be more easily 
effected.  
Individuals within Chicago, however, stated that they could see the implementation 
of some of their ideas. The discussion entered into by the focus group alluded to the 
process being a little haphazard. Discussions were around some ideas being 
implemented and some not, with no mention of what the evaluation process was nor 
how individuals discovered why their ideas may not have been implemented. 
Comments from the focus group noted the ‘non committal’ approach within Chicago: 
“…the kind of things I’ve suggested have been considered, some changed 
some not…” 
The advantage of not having a too formalized process, however, was the open 
dialogue around solutions and opportunities which they felt able to have as a 
business due to them being a relatively small and close team. 
This apparent contentedness of Chicago with a flawed system contrasted drastically 
with Lloyd’s (2006) proposed best practice case study in a much larger organization. 
The dichotomy suggested that there may be a different set of best practice LO 
processes depending upon the size and makeup of the organization and that any 
organization can demonstrate a LO culture. This apparent flexibility as to what to look 
for when identifying a LO was a key criticism of Senge et al (1990, 1994) by 
Ortenblad (2007). 
6.2.5 Dallas 
Dallas’ process was an informal one of raising issues to senior management. It did, 
however, appear to always go through the senior management loop before change 
was implemented. A committee then gave a yes or no assessment of the idea, 
although it was stated that most changes were tweaks to an existing model. Where 
large changes in the business service were required, Dallas tended to enlist the help 
of experts in the field rather than rely on internal assessments and use of a formal 
system. It was suggested that there may not be much requirement for business 
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change due to the ability for individuals to make changes within the processes as 
they stand. Dallas MD commented: 
…our management systems are somewhat different to most of the 
contractors in that they’re a little bit open to individual interpretation. We 
then monitor performance against it. We get a formal report back which 
identifies observations - which is where it says ‘They are not using your 
system but I don’t think they’re causing you any problem 
However, the above approach did occasionally cause a flawed outcome which 
required an investigation from senior management. It may be questionable as to 
whether passing this level of personal risk to employees for departure from process 
encouraged or stifled improvement (Kriegsmann, 2005). In addition, the focus group 
was less enthusiastic about the informal process improvement approach. It was 
suggested that whilst improvement ideas were encouraged, they could end up being 
passed between, and discussed by, the directors and then rejected due to not fitting 
with the business vision or other systems. The focus group noted: 
“…somebody came up with [an idea] and that would have…it was contrary 
to what we were trying to do. Management said no.” 
Such an approach to management rejection of ideas suggested that there might not 
be an open improvement discussion group which non-directors could join to develop 
‘different’ ideas. Such a division of voices within an organization into ‘privileged’ and 
‘marginalized’ was a noted criticism of the reality of the LO in Ortenblad (2002). In 
addition, if individuals were not clear on the organizational vision or impact on other 
business systems, then such lack of knowledge was seen to draw into question the 
presence of a true Shared Vision and the depth of the Systems Thinking. 
6.2.6 Kansas 
Like some of the aforementioned organizations, idea implementation appeared to be 
a weakness for Kansas as it openly admitted to having an open door policy for 
individuals to submit improvement ideas to the directors, but that ideas tended to 
wait before being acted upon by directors. This delay was either due to constraints of 
when the directors could meet to discuss the idea, or where those same directors 
were focussing on another area of the business because it may be struggling. Kansas 
MD pointed out its own weakness in the system: 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 133 
“…an [employee] will come to you with an idea and you’re going “Great.” 
Three weeks later you still haven’t done anything to do with it. And you can 
tell their frustration…” 
This quote suggested that Kansas may be missing out on LO opportunities due to 
management focussing too hard on solving the problems, which as Senge et al 
(1990, 1994) observed, was often the cause of future organizational problems. 
6.3 Lifelong learning and support from the organization 
The commitment of the individual within the LO to individual learning that continued 
throughout their career was essential for the organization to keep pace with change 
in the business environment and maintain competitiveness (Keep, 2000). Senge et al 
(1990, 1994) noted that this notion of learning was that the individual never actually 
arrived at a destination and that learning was a journey towards an unknown 
destination. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the organizations were 
assessed for their individuals’ long term commitment to the learning journey and the 
support which the organization provided to allow them to realize their vision. 
6.3.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati’s approach to lifelong learning was with a two stream approach. They 
recognized the weakness of individuals only being able to progress their careers 
through a management route. Cincinnati had been able to establish an alternative 
technical specialist route for those who wished to stay technical as opposed to 
managerial. The old Mental Models that people could only attain a certain seniority 
when they had a certain number of reports were slowly breaking down. Cincinnati’s 
leader noted a few areas where Mental Models were changing in terms of staff grades 
being only related to the number of direct reports: 
“…you haven’t even got anybody who reports to you, yet you’re a level one. 
What an easy life you’ve got!” But I couldn’t do what they do.” 
Central group prepare a learning programme based upon personal goals and skill set 
requirements (following Petroni, 1999). The principle, at all levels of the organization, 
was never that someone was trained once, deployed into a role and forgotten about. 
The main piece that drove the personal development was the underlying business 
succession plan, which suggested a good link between these two business processes. 
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Cincinnati’s approach created a network of learning and training programmes for 
every stage of the individual’s career. The approach to first year trainees was for 
them to spend their first year learning how to do the job before they even set foot in 
an office. Cincinnati’s leader recalled: 
“…I didn’t even step in the office for the first year. I spent it in a training 
centre learning how to do practical engineering side of things…” 
In this way, they were likely to remove some of the pressure on the experienced 
office staff to train extremely ‘green’ trainees. It was likely that this approach 
improved the quality of work produced by the office as it did not have to ‘carry’ these 
staff for their first year. 
In addition, Cincinnati sponsored key members of staff to complete a Master of 
Business Administration (MBA) degree on a full time basis and with full pay. These 
degrees could be taken when the individual and the organization agreed that 
business and personal circumstances were aligned. In terms of starting learning for 
their junior staff, Cincinnati tried to give them as much responsibility as early as 
possible. It then had its senior staff manage and mentor the juniors. One interesting 
comment made by one participant of the focus group was “…it’s courses galore…” in 
terms of developing the senior staff. Blackman & Henderson (2005) noted the 
weakness in a ‘courses galore’ approach to developing a LO and confirmed Senge et 
al’s (1990, 1994) position that action learning was the better way to develop Personal 
Mastery. The reliance on courses suggested a weakness in the Cincinnati Personal 
Mastery model when compared to Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model. 
6.3.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee did not have a formal Continuing Professional Development (CPD) 
programme. Its approach was to have a commitment to their people to ensure that 
they were content in their roles. Such commitment from the individuals enabled them 
to take control of their own learning and development in order to give the most in 
their role. In addition, Tennessee tacitly rather than explicitly expected its employees 
to comply with the CPD requirements of their respective professional bodies. 
Tennessee’s MD commented: 
…getting [employees] to do that is one of the basic culture items of the 
company.” “…that is part of this issue about how people in an organization 
do, sort of, belong to it. Focused in what it is that they’re doing, that the 
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company actually commits to them being satisfied with their lot within the 
company. And out of that comes a willingness and a wish to actually make 
sure that they do their best for the company. And how do you do your best 
for the company? Well you make sure that you keep up to date for a start… 
Tennessee did have a learning and development manager who provided support as 
required, but it was up to the individual to take ownership of their own development; 
which was how Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggested Personal Mastery ought to 
happen. 
6.3.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis’s key position on lifelong learning was that the majority of their staff did 
not leave the organization, but rather spent their entire career at Indianapolis. This 
meant that they were living and learning the organization’s culture for much of their 
lives. This culture, it was suggested by the MD, was that of “…Indianapolis being 
better tomorrow than it is today…” Indianapolis suggested that it learns together as a 
family through shared experience and communication. 
Indianapolis admitted to having no formal structure, policy or process for 
encouraging, enabling or supporting lifelong learning. There was a personal 
development planning process, but the directors admitted that this did not work 
particularly well. It did not see this as a weakness, because it suggested that the 
family atmosphere and family approach as being a powerful tool in lifelong learning. 
The MD suggested: 
“How does the family learn? You know it learns through experiences. It 
learns through the communication. And that’s the way we are.”  
Individuals were still encouraged to achieve professional qualifications, but without a 
well-working formal planning process to support them it appeared that Indianapolis 
may be abdicating too much responsibility for development to its staff. 
Indianapolis felt that the flexible approach to training that they gave their staff, which 
involved giving them an understanding of other team members’ roles, was another 
positive. This approach allowed Indianapolis to be flexible in terms of having multi-
skilled individuals who understood how the rest of the organization worked, as the 
MD noted:  
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“…I want the benefit of [Indianapolis employees] being cross discipline, agile 
and flexible. So that if you think about it, if I’ve only got a cost manager, but 
I need a construction guy on another job…I want to be able to say ‘right, 
great you’re not totally 100% construction. But you understand it enough to 
be able to do that role for me.’ And that’s where you become agile and that’s 
where you add value to your client.” 
The advantage of such a Systems Thinking approach to Personal Mastery (Senge et 
al, 1990, 1994) was an absence of the silo and boundary mentality prevalent in the 
construction industry (following Ankrah et al, 2009). Indianapolis also accepted that 
this did make its employees more marketable from a recruitment perspective, but 
accepted this as part of the reality of business. 
Following on from this, Indianapolis was starting to raise the profile of ‘attitude’ in 
comparison to ‘technical competence’ in the selection and development of people and 
supply chains. A member of the focus group asked “…it's the right person the right 
attitude, they can learn to do the job can't they?” There was a general agreement in 
the room from the focus group to this rhetorical question. 
Sagar (1980) differentiated people with positive attitudes as ‘improvers’ as opposed 
to ‘non-improvers’ who were those with poor attitudes. Indianapolis, therefore, were 
looking to hire ‘improvers’. For development of their own people, Indianapolis had 
developed its own system called ‘I-Train’ which covers technical and behavioural 
competencies. 
6.3.4 Chicago 
Chicago had a similar stance on lifelong learning to Indianapolis in that they 
suggested that there was no substitute for learning through doing and that this 
stance had been very successful. Its MD admitted, however, to having to add a 
necessary change into the system in order to encourage people to learn, saying: 
…my job really is to just keep challenging and pushing and you know people 
get so frustrated with me because I'm constantly fiddling with systems and 
suggesting productivity aids and encouraging people to try new ways of 
doing things. And altering structures, but I think that's my job isn't it; I've 
got to keep challenging and that forces people to keep learning…. 
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It could be suggested that the MD was trying to challenge people’s Mental Models in 
order to necessitate learning. It may be argued that Chicago’s position, which was 
much like the other participants in the research study reported in this thesis, were 
aware that lifelong learning had to be led by the individual and the business did not 
drive it through a formal process. Basic education and qualification in the business 
essentials, such as NVQs, was encouraged and some directors within Chicago 
encouraged their teams to gain further formal qualifications. Even accepting this 
encouragement, all participants confirmed that the onus was always on the individual 
to push themselves and then the support would be provided by Chicago. During the 
focus group, there was a lot of discussion around wanting to do further study, but 
work commitments not permitting the time. A general comment from the focus group 
was: 
I always had this whole idea when I came out of university about going on 
and do another course afterwards and definitely getting my Chartership for 
building. But it’s just one of those things as soon as you get into work and 
you’re working away you just…It just vanishes. And I’ve been meaning to 
do it for ages. 
It might suggest that Chicago had a culture where formal qualifications were not 
viewed as a source of business excellence; a view which was in fact supported in 
research (following Fonda & Smilansky, 1994). Support to the individual taking 
qualifications was decided on a case by case basis and Chicago had made use of 
‘coaches’ for their directors and some key project managers to develop competency 
where needed. 
6.3.5 Dallas 
Dallas suggested that its training and development of new trainees was amongst the 
best in the industry, but admitted that after trainees reached their chartered status, 
Dallas was not brilliant at taking personal development further. An example was 
given of a recently chartered employee who wanted to do a Risk Management 
Masters degree, but who was being discouraged because she could not demonstrate 
a clear benefit to the business. Dallas did not wish to garnish CVs with qualifications 
for the sake of it. The strategy for this person was for her to spend time with Dallas’ 
three best risk managers to learn as much as possible and then the Masters would be 
reconsidered. She commented that she was advised: 
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…go and talk to these three people, look at their risk registers, talk to them 
about your job. They’ll all be quite happy to help you compile your own risk 
register and let’s see how it goes. Come back and tell me at the end what 
you got right, what you got wrong, what risks you controlled and then let’s 
get you off on a Masters degree. 
In addition, Dallas had an internal prospectus of 400 courses which were usually 
selected by individuals for personal development during their appraisals. This 
appraisal process flowed from, and was linked to, the overall business plan which 
ensured role alignment. The process highlighted areas and directions for personal 
development which combined the business and individual needs as one. Alongside the 
‘Academy’, Dallas offered first degrees which were created specifically to improve 
upon the formal education offered by Universities which Dallas stated was ‘boring’ 
their trainees. Therefore it had created a degree course which aligned with the 
interest trainees got from their on site learning environment. Dallas team leader for 
the Washington commission stated that: 
…we set up our own degree course in [location] and that’s a general 
construction management course…” “So they come out with a basic 
understanding but then the Academy trains apprentices as well. Generally 
about 50 a year bricklayers, carpenters and some decorators… the 
knowledge that probably 70% will leave us but there will be a number that 
will stay with us…. 
Dallas’ position here appeared to be well aligned with Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) 
position on Personal Mastery, where it was defined as a journey of personal 
enlightenment which served to change the organization itself (Garcia-Morales et al, 
2007). Many of the other participants talked almost exclusively about the 
development of the individual as a destination ending in a qualification without 
reference to the impact upon the organization. 
Part of Dallas’ early development of trainees was not to pigeonhole them as project 
managers, quantity surveyors, architects, planners or similar. Dallas gave them the 
opportunity to spend a couple of months within each department, should they so 
choose, to gain an understanding of where their career might best lie. In addition, 
this developmental approach gave all trainees a better Systems Thinking 
understanding of the organization and the industry (following Senge et al, 1990, 
1994). The MD of Dallas started his career this way and recommended it to new 
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starters as the best way to find personal direction. Indeed, more experienced 
members of the organization were still moved around where relevant to their learning 
and development. A focus group member commented that: 
“…you're watched sort of you know, you're interacting with people and that. 
And if they think you've got a capability for doing something they'll tend to 
sort of, you know, move you forward or into a different area…” 
Dallas used to have a different approach to lifelong learning in terms of taking 
individuals through their career. It used to be that individuals would start at site 
labourer level and work their way through to project manager level. However, given 
Dallas’ move to a more ‘management contractor’ model relying on subcontractors to 
supply site operatives on projects, they now had individuals coming in at trainee 
project manager level instead and going through the ‘Academy’. This approach, 
Dallas admitted, was not as good a route as before, so it tried to get trainees on site 
as much as possible to observe and to ‘make mistakes and learn from them’ 
(Kriegsmann, 2005). Dallas’ team leader for the Washington commission asserted 
that: 
…the difficulty for us is letting someone do something and making a 
mistake. Accepting that someone learning is going to make a mistake. It’s 
very easy to do everything yourself and jump “You’re doing that wrong, do 
it like this”. They don’t learn anything by doing that. Let them make a 
mistake, it’s not a problem once. It’s not a real problem twice…. 
Dallas did have understanding customers who accepted having such trainees on their 
projects and that such mistakes were part of the learning process (Kriegsmann, 
2005). Dallas’ team leader for the Washington commission followed up with: 
…we do consult [Washington] and if we’re going to put somebody in the 
firing line, one of the Assistant Project Managers in the firing line to do a 
particular task, say give them a piece of the work to do and say ‘Right 
that’s yours, you’re responsible for it’. We’ll talk to the [Washington Project 
Representative] first and say you know and 99 times out of 100 they’ll say 
‘That’s good you know give them a chance to develop and go for it. 
The ‘Align’ team within Dallas had its own personal development budget in order to 
keep themselves up to date with new technologies to bring the learning into the 
organization. This team was actively encouraged into keeping their lifelong learning 
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completely up to date to ensure that they did not fall behind their competitors. This 
approach, however, did not suggest a LO in Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) terms where 
individuals choose to engage in lifelong learning in order to be able proactively to 
shape their environment. 
6.3.6 Kansas 
Kansas sought to develop people from entry level to management level and tended to 
work with those who put themselves forward for new roles. It had appreciated that 
individuals may not perform or grow within a role that they do not want, even if it did 
look like a good career opportunity. Kansas MD indicated that: 
“…[director] who owns Kansas Joinery he’s a very encouraging man for 
people to get on with in the business. But once he gives you something he 
tends to let you just get on with it. Because you’ll either make a good job of 
it or you’ll just fall to the wayside, do you know what I mean? And he’ll 
support you on the way up there but he won’t push you to the extent you’re 
somewhere where you don’t want to be.” 
In addition, the directors appeared to understand the principle that if someone could 
not be replaced, they could not be promoted. Kansas MD stated: “…I want you to 
have my job because if you have my job that means I can move on to another job.” 
Kansas also provided support to individuals who wished to take formal courses. This 
support took the form of payment of fees and time off for study. In fact there were 
compulsory levels of study which the organization required and in some cases 
individuals were seen to need to be strongly encouraged into taking the study. In 
some instances individuals took it upon themselves to gain formal training and 
qualifications without the organization’s knowledge and then informed it afterwards, 
rather than ask for support up front. Kansas’ directors speculated that this might be 
because individuals did not wish to take the risk of having business support them on 
a course that they subsequently failed and with then feared they might jeopardize 
their position as a result. The MD stated: 
“…if [employees] fail and they don’t make it, it’s not… They think it might 
affect their employment within the business. But it doesn’t really with Kansas 
if I am honest…”  
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Fear of failure was seen to be a key element holding back many organizations from 
becoming LOs (Simpson, 1997). It was made clear during the herein reported 
research that Kansas did not view a failed course as being a weakness in an 
individual, although a passed one was viewed as a strength. If individuals were 
making a different assumption, then there appeared to be a disconnection between 
the directors’ message and the employees’ beliefs, a disconnection that might 
suggest a lack of a Shared Vision being demonstrated in the Personal Mastery arena 
(Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
6.4 Summary 
Within this Personal Mastery chapter, the analysis again came from the case study 
work done on all six nominated contractors. It should be noted, however, that not all 
discoveries in all contractors were analyzed against all Personal Mastery elements. 
This was due to the differences in depth of demonstration of this LO discipline 
between the contractors. It is noted in the Conclusions, Implications and 
Recommendations chapter 10 that no one organization demonstrated all of the 
elements of a LO and that the analysis herein drew together the better examples in 
each Personal Mastery sub-section from the six contractors and contrasted them 
against each other and previous research. 
This approach, whilst it provided what could be suggested to be a best practice 
example of the deployment of Personal Mastery within a contracting organization, 
provided a idealist ‘tapestry’ which does not represent the reality for any one 
organization. In addition, some points brought out where there are notable failings in 
the six contractors to adopt LO processes which provided a contrast within the 
analysis. The same approach to analyzing the research was taken in the following 
chapter 7 which examined the Shared Vision element of the LO model within the six 
nominated contractors. 
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7 Data Analysis and Discussion – The ‘Shared Vision’ 
Element of the Contractor LO 
7.1 Introduction 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggested that a Shared Vision held by a LO could be 
described in more detail as a shared picture of the future the organization seeks to 
create. It was seen to be distinct from the all-too-familiar vision statement which was 
often nailed to the wall of the reception of some organizations which may have been 
written decades ago and had become part of the furniture. Senge et al (1990, 1994) 
postulated that having a Shared Vision enabled other LO disciplines, such as 
experimentation and innovation, to be achieved. The Shared Vision did this through 
ensuring that individuals committed as a group to the organization and personally 
wished to excel and learn rather than having to be encouraged or forced to grow. 
Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) position did not mean that the vision could not emanate 
from the leader with the rest of the organization committing to this vision, although 
they must be able to modify and clarify the vision through their interactions with it. 
What was clear was that a Shared Vision could not be directly imposed onto the 
organization by a powerful minority. In order to identify the presence of Shared 
Vision, the research reported in this thesis examined the prevalence of elements 
suggested by Senge et al (1990, 1994) as being essential to developing the vision. 
These were the development of communities of practice for like-minded individuals to 
come together to develop the vision; the ability for individuals to live the vision 
through the demonstrating leadership at all levels within the organization; the 
aligning of individual and business needs; and most importantly the presence of, and 
agreement with, an organizational vision as a whole. 
Each of the elements mentioned in the preceding paragraph are analyzed and 
discussed through the reflection of the observations within the six nominated 
contractors. Reflection is done not only against the back drop of Senge et al’s (1990, 
1994) work, but broader work from within and without the construction industry. 
Whilst Shared Vision as a discipline within the LO model from Senge et al’s (1990, 
1994) is not challenged within this chapter, it is important for credibility and rigour to 
analyze and discussion the findings against the detailed, and more recent works 
referenced herein. 
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7.2 Communities of Practice 
A Communities of Practice is defined in Loyarte & Rivera (2007) as 
“…an activity system that includes individuals who are united in action and 
in the meaning that action has for them and for the larger collective”. 
It is further noted that they are informal entities that exist when people participate in 
problem solving, or acting upon opportunities, and share knowledge necessary to 
complete the task. Communities of Practice can therefore be viewed as vehicles to 
create, maintain and exchange knowledge within an organization (Senge et al 1990, 
1994). 
7.2.1 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis used its customer delivery teams to create communities of practice. It 
described each unit as a little family within the overall family that was the 
organization. The suggestion was made that all within these communities understand 
the various strengths and weaknesses of the other members as they worked together 
all the time. The situation was not, however, formalized as communities of practice 
as such; although this may not be felt as necessary within an organization this size, 
as noted in the focus group: 
“I also think, because of the size of the company we are, we talk about a 
'family' but what it really is, is a society in a way. We are that size where we 
are a society. And everybody virtually knows everyone else…” 
Du Plessis (2008) noted that fully implementing communities of practice within 
smaller organizations can, and did, support the flow of innovation and knowledge. It 
appeared that Indianapolis might not be exploiting this LO resource to the full. 
7.2.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee developed two types of community of practice, labelled “…product 
groupings….” and “…process groupings…” The product groupings were expert 
representatives from various sectors who came together to exchange knowledge 
about the sector. The process groupings were similar, but these groups were 
comprised of individuals who were experts in the same technical or professional field. 
These groupings demonstrated a ‘roles-based’ approach which enabled the 
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improvement of individual and team job performance and productivity (Hemmasi & 
Csanda, 2009). 
7.2.3 Dallas 
A conscious effort was made in terms of seating arrangements in the Dallas 
organization office to encourage informal discussion between those in similar 
professions. Whilst this arrangement in itself did not create communities of practice, 
Hemmasi & Csanda (2009) noted that the best performing communities of practice 
tended to be informal ones. 
Outside of socializing and the informal communities that came about on projects, 
Dallas did not create or encourage communities of practice. Such an approach was 
suggested by Hemmasi & Csanda (2009) as being a ‘project-based’ approach to 
communities of practice; or ‘emergent’ communities of practice (Juriado & 
Gustafsson, 2007). Dallas’ focus group bemoaned the transient nature of the industry 
given its project based status which made forming communities of practice difficult: 
“…you can be working away to what you think is right and occasionally sort 
of it's not the same as what another site is doing. And you think, "Oh I 
wouldn't have done it that way" or whatever…there's not an awful lot of 
communication between the different teams...” 
The scenarios noted above appear to suggest that within Dallas, the project based 
communities worked better than roles based communities, which might suggest that 
project level learning was being lost.  
7.3 Demonstrating leadership at all levels 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) noted the need for the LO to be able to demonstrate that all 
members could adopt leadership behaviours when necessary and not rely on titular 
leaders to provide all leadership. This is not to say that anarchy of everyone trying to 
lead should prevail, but that the appropriate person is leading at all times whether 
that should be a board member or someone with ownership. Senge et al (1999) 
defined several types of leader for several situations – executive leaders, line leaders 
and network/community leaders. 
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7.3.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati actively encouraged leadership demonstration at all levels to enable 
individuals to identify themselves for promotion through the business. The onus was 
still on the individual to step forward, but the demonstration of leadership itself was 
what was supported by the business. Cincinnati’s leader cited an example of a 
document controller who had started to take informal leadership responsibility 
(following Neubert & Taggar, 2004) for her area and now worked autonomously 
managing document controls for Cincinnati: 
“…Lynne, for example, used to be document control, not the highest level in 
the world, but she’s developed from her own little areas. She’s expanded it 
up. She’s now Head of Waste Water for document control. She’s now head of 
non-infra for document control. She’s now moving in there and we love 
that.” 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) noted that leadership did not need to be shown as 
groundbreaking, but just as the ability for individuals to demonstrate leadership in 
their own field or area of influence within the organization. 
7.3.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee viewed individual leadership as a current hot topic which it was working on 
at the time the research for this thesis was undertaken. It was carrying out extensive 
employee research and one of the topics being covered was leadership generally. 
Tennessee’s research was prompted by some vocal criticism of the management 
levels and their leadership. Although ironically, Tennessee’s own research had 
eventually shown good reviews for leadership generally within the organization. 
Tennessee’s research was done at the same time as rolling out a personal leadership 
programme to encourage people to take leadership at all levels. This programme was 
designed to raise employee cognizance of the fact that they were required to step up 
and show leadership where necessary, especially at a site level. The MD noted: 
“…we've already set off on a sort of personal leadership programme for 
people so that, recognising that even if they are the ganger on site they are 
still leaders…”  
This process suggested that Tennessee was actively looking to create the impetus for 
individuals to take leadership responsibility. 
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In addition, Tennessee was trying to align this training to a culture change whereby 
employees did not just view those with leadership titles as leaders, but realized the 
need for all employees to demonstrate leadership: 
“…even the person at the bottom of the pile, the site labourer yeah, can 
actually demonstrate leadership qualities by saying 'don't go up that ladder, 
it's not tied.” 
It suggested that the decentralized nature of the organization helped such a culture 
to develop. If the organization was viewed as one centralized entity then people 
might feel removed from the leadership and influence process. 
7.3.3 Indianapolis 
At Indianapolis, the site managers were the best example of individual leadership 
demonstration. However, all in the organization were expected to try and 
continuously change and improve. The focus group related that one of the site 
managers has recently taken on the responsibilities for the IT setup on his sites to 
save the IT department having to come and do it. One focus group member stated:  
“Because we're doing quick three, four week jobs, setting them up quick and 
doing it. He said, I'm quite good on I.T., why don't, rather than the I.T., 
department doing it why don't they give me the box of tricks and I'll do it 
while I'm down there doing the phasing and stuff.”  
Indianapolis’s management suggested that approaches such as this allowed people to 
have greater ownership of their projects. They did note the paradox that the more 
leadership an individual demonstrated, the less individual plaudits they received. 
Plaudits tended to be given to those closer to the work delivery and/or at a more 
junior level, particularly from the customer. 
The above paradox was interesting and appeared to be a key omission from Senge et 
al’s (1990, 1994) model. The more that an individual demonstrated leadership, the 
more removed from the customer feedback they became. It could be postulated that 
those who were most motivated by positive individual feedback may be discouraged 
from seeking leadership roles. These individuals may be more comfortable in a 
follower role where they could receive the mainly positive messages they crave. This 
observation aligned with the research of Drake et al (2007) who suggested that 
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positive feedback had more of an impact on individual performance that financial 
(such as promotion) incentives.  
7.3.4 Chicago 
Chicago expected its employees to demonstrate leadership on a regular basis and 
suggested that their customers, particularly Minnesota, would find it surprising if 
Chicago did not give employees the opportunity to do so. The MD stated: 
“…if I showed up to check that it was okay they'd think I was insulting the 
guy that was doing it because they trust him so much…”  
This view lent further support for the necessity for the construction LO to receive a 
drive from their customers, departing from the assumptions of Chinowsky et al 
(2007a) and Maqsood et al (2007) that the LO can develop independent of customer 
influence within the construction industry. An example was that one of Chicago’s 
project managers had started to manage projects autonomously on the continent 
without the need for intervention from Chicago’s senior management. This individual 
was an example of individual leadership supporting the Shared Vision (in this case 
diversification) of the organization (following Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
The job roles within Chicago were specifically designed to create the ability for people 
to take on a leadership role. The entry level role in Chicago was that of ‘site 
manager’, which was a role that entailed the management of subcontractors on site. 
Chicago’s MD commented: 
“…everyone is managing. So you know I don't think that question has a lot 
of meaning for us really.” 
This role, therefore, required a certain level of leadership and individuals assuming 
this role were to an extent expected to be able to demonstrate leadership 
immediately. It was the site manager’s responsibility to provide leadership to the 
subcontractors on site and ensure that the project was tightly managed. Senior 
management acted in a consultative role to provide assistance and leadership support 
when needed. 
7.3.5 Dallas 
Dallas encouraged its employees to take leadership if they saw something on a live 
site that did not appear correct; which could be from a technical, project or health 
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and safety perspective. They were given carte blanch empowerment from 
management to stop all work and to report to the project manager what might need 
attention. This was similar to the empowerment to halt production principle employed 
by Toyota on their production lines (Liker, 2004). Dallas’ team leader for the 
Washington projects noted: 
“…if a surveyor is walking around site and thinks that foundation should be 
a lot deeper than [it is being cast]… he’ll go in to see the Contracts Manager 
or even the Site Manager and say ‘Pull out that drawing and just check 
that…” 
The MD had actually tested this point by deliberately entering a site enclosure without 
relevant safety equipment. Junior members of staff were expected to stop him from 
entering site and were rewarded if they did so. Thus far, these individuals usually 
passed the test. 
Within the fast track environment of retail construction, Dallas suggested that 
everyone must demonstrate leadership in order to simply get the project completed. 
All members of the Dallas organization had to take ownership of their role and not 
wait for instruction from management. Fast reaction and action were necessary to 
make such projects a success. Dallas suggested that there was little time for an 
empathic approach in such an environment and that not all individuals were suited to 
work in it. Dallas’ MD said: 
“…you have to want to be the leader, so we will often be described as 
arrogant and brash and not very empathetic. I think that’s a common trait in 
fast track retail construction and I don’t think you can be successful any 
other way.” 
It appeared that Dallas had indeed learned the need to act this way as an 
organization through encouraging individual leadership. Millet & Sandberg (2005) 
suggested that empowerment was a solution to the problems which arise as part of 
working in a high pressure arena. Millet & Sandberg’s (2005) position suggested that 
combining individual leadership with high pressure might be a better LO solution than 
it might first appear. 
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7.4 Aligning individual and business needs 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) referred to alignment of the individual and business needs 
as a sort of natural facing towards a ‘magnetic north’ or orientation point. Such a 
point would almost be pulling the business and the individuals towards their future. 
He suggests that it is almost a natural phenomenon of Shared Vision if the 
organizational change is being carried out well. 
7.4.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati tackled the issue of aligning individual and business needs through their 
Personal Development Review (PDR) system. Their strategy was to align the most 
senior members of the organization’s personal goals to the organization’s overall 
goals through their PDRs. Then, each member of the organization below them had 
their PDR aligned with their line manager dependent upon their own personal goals. 
Cincinnati’s leader noted that the process flowed from his parent company’s MD, 
advising: 
“…the way they do it, I can’t fill in mine until my boss has done his. So the 
MD’s actually done his now. So the next level do theirs….”  
Such alignment allowed the PDR process to serve a purpose for both the organization 
and the individual and ensured that there was as much alignment and as little 
misalignment of goals as possible. 
Such an approach was similar to the ‘Investors in People’ model set out by Mason 
(1994a) which advocated clear alignment between departmental and individual goals. 
Cincinnati accepted that its approach left a time lag between PDRs as they were 
passed down through the organization, although this lag was felt to be a small 
sacrifice to make for excellent goal alignment. 
7.4.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee discussed the opportunities for personal advancement within its and its 
parent organization as the source for alignment. Similarly to Cincinnati, alignment 
was managed through the PDR process (Mason, 1994a). The key difference within 
Tennessee’s system was that the Human Resources (HR) representatives from each 
operating division within the organization had sight of all instances where individuals 
highlighted a desire to work in a particular area or specialism. 
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With this information Tennessee HR could align strategic opportunities identified at a 
business level with opportunities individuals were seeking. Such alignment allowed 
for the easy and frequent transfer of individuals between elements of the business. 
Transfer was seen to improve the knowledge and experience transfer within the 
organization as a whole (Senge et al 1990, 1994) whilst allowing the individuals to 
fulfil their own needs. Tennessee’s MD advised that: 
“…where an individual is flagging up that actually he would like to go and 
work not on buildings but on the railway for instance, yeah, it's, it really is 
quite easy for us to be able to effect a transfer…”  
This approach was very similar to the process deployed in manufacturing such as in 
the Volkswagen-Skoda partnership (Gutmann, 1995). The difference with 
Tennessee’s model was that the intention was not to transfer knowledge from one 
business partner to another, but rather was part of an ongoing business improvement 
initiative. 
Having an ability to move people easily within the organization was also seen to 
improve Tennessee’s competitive advantage and quality of service (following 
Gutmann, 1995). Such improvement aligned with their business strategy. Having 
people with different backgrounds throughout the organization allowed operating 
divisions to subcontract effectively with each other at net cost. Other organizations 
without this flexibility may need to buy experience to gain the same advantage as 
Tennessee suggested it possessed. 
7.4.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis suggested that their business philosophy aligned very well with 
individual needs. A member of the focus group postulated: 
“…obviously people want to progress, they want to be happy with their 
work, they want to feel they're going to work for a good company and 
they're going to get satisfaction from their job. They're going to learn and 
progress.” 
The Indianapolis focus group discussed individuals who were able to align their need 
to change roles or progress through the organization. The lead from the directors was 
that individuals should not wait to be told to do something, they should take the 
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initiative by default, with management only intervening where requested. Another 
focus group participant stated: 
“It's trusting as well that the people working around you trust you enough 
to know that you're going to go up there and do the work…” 
In addition, Indianapolis ensured that new employee inductions covered not only 
their own values and goals, but also those of their key customers. This process 
ensured alignment between the individual, organization and customer. This process 
might be relatively innovative within the construction industry, although in depth 
verification of this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
7.4.4 Chicago 
Chicago was acutely aware of the fact that if it became a bureaucratic machine which 
constrained the actions of its employees then it was likely to lose some staff. In 
addition, it was also aware that some individuals would actually prefer to work in an 
autocratic and/or bureaucratic environment. This last point was in sharp contrast with 
the reams of ‘autocracy was bad for the organization’ literature of recent times 
(Jones, 2003) and was also not in line with Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) LO model. 
Chicago understood that empowering willing individuals and allowing them to align 
their personal goals to that of the organization was key to staff retention in a 
competitive talent market. Chicago’s MD said: 
“… we feel entitled to job satisfaction and lifelong learning and riches. And all 
the rest of it so - and different people are going to come at that differently, 
you know, I mean some people who work here who I have been thinking for 
the last 10 years, ‘They'll hand in their notice tomorrow.’ You know they're 
so bloody good I don't know why they're staying; they could go and earn 
twice as much somewhere else.” 
In order to assure that the organization allowed its employees to best align their 
goals with the organization, Chicago had taken the first step in understanding that all 
employees had different needs. This insight allowed them to retain their talent by 
allowing people to develop their role to suit. 
7.4.5 Dallas 
Dallas talked enthusiastically about its ability to promote internally and develop its 
internal talent. It did not until recently align individual needs to organizational goals. 
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A change was made recently to their appraisal forms and process which now aligned 
individual needs, business targets and strategy, and training needs (following Mason, 
1994). This change had yet to be really tested in the long term to establish whether 
the system was now working to create alignment. 
It was noted that the Dallas focus group was currently unsure of whether there was 
alignment between individual and organizational goals, but they assumed that 
alignment. One key theme which emerged was individual pride – pride in delivering 
projects on time and to budget. Dallas suggested that this pride was visible in the 
effort and time that individuals committed to making their projects a success. 
The use of the word pride linked with the reference to family atmosphere was 
interesting as it suggested that Dallas had the same approach to its employees as 
Bacardi-Martini (Kirby, 2005), albeit less developed. There is, however, clearly a need 
to communicate how aligned to Bacardi-Martini’s best practice Dallas’ approach might 
be, as the focus group clearly noted a communication breakdown in understanding 
how their organizational pride might create (or indeed came from) good alignment of 
goals. 
7.4.6 Kansas 
Kansas alignment appeared simply to be that individuals were part of Kansas to make 
money and Kansas existed to grow and make money too. This observation suggested 
that thinking about goal alignment was not at the forefront of thinking within this 
organization. 
7.5 Organizational vision 
Organizational vision remains the most abstract of Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) 
concepts behind the LO model. Foster & Akdere (2007) conceptualized it as 
something which offers direction to an organization and that helps increase 
organizational success. In addition, he noted the lack of research into the area 
specifically and therefore the lack of an accepted definition. This in turn suggested to 
Foster & Akdere (2007) that visions were not as effective as they could be at driving 
success. Nonetheless, organizational vision was a key element of Senge et al’s (1990, 
1994) Shared Vision model. 
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7.5.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati’s vision, whilst being the laudable one of ‘taking the lead’ among its peer 
group in terms of innovation and organizational progress, still appeared to be dictated 
rather than created. The organizational vision was reinforced to employees during 
presentations given by the senior members of the organization, albeit commitment to 
the vision appearing to be lacking. One member of the focus group stated that: 
“…in our morale survey is that we either [no ‘or’ stated] get feedback on the 
fact that some of them don't appreciate all the vision that they get shown…” 
The lack of commitment to a dictated vision was apparently a common organizational 
problem, as noted in Senge et al (1990, 1994). A LO cannot have such an approach 
to organizational vision creation. By definition (Senge et al 1990, 1994) it must be 
created from a shared position. 
7.5.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee did not bother with visions at all. It did not have an organizational vision, 
nor did it have them at operating division level. Instead, it had a series of 
commitments which were prominently displayed on its website. Again, each of these 
was quite laudable in its intent, but there appeared to be little insight as to how these 
were developed and to what extent the organization’s individuals helped to develop, 
update and actually strive to achieve those commitments. Furthermore, when these 
commitments were examined, they were very reminiscent of a broken down vision 
statement when analyzed against Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model. 
7.5.3 Indianapolis 
One of the Indianapolis senior managers, the team leader of the Miami commission, 
felt that he was at his most motivational when delivering his vision to the team. 
Reflecting on the lack of feedback and innovation from staff generally which was 
bemoaned by senior staff at Indianapolis during the course of the research; there 
may be a link between the fact that the vision was being delivered rather than 
constructed collectively (following Hodgkinson, 2002) and the fact that individuals did 
not feel empowered, or the need to feed innovation back. The specific link between 
the two phenomena was not investigated specifically. The Miami commission team 
leader did however believe that he created motivation within his team to overcome 
obstacles and blockers. Others within the Indianapolis focus group, however, did 
seem to all repeat the same vision – that of being “…more than just a builder…” 
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The Indianapolis vision appeared to be adjusted through customer interaction. The 
focus group advised: 
“…the overall vision doesn't change really. We just reinforce the message of, 
as I keep saying, delivery, certainty, quality, do the best job you can for your 
client and understanding it. Updating it we probably tweak it and we vary it 
bit to bit to what the client's current needs are….”  
This position of having the Shared Vision adjusted through customer interaction was 
a departure from Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model which assumed the vision was 
constructed from within the organization. It was seen to parallel the similar customer 
influence alluded to in the Mental Models chapter of this thesis. 
7.5.4 Chicago 
Chicago’s vision, or guiding principles as the vision was referred to, was one of 
excellent customer service – albeit that Chicago conceded that this service did cost 
their customers a premium. Its organizational vision was taken from the MD’s 
personal vision. The MD stated: 
“I think we have some guiding principles here, I think they're well 
understood because I have enough meetings far enough down the 
organization to make sure that people hear what I think. And what I think 
definitely changes with the changing context in which we work…” 
This quote suggested that the vision within Chicago was not a shared one in the 
terms that Senge et al (1990, 1994) suggested, but was imposed from the top. This 
was not to suggest that the business did not support the vision, but it did question its 
ability to influence and shape it. This position was confirmed during the focus group, 
where one member commented:  
“A new mission statement was sent out, new logos were produced, new 
company branding, colours, all that kind of stuff. So definitely that has sent a 
new communication out to everybody…” 
Further to this, the focus group’s language continually referred back to how the MD 
wanted the business to be run. This suggested that individuals, rather than helping to 
shape the business vision, were simply reflecting the required vision back to the MD 
and adjusting their vision to that which he expected. This approach was not 
consistent with what Senge et al (1990, 1994) proposed whereby the leader’s vision 
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was grown by the individuals in the organization. Fowles & Edwards (1999) offered a 
practical case study of how a leadership vision became a Shared Vision, creating real 
business results, which suggested that there should be a greater element of Shared 
Vision implementation within organizations such as Chicago. 
7.5.5 Dallas 
Dallas showed an excellent development of organizational vision in terms of all 
participants in this thesis research relating the same vision. Dallas’ business vision 
was one of keeping the customer happy and doing everything in its power to ensure 
that that happens. The theme of all members of Dallas demonstrating a personal will 
to keep customers happy ran throughout the case study. It should be stressed, 
however, that all respondents noted that this did not include a high commitment to 
innovation, rather being excellent at the basics. One focus group member 
commented: 
“…the vision is to keep the client happy and for the last three years since 
we’ve been running it…change could happen tomorrow I suppose because 
someone could come and think of we want to do this instead now, we want 
to be the most innovative contractor in Washington, might change I doubt it 
but we’re not like that. It’s one of the criticisms of the Group really that 
we’re…we don’t come up with brand new radical solutions, we just do the 
basics, well….” 
Dallas’ Shared Vision also allowed it to alter the mental model of the project 
management role. A focus group member stated: 
“…we try and deliver a first class service. As I said before like when I said 
about the trying to get into the Project Manager’s mind that you’re effectively 
especially on an existing store like a doctor on call.”  
It was likely that Dallas’ leaders developed this mental model alongside the vision 
before implementing the strategic direction for the organization (following Santos & 
Garcia, 2006). 
In addition, there was a strong suggestion that Dallas aligned its organizational vision 
to its customers’ visions. This may be easy for an organization which works 
predominantly in one sector, but may be more difficult for a larger contractor which 
covers many sectors. A focus group member offered: 
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“…you can see how much the industry or the sector of construction that 
we’re working in has affected the way we run our company and I think that’s 
a great strength for Dallas that we are not afraid to allow our sector to set 
our plan and our management systems. And I think a lot of the big national 
contractors try to inflict a ‘We are the mighty so and so and this is how we 
are'. Now go away and talk to the customers and tell them how great we are’ 
and we actually say ‘We’ll work with you. How should we operate to most 
meet your requirements?” 
However, the director of the Washington team still developed a ‘vision’ for his 
element of the business. This was then submitted to the board for review, critique 
and approval with the board having the final say as to what went into the vision for 
the year. This approach suggested that the vision was not entirely shared and still 
largely controlled at a board level and may be seen to conflict with the practice 
suggested by Fowles & Edwards (1999) and Senge et al (1990, 1994). 
7.5.6 Kansas 
Kansas’ vision was one of doing an excellent job for their customers and to use this 
to gain further work from referrals. It tended not to advertise and therefore such 
referrals were the lifeblood of the organization. In addition, it was strict about not 
misleading customers and this was something that the chairman developed and 
instilled as the business vision in his employees in order to gain those referrals. The 
MD stated that: 
“…we’ll never ever convince a client that what he’s got is good if it’s bad. 
We’ll just say to him ‘Forget it. We’ll rip it down and we’ll do it again.’ So in 
the way, the goals for the people within the business they will see that, 
that’ll be demonstrated to them.”  
This vision has, however, been tempered by a short term vision to survive in the 
recession. This issue had changed Kansas’ view on self promotion and it had started 
to raise its visibility in pursuit of this new vision. 
7.6 Summary 
Within this Shared Vision chapter, as with the previous chapters 5 and 6, the analysis 
again came from all six nominated contractors. Again, not all discoveries in all 
contractors were analyzed against all Shared Vision elements. This was again due to 
the differences in depth of demonstration of this LO discipline between the 
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contractors. It is noted in the Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations 
chapter 10 that no one organization demonstrated all of the elements of a LO and 
that the analysis herein, again similarly to chapters 5 and 6 drew together the better 
examples in each Shared Vision sub-section from the six contractors and contrasted 
them against each other and previous research. 
This approach, whilst it provided what could be suggested to be a best practice 
example of the deployment of Shared Vision within a contracting organization, 
provided a idealist ‘tapestry’ which does not represent the reality for any one 
organization. In addition, some points brought out where there are notable failings in 
the six contractors to adopt LO processes which provided a contrast within the 
analysis. The same approach to analyzing the research was taken in the following 
chapter 8 which examined the Team Learning element of the LO model within the six 
nominated contractors. 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 158 
8 Data Analysis and Discussion – The ‘Team 
Learning’ Element of the Contractor LO 
8.1 Introduction 
Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) position on Team Learning is that it is essential to align 
and develop the capabilities of the individuals within an organization if they are to 
work together toward a common goal. The discipline builds upon what is achieved 
through the employment of Shared Vision and Personal Mastery to enable employees 
to work together effectively. 
In order to identify the presence of Team Learning, the study reported in this thesis 
examined the prevalence of elements suggested by Senge et al (1990, 1994) as 
being essential to developing the vision. These elements were the propensity of the 
organization for importing knowledge from without; the ability of the organization in 
sharing knowledge at a business level; in sharing knowledge at an individual level;; 
having a supporting organizational structure and processes to encourage the 
importing and sharing of knowledge; and having a form of incentivization for 
individuals to share their knowledge with others. 
A very important element of Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) view of the LO which 
appeared to be conspicuous by its absence from this thesis’ case studies was the 
concept of dialogue. Senge et al (1990,1994) notes that dialogue is a better form of 
knowledge exchange than discussion, as dialogue involves the suspension by all 
participants of assumptions behind their ideas to allow the group to examine these 
assumptions and discover greater insight. Not one of the participating organizations 
suggested that they used such an approach in Team Learning and that discussion, 
supported by advocation of individual ideas, was the main method utilized. 
The following telling quote from the Indianapolis focus group demonstrated the 
technique for bringing learning to a group and advocating it as the best way forward 
for the organization: 
“…we often end up shouting over each other to get our point across…” 
Such an approach was not viewed as a weakness to Team Learning by the 
participants. Rather, they considered the approach to be a strength because all 
individuals had the opportunity to bring their ideas to the table and to advocate those 
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ideas. The organizations did not view shouting as argument, but as a method of 
establishing the best ideas and learning for sharing. 
Each of the elements mentioned in the second paragraph above are analyzed and 
discussed through the reflection of the observations within the six nominated 
contractors. Reflection is done not only against the back drop of Senge et al’s (1990, 
1994) work, but broader work from within and without the construction industry. 
Whilst Team Learning as a discipline within the LO model from Senge et al’s (1990, 
1994) is not challenged within this chapter, it is important for credibility and rigour to 
analyze and discussion the findings against the detailed, and more recent works 
referenced herein. 
8.2 Importing knowledge from without the organization 
8.2.1 Cincinnati 
Simple changes within Cincinnati seemed to be being imposed, as it seemed to 
struggle to encourage those not in a management position to bring forward ideas. 
Therefore, most imported knowledge seemed to come from management and be 
imposed upon the organization as this quote from the focus group suggests: 
“But a lot of [non management staff] don't [bring forward knowledge/ideas] 
and just let [middle management] do it.”  
It may be that Cincinnati believed it was encouraging ideas, whereas it may be acting 
sincerely but inadvertently killing off ideas. Koulopoulus (2010) noted methods which 
organizations used to inadvertently stifle innovative ideas whilst thinking they were 
actually encouraging them. Those methods included: Believing innovation will just 
‘happen’; telling everyone to ‘think outside the box’ then holding a brainstorming 
session, and then not following up; creating an ‘obstacle course’ for ideas; viewing 
‘different’ and ‘new’ as bad; being afraid of failure; innovating only when you need 
to; leaving innovation up to the ‘innovators’; encouraging everyone to drop any and 
all ideas into an electronic submission box. 
8.2.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee had made a concerted effort over the years to observe improvements in 
the way other industries work. As one of their directors noted: 
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“…one of the things that I did do was to look to what other industries were 
doing and actually found that the oil and gas industry were actually leading 
the way at that time.”  
Such research had largely come through the efforts of Tennessee’s directors and did 
not, however, appear to be part of the contemporary organizational culture. The one 
organization who it appeared to aspire to be like was BP and it had spent 
considerable time looking at how BP worked and tried to copy its operational ideas 
and adapt them for Tennessee’s own uses. It had observed BP building oil rigs and 
realized how similar in principle this was to constructing buildings. The research with 
Tennessee was carried out before the BP Gulf of Mexico disaster and therefore further 
comment on this comparison is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In addition, Tennessee’ directors had tried to bring some ideas from the automotive 
manufacturing industry. The MD stated that: 
“…we’ve had a guy from Toyota who came into the industry and started 
practicing as a consultant in the 1990s who brought some of the ‘Just in 
Time’ sort of stuff. Some of the ‘Kaizen’…” 
Much had been written about the construction industry being more like the 
automotive industry and certainly the automotive industry had provided excellent 
examples of how to import learning successfully from other industries, such as 
Hyundai (Kim, 1998), but Tennessee had observed that not everything was 
realistically transferable from automotive processes. For example, Lean techniques 
which Jorgensen & Emmitt (2008) suggested required much translation before 
application in construction.  
8.2.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis also looked to the automotive industry to help it import knowledge, and 
by extension, learning. It looked more along the lines of collaborative buying, 
collaborative working, value engineering, researching different materials and how the 
automotive industry markets itself. Its directors suggested: 
 “…the car industry is a great example of where people can work together, 
collaborative buying. You know I’m surprised they haven’t gone further in 
the car industry? Collaborative actual production lines…”  
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This was, however, very much stated in the ‘how would that look’ stage and was 
clearly still embryonic thinking on Indianapolis’ part. Where Indianapolis was 
implementing technology from other industries was in the arena of three dimensional 
modelling. Whilst this model was not new to the construction industry, it was still not 
as widely used as in manufacturing. Indianapolis had made it a bigger part of what it 
did, particularly within the team that worked for Miami. These varied approaches 
suggest a high absorption capacity (following Kim, 1998) for imported knowledge at 
Indianapolis. 
Further to the directors’ approach, members of the Indianapolis focus group tried to 
bring in ideas from construction industry press, with one focus group member stating 
“…there's industry magazines and industry information…” and from consultants with 
whom Indianapolis worked. An example of this importation was the modular build 
student accommodation where it had employed the expertise of a subcontractor; it 
was using this knowledge to help Miami with its push towards wider utilization of 
modular build. In addition, Indianapolis looked to import as much knowledge from its 
customers as possible. It viewed this relationship, for example, as a marriage of skills 
between the retail mind of Miami and the construction mind of Indianapolis. It had 
used the skills marriage to integrate these two bodies of knowledge within its own 
organization and to pass the knowledge down the supply chain. 
8.2.4 Chicago 
Chicago’s directors pointed to the recruitment of new people as the best way of 
importing new knowledge into the business from outside. Chicago routinely 
externalized new recruits’ knowledge about the way their previous employer 
purchased from, and organized, its supply chain and how it controlled the business. 
One of the directors noted: 
“…last year, we recruited quite a lot of people. And I think we learned a lot 
during that process as well. If nothing else we learned about how other large 
contractors buy things, who its - what its supply chains look like, you know 
what sort of control systems it tend to have…” 
The recruitment process allows it periodically to review and improve its own systems. 
This meant that Chicago viewed an employee turnover of zero as a weakness to the 
business as it curtailed the ability to bring in that stream of learning. Palekar (2006) 
advocates recruitment as vital for importing new organizational knowledge and 
learning. 
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8.2.5 Dallas 
Much of Dallas’ external knowledge acquisition appeared to be borne either out of 
necessity to research a construction technique or product. The other main driver 
tended to be customers such as Washington challenging it to adopt things that its 
peer group were already doing. Dallas did, however, have its own design group which 
was specifically in place to research such knowledge opportunities. Dallas directors 
noted: 
“…[Dallas design group] imports certain things into the Washington team 
because one of our engineers will say “Oh actually we’ve been trialling this, 
we do this sort of thing. Have you ever thought about using it on such and 
such?”  
What was not clear was how proactive Dallas’ design group was in terms of whether 
it actively seeks new knowledge unilaterally or reacts to internal knowledge requests. 
Such an assessment of the proactive-reactive knowledge acquisition position adopted 
by different organizations was conducted by Saka-Helmhout (2007) who suggested 
that it was the action of actors rather than the organizational structure which 
determines the acquisition of new learning. Therefore, it may be that Dallas had a 
particularly proactive head of design group. 
In addition, Dallas’ management procedures were developed by importing some of its 
customers’ procedures. Such importation aided alignment between Dallas and its 
customers and highlighted that it was willing to learn and develop its business 
through learning. An example given was Washington’s ‘RAGB’ system, which the 
Dallas MD was even using on a personal level during a house extension project: 
“…there’s a snagging list to be resolved and I’ve filled it in red, amber, 
green and blue.” 
Importing actual business operation processes directly from customers appears a 
novel departure from current writings about value stream alignment (c/f Adamides et 
al, 2008) or the alignment of IT to reduce inventory in the supply chain (c/f Piplani & 
Fu, 2005). 
Perhaps Dallas’ best source of learning could be attributed to its undercover work, as 
noted by one of the directors: 
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“…we have an unmarked van that can sometimes go on to someone else’s 
site, have a little look around if I’m particularly interested in something…”  
Whether this could be noted as a questionable source of learning is a moot point; it 
did not appear to quite come under the heading of industrial espionage (c/f Samli & 
Jacobs, 2003). Another useful source of learning appeared to be its strategic hiring, 
which was similar in approach to that of Chicago when discussed with the directors, 
one commented: 
“…I do sit down and consider people’s backgrounds and think “Ah I haven’t 
had a [contractor] man for a long time. I wonder what [contractors] are up 
to these days?” 
Dallas’ risk management policy was learned from the petrochemicals industry. The 
reasoning was that without an excellent risk management policy, the petrochemicals 
industry would kill people and therefore Dallas’ directors decided to import its risk 
philosophy, with one director commenting: “…when they have a bad day they blow 
people up so its risk management provides a very important function…” which it has 
adapted for construction industry use. 
8.2.6 Kansas 
Kansas imported some new joinery knowledge through the hiring of a key individual 
and in the view of the directors this had been successful in the development of its 
joinery business. One director commented: 
“…he brought in these new flat pack grommets and key clamps and god 
knows what. And, well first of all I said ‘God, [name] you know we’re a 
traditional joinery company, we’re not going to be messing about with that 
crap.’ But it’s actually fantastic stuff…”  
In addition, Kansas simply viewed what other contractors were doing when it worked 
alongside those contractors on site. Furthermore, there was formal knowledge 
exchange that occurred in the contractors’ forum run by Oakland set for the specific 
purpose of allowing contractors to learn from one another. Another forum set up with 
other contractors was the ‘Toolbox Talk’, which was a talk to transfer expert 
knowledge about a specialist area, which Kansas asked its subcontractors to do when 
these subcontractors were carrying out a specialist service. Toolbox talks were noted 
by Cameron & Duff (2007) as a key learning element in the construction industry 
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8.3 Sharing knowledge at a business level 
8.3.1 Cincinnati 
One of Cincinnati’s parent companies ensured that there was representation from 
various sectors within a centralized team to ensure that learning was pulled together 
from the various sectors. Cincinnati’s leader advised: 
“…they are the centralized area which covers nuclear power, water, oil and 
gas and process within the same building. They’re pulling in the learning 
from all of them.” 
Actively encouraging project discussions at this business level had provided 
individuals with ideas for technology that could be moved between sectors. Cincinnati 
had found that this was the best way of getting improvement in ideas over and above 
the individuals who may have been in one particular industry for twenty years. The 
centralized team then acted as consultant to the various sectors and Cincinnati’s 
leaders were expected to liaise with it to find out what new developments there were 
in the world and how they might be imported into its current service stream. It is 
interesting to note that Ribiero (2009) recommended the use of key knowledge 
teams for improving KM in construction organizations. 
The centralized team also set knowledge exchange visits with a key learning purpose, 
such as a team from Cincinnati visiting one of another sector’s key projects to view 
how it was handling waste management, which included their leader, who 
commented: 
“…they’ve been dealing with waste for fifty years at Sellafield. Granted, it’s 
radio-active. But if there’s anything we can pick up [we will].”  
In addition, the central group issued information and ideas and visited service 
delivery points to exchange knowledge and help with ideas generation. Cincinnati 
extended this service to Pittsburgh by inviting it to attend knowledge exchange 
sessions. These sessions spawned ideas about how what was happening on one 
customer service stream can be augmented into another. 
Cincinnati’s parent companies have offices in other European countries, which allowed 
it to glean learning from further afield and examine how things were being delivered 
within completely different cultures. Cincinnati’s leader was particularly impressed 
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with the different ways of thinking about problems which were demonstrated by 
these different cultures and vice versa. He stated: 
“…you get invited to these cross-network things, so I’ll go to [country] and 
I’ll meet people from [construction industry sector] in [country]. Those 
things are quite good for, for learning…” 
This type of learning might be the most valuable to Cincinnati as it allowed individuals 
to change their viewpoint on an issue and thereby come up with an improved solution 
compared to what it might have with ‘accepted’ thinking. It was clear from the way 
these inter-country knowledge exchanges were talked about that it was seen as an 
exciting source of thinking to the Cincinnati team. The team’s enthusiasm suggested 
an excellent alignment with the multi-cultural JV learning environment described by 
Berrell et al (2002). 
In fact, Cincinnati had been noted by its parent companies as having some good 
learning which can be taken on board by its wider businesses. This approach was 
considered to be a good demonstrator of knowledge exchange between a JV and its 
parent companies. Such exchanges were meant to be one of the competitive 
advantages of entering into a JV in the first place. The focus group members felt that 
Cincinnati had been able to bring more learning to the table comparatively than other 
programmes of works run by its parent companies. 
Cincinnati tried to ensure that knowledge was disseminated from its design review 
process. This was a gateway process whereby designs were reviewed before 
approval. This system, however, did fall down at the recirculation stage where some 
lessons had taken two years to circulate. A member of the focus group advised: 
“…some of those lessons learned won't get published until two years after 
they've been learned, which is an issue.” 
Cincinnati had found that the best way to overcome this problem was to have 
continuity of personnel and to ensure that they talked frequently. This failure did, 
however, suggest an underlying process problem. Gyampoh-Vidogah et al (2003) 
suggested that slow knowledge circulation in construction organizations was an IT 
and systems problem, which may be the case in Cincinnati as it was using a people 
solution to solve the issue. 
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Cincinnati had initiated the use of document controllers who acted as collators of 
information as that information arrived into the organization. Thus, when any 
information was needed, it was easy to approach the controllers with a request and 
obtain it. There was no such system before and some other contractors working for 
Pittsburgh still stored information on computer drives. The focus group was clear on 
their value to knowledge sharing, with one member commenting: 
“…in six months time, I go to the doc controller and say "What came in from 
these people?" They'd give me a print out and show me and that's it.” 
The use of document controllers was an example of a relatively simple change which 
had improved knowledge retention and availability. This change, however, did still 
require some explaining as to the benefits when it was proposed to Pittsburgh and 
the other contractors in Pittsburgh’s alliance. 
8.3.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee acknowledged that the default position for individuals within its 
organization was not one of wishing to share knowledge. Tennessee’s MD asserted: 
“…we need to get employees actually motivated to want to share the 
knowledge. And it has to be said that is not the default position...”  
What Tennessee tried to encourage was a culture of individuals understanding that 
they were part of something larger than simply the particular office in which they 
worked. Tennessee’s position and solution was in alignment with De Long & Fahey 
(2000) who noted the cultural aspect required to align individual knowledge with the 
organization. 
Tennessee continuously looked into ways to motivate employees to make such wider 
knowledge exchange happen. It had started by ensuring that the central core of the 
company actively shared knowledge and that this approach was clear to other 
departments. This ‘lead’ was designed to start the other departments towards seeing 
the benefits and changing their cultures to follow suit. Such an approach suggested 
that culture change cannot be enforced; it can only occur through organizations, or in 
this case departments, wishing to change themselves and doing so voluntarily 
(following De Long & Fahey, 2000). 
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8.3.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis was prepared to share certain ideas with other organizations which 
might normally be regarded as its competitors. Indianapolis’ team leader for the 
Miami commission postulated: 
“…we as an organization, we don't have a problem with people giving 
competitors our idea.” 
This sharing was particularly the case in the environment with Miami where it was 
expected that suppliers collaborate with ideas in order to improve the performance of 
the whole. Indianapolis, however, did make the point that there were some business 
sensitive ideas which the organization invested in and developed that it was naturally 
not willing to share. From its own perspective, Indianapolis tried to view the many 
ideas it generated in a Miami environment as ideas for the Miami contractors’ forum 
rather than for itself. Such knowledge exchange was viewed as a cultural approach 
within Indianapolis which helped set it apart from its peer group. Kumar & 
Thondikulam (2006) noted that exchanging knowledge with ‘trading partners’ who in 
another arena might be competitors was a source of competitive advantage. 
Indianapolis did seem to understand the power of sharing its ideas at an 
organizational level in terms of making things better for all within the organization. It 
pointed to its close knit customer orientated teams as being the best way to 
encourage knowledge sharing at this level. It had ‘communication days’ which 
doubled as team building events. The directors noted: 
“…we are trying to do a bit more of the, like the relaxed informal day that we 
are having on Friday….” 
The members of the focus group agreed that these were successful forums at which 
knowledge was shared across the business, with one commenting: 
“…that was quite a successful day that we had earlier on in the year….” 
Chua (2002) noted the particular usefulness of social interaction for knowledge 
creation and exchange within an organizational setting. 
In addition, Indianapolis held regular open forums and workshops to enable all team 
members to bring ideas back from their various sites to distribute them amongst the 
team. The idea here was to give people opportunities to contribute problems and 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 168 
opportunities in small incremental sessions rather than try to bring all their learning 
from a particular site in one go. The other intention of these forums was to maintain 
the team spirit. 
The focus group admitted that trying to keep teams of 200 communicating and 
working as a team was difficult and described communication as: 
“…email based and obviously we talk to each other on the phones and stuff 
and you know, [Miami team leader] gets round and visits people and spends 
a lot of time out on the sites and stuff. But it is quite hard because you are 
so split up …” 
Keeping a team of 30 working as a unit was easier, so this was why Indianapolis 
concentrated learning and communication on this customer team level in order to 
support the whole. Roberts (2000), however, questions the ability of ICT supported 
knowledge exchange to replace human interaction adequately, particularly for tacit 
knowledge exchange. This dichotomy suggested that Indianapolis was not as efficient 
at knowledge exchange as it believed. 
In addition, Indianapolis did have an accepted ‘reflection’ time within the year. There 
was a four month period, usually during the winter, where its workload was lower 
than the rest of the year (due to its heavy retail based focus). It used this time to 
think about how it had performed and how it could perform better when the work 
picked back up. Goddard (2001) noted the importance of reflection time within the 
organization for improving performance. Indianapolis directors clarified its approach, 
with one stating: 
“…we do all the systems, all the things that we should be doing. Think about 
the jobs, how we've done, how we're doing better, so it's a real sort of time 
for reflection…”  
Clearly knowledge exchange during busy periods was very difficult for Indianapolis 
and reflection time was an important tool. 
8.3.4 Chicago 
For its Minnesota works, Chicago had a handbook which set out the service provision, 
how to deal with any landlord issues, the Minnesota team and the supply chain. The 
directors stated: 
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“…we have put together a handbook, and it basically sets out what is 
expected of us by Minnesota…” 
Further, the handbook set out the process from Minnesota’s inception of the project 
to the end of the warranty support period. Minnesota assisted in the development of 
this handbook, suggesting a good alignment with customer needs. In addition, 
Chicago had the occasional ‘learn and share’ sessions to which it invited all its project 
managers to carry out a post mortem on key projects. 
8.3.5 Dallas 
Dallas regularly attended learning sessions set up by Washington where it presented 
to its peer group and viewed presentations from its peer group, again aligning with 
Kumar & Thondikulam (2006). These presentations were on a specific area of 
learning which each organization had discovered and considered of interest to the 
group. In addition, Dallas suggested that due to its size and diversity of skills, it finds 
it relatively easy to pool resources when looking for solutions. However, in knowledge 
exchange, Dallas admitted to being more reactive than proactive. 
Dallas made the point that as much of its knowledge was made explicit as possible as 
if knowledge was only held tacitly then this led to problems on projects. Dallas MD 
advised: 
“…explicit is very very important to us. …the management team on a building 
site need to have very explicit direction and they need to then be very good 
at communicating that explicit information in a very explicit manner, because 
we end up with the wrong product at the end of the day if we don’t do that. 
So, to a degree, we try very very hard to not have any tacit knowledge 
because that leads to an uncertain outcome and that can be very dangerous 
to us.”  
Stenmark (2001) noted the wider problems organizations encounter with leveraging 
tacit knowledge, such as lack of awareness and unwillingness for the individual to 
share. 
The focus group was less aware of these knowledge exchange processes. Some 
participants stated that the recent drop off in Washington work had given some of the 
team the opportunity to learn about the different processes used in working with 
Dallas’ different customers. The focus group concentrated more upon the individual 
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knowledge exchange within the Washington delivery team which was based upon a 
mentoring system. In addition, it discussed the twice yearly ‘knowledge exchange’ 
day and e-mails from the directors as the main sources of organizational knowledge 
exchange. One member commented: 
“…you will get some sort of communication because every month we have an 
internal review meeting where [the directors] will come down and review 
every aspect of the job…”  
The difference in opinion on learning between the management and the focus group 
suggested a disconnect between what Dallas management intended to happen on the 
learning front and what actually occurred within the organization, which should not 
occur in an LO (Senge et al; 1990, 1994). 
8.3.6 Kansas 
Kansas used a similarly informal knowledge exchange system to Dallas with the 
directors meeting on a Monday morning to carry out knowledge exchange and then 
the learning was disseminated though each director’s team. Moreover, there was a 
quarterly newsletter circulated which informed the group about what was happening 
around the group. It was unclear whether there was any true knowledge which can 
improve business performance exchanged through these two routes or whether it 
was simply news and information being exchanged.  
At a site level, there did appear to be knowledge exchange which happens when the 
site foremen come together, as noted by the focus group: 
“They have weekly meetings between the Site Foremen that are there or the 
Contracts Managers. To see if there’s anything on each of the individual 
projects that might be able to help the other person when they come to do 
something similar.” 
In addition, at the end of each construction project, each foreman offered up unused 
materials to the others to avoid unnecessary transport back to stores and then those 
materials potentially remaining unclaimed for months. Formal knowledge exchange 
was, however, not seen as overly necessary on the Oakland commission due to the 
repetitive nature of the work. Gieskes & Broeke (2000) noted that learning is more 
difficult in a non-repetitive climate and therefore Kansas’ position may not be viewed 
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as complacency, but simply that it felt knowledge exchange was part of the day-to-
day role. 
8.4 Sharing knowledge at an individual level 
8.4.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati set up team briefs and brunches to allow learning to take place informally. 
This was particularly done where there had been a health and safety incident to 
ensure that the individuals involved shared the experience with others. Furthermore, 
Cincinnati’s team leader actively introduced different individuals with different 
experiences to these brunches and encouraged them to discuss what they were doing 
and if their knowledge might be of benefit to another project. This approach aligned 
with Chua’s (2002) position of utilizing the social backdrop to allow knowledge 
exchange. 
8.4.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee ensured that learning was captured and shared between individuals 
working on the same customer account through having a ‘core team’ which managed 
the knowledge. This helped when customers required Tennessee to work from various 
locations throughout the country providing largely the same product. The core team 
helped to ensure that the project delivery teams: “…certainly [only make] one 
mistake and not fifty [identical] mistakes…”, said Tennessee’s MD. 
Tennessee accepted that its employees related more easily to small groups of 
individuals than they do to the organization as a whole, a position supported by much 
research (Restubog et al, 2008; Sheard & Kakabadse, 2002). This tenuous 
relationship, the directors felt, was something alleviated through the use of an 
innovative organizational structure, with one director commenting: 
…the strength of having local businesses that are actually focused on the 
local clientele and relate to the needs of the customers in that particular 
region. But, they all actually mirror each other in what they do, in that the 
processes are the same. And through an overlay, which we call ‘National 
Business’, we actually have a mechanism to make sure that people are 
actually all pulling on the same end of the rope and getting information 
across from A to B. 
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Therefore, Tennessee has encouraged the more small scale relationships to enable 
individuals to share more readily and then used business process to take the 
knowledge further around the organization. In addition, Tennessee actively 
encouraged particular individuals with key knowledge to share on a specific and 
targeted basis. An example of this was two healthcare experts in different parts of 
the country coming together to exchange best practice and thereby increase both 
experts’ knowledge. 
8.4.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis had struggled in getting people to engage with each other and exchange 
knowledge. It did appreciate that it had good people, but it had yet to motivate them 
to exchange ideas. It is questionable, however, as to whether individual knowledge 
exchanges should be ‘push’ motivated or whether the culture should be such that it 
enables it (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). The Indianapolis focus group noted that the 
organization had put in place a flat structure and tried to encourage the exchange of 
knowledge through embedding it within the culture. It may be that the lack of 
success was down to a lack of supporting processes. A member of the focus group 
commented: 
“…I can't think of a formal process that we've got that we sit down and share 
things...but really it's more a case of, we do it in team meetings, we do it in 
project reviews…” 
Informally, Indianapolis’ project managers continued to communicate ideas to each 
other throughout the year and the MD regularly attended sites to help with 
knowledge exchange. Such attendance allowed an informal channel for knowledge to 
flow from project site to project site despite the site teams themselves changing 
slightly for each new project. Indianapolis tried to keep a mixture of maintaining an 
existing team from one project for the next one whilst rotating some individuals to 
help employees gain varied experience. 
8.4.4 Chicago 
Most of Chicago’s exchange of knowledge outside of the Minnesota commission was 
carried out on an informal basis through business communication. The directors did 
try to facilitate this exchange by pointing individuals in the direction of people within 
the organization who may have knowledge that might be of use in a particular 
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situation. One director suggested that Chicago’s entirely open plan office assists with 
communication, stating: 
“I know it's not perfect by any means but you know it's also part of being in 
an open plan office. I don't have an office. I think there's so much that you 
sort of latch onto just because you overhear someone talking about it.”  
The open plan office as a facilitator or communication exchange appeared completely 
consistent with Ding (2008) who suggested that managers took this view although 
employees took the view that open plan offices were too noisy. 
In addition, Chicago noted that the consistency of the team, particularly the 
Minnesota delivery team, was an advantage to easier knowledge exchange. The 
constant communication and the fact that individuals know each other and each 
other’s experience, skills and current workload were the enablers mentioned. It was 
interesting that Chicago’s focus group viewed a low team turnover as an advantage, 
with one member commenting: 
“…it’s really helpful having that consistent team working on it and not 
constantly swapping people around….” 
By contrast, its directors viewed it as a potential weakness to getting new knowledge 
into the business. It appeared that an ‘ideal’ turnover level was required to achieve 
both ends satisfactorily, as discussed by Siebert & Zubanov (2009). 
8.4.5 Dallas 
Dallas suggested individual knowledge exchange was so inherent in the business that 
it did not need to be actively encouraged, enabled or managed by the business itself. 
It was suggested that the passion for the business, the customer and the customer’s 
stakeholders felt by Dallas’ employees meant that they were all willing to share 
knowledge and ideas. Furthermore, Dallas’ directors suggested that it did not want to 
impose a formal knowledge exchange structure upon what it viewed as being its 
creative people for fear of stifling the knowledge exchange which already takes place. 
One director stated: 
“…we don’t have, deliberately don’t have a huge amount of process. We are 
very nervous of process. We think it stifles personal ability.”  
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Although no evidence was offered as to why Dallas thought that to be the case, it was 
similar to a position held by Pech (2001). 
In addition, Dallas brought in individual experts when necessary to replenish the 
business knowledge capacity where customer needs demanded it. Dallas’ team leader 
for the Washington commission confided: 
“I know [name] at [Dallas subsidiary organization] is an expert on glazing 
and he knows us all, we all know each other and we trust each other.”  
Dallas’ approach suggested a willingness to collaborate with related organizations in 
order to widen or deepen the service offering to the customer. In addition, Dallas had 
recently hired a modular construction expert to roll out this expertise to the rest of 
the business.  
8.4.6 Kansas 
Kansas was another organization with a very open culture where anyone could talk 
with anyone else, which aided knowledge exchange. The directors sometimes walked 
the site and asked individuals to: “…show us what they’ve done. Explain to us what 
they’re working on.” A ‘go and see’ approach (Womack & Jones, 2005) helped the 
directors understand where activities could be done better and reminded directors 
that managing the organization can not just be about sitting in the office watching 
the bottom line. 
8.5 Supporting organizational structure & processes 
8.5.1 Cincinnati 
Within all of the organizations examined for the research reported in this thesis, there 
was a structure which, it was suggested, supported the creation of Team Learning. 
Cincinnati felt that its position as a JV allowed it to bring learning and perspectives 
from two separate parent organizations which was seen to be advantageous over its 
singular entity peer group, in line with Inkpen & Currall (2004). Inkpen & Currall 
found that learning processes are central to alliance development dynamics. 
Cincinnati’s leader noted the distinction between the two parent organizations and 
how the two perspectives worked so well: 
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“The [parent organization] side of things, which is heavily biased towards the 
engineering. And the [parent organization] side, which is more the 
construction [side]”  
Having two diverse parents allowed it to pool viewpoints on problems from both 
sides. 
Cincinnati had found this situation particularly useful in developing its leaders’ 
perspectives on engineering, construction and project management. In addition, 
Cincinnati was being increasingly proactive in getting structure in place before 
changes in workload with its customer which improved its reaction ability. It accepted 
that there were disadvantages to be managed in the form of allocating individuals to 
roles. Where it might be simpler in an individual organization, there was the issue of 
trying to achieve the correct management and reporting lines when dealing with 
individuals from two different parent organizations, as noted by Beamish & Lupton 
(2009). 
In addition, Cincinnati felt that its parent companies’ approach of housing centralized 
teams in the same locations further supported Team Learning. One of its parent 
companies operated. Cincinnati’s leader advised: 
“…the EFQM model which is the European Foundation Quality Management, 
or something like that, which includes Continuous Improvement.” 
which fed into Cincinnati’s learning processes. Cincinnati had an improvement team 
which visited the sites specifically in order to transfer improvement ideas. The tool 
used by the team was a simple improvement log which it maintained and distributed 
accordingly. 
At a project level, those who delivered Cincinnati’s projects were made to go through 
the lessons learned from other projects before they started a new one. This approach 
to learning suggested that there was not yet the culture to ensure that they carried 
out lessons learned voluntarily; nor was it obvious how Cincinnati used those lessons 
learned to improve the next project. A member of the focus group stated: 
“…we're trying to put things in place where you have to go through the 
lessons learned from previous jobs to get to do a job.” 
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Although the focus group stated that the process was not perhaps as successful as it 
might be, with one member commenting: 
“…we have formal lessons learned things, but in real truth it comes down to 
somebody saying "That's not the best way to do it." 
These quotes suggested that best practice models such as those presented by Jeon 
(2009), which included a model for knowledge acquisition, storing, evaluation and 
dissemination, had not infiltrated Cincinnati’s processes. 
8.5.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee’s MD stated that its uniqueness was that it structured itself so that it 
operated on a national and regional basis. It achieved this through ‘…complete self-
contained units to some fair extent…” which allowed Tennessee to interact with its 
local customer base on a more personal basis. It also enabled regional offices to refer 
back to the national business when needed in terms of interaction with larger 
customers or reliance on central services. 
Tennessee’s setup helped it to avoid doubling up efforts in terms of project and 
customer bids. Each regional office bid only in its own region, but national clients 
were managed by a central champion. The structure could therefore be described as 
a conglomerate of regional businesses with a strong overlay which stitched it all 
together. Tennessee suggested that each unit traded almost as an independent 
organization which motivated learning at the business unit level. 
BS5750 was the catalyst for Tennessee to create the best practice processes that 
supported its Team Learning. BS5750 was a quality standard applied to business 
processes under which Tennessee would have set quality targets and monitored 
performance against target. It was once acknowledged as the construction industry 
standard in the UK but was now almost entirely superseded by ISO 9000, the 
international equivalent (Moatazed-Keivani et al, 1999). 
Tennessee postulated that, unlike other organizations, it looked to the BS5750 
standard to help improve its organization rather than just to obtain a plaque on the 
wall and a logo on its documents. One of the directors noted: 
“We very much decided that we would not do it to get a badge on the wall. 
We would do it as a business improvement exercise and that is what we 
did.”.  
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Tennessee felt that the best way to use this would be to attempt to align its 
processes to the best practice principles of those of the manufacturing industry. It 
made the clear distinction of not aligning exactly with the manufacturing industry’s 
processes themselves as it suggested that such processes do not translate exactly to 
construction. Manufacturing was viewed simply as a source of learning. 
Tennessee took a similar approach when achieving ISO14001 and ISO18001 which 
are European environmental and safety standards respectively. It combined these in 
a way that supported the business so that it learned to examine both factors when 
planning ways of working on site. This approach had spawned an integrated 
management system which was industry recognized, as one of their directors noted:  
“…we were actually the first company in the country – construction company 
in the country – to gain registration from BSI for an integrated management 
system…”  
Tennessee opined that this was a huge driving force around which its organization 
had grown. 
Tennessee used its integrated management system to help apply all business 
improvements in a common way. Such application had been a fundamental part of 
the business culture – the understanding and acceptance that improvement is sought 
and then applied in a consistent manner across the entire business. Tennessee’s MD 
asserted 
“…when there is an improvement identified, you can apply that improvement 
very easily across the whole company in all it’s geographic parts because 
you’re always moving from the same common base…” 
Tennessee genuinely believed that the system made it one of the best practiced 
contractors in the industry. Zeng et al (2005) set out the benefits of implementing 
such an integrated system as “avoidance duplication of procedures”, “reduced conflict 
of procedures”, and “reduced requirements for resources”. 
IT support was another key to Tennessee’s process support to learning. It felt that its 
use of Lotus Notes over the Microsoft system enabled it to be more intelligent in its 
collection, management and distribution of soft knowledge. One of the directors 
stated: 
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“…what I would describe as ‘soft knowledge’ more than the hard knowledge 
is actually in Lotus Notes, in databases. And the advantage of that is that 
Lotus Notes databases replicate in all the servers around the country and can 
replicate on to your own C drive….”  
Due to its replication, manipulation and retrieval, Tennessee felt the system took care 
of the ‘mechanics’ side of Team Learning. It allowed people to access information 
about a customer project in another part of the country to utilize on their projects. 
The ability to simply demonstrate a high sophistication of internal knowledge 
management by talking knowledgeably with a customer about projects in other 
regions was seen as a key benefit of the system. 
8.5.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis had divided itself up into customer service streams, but beyond that it 
prided itself in having little formal structure or processes. It was able to do this 
successfully because it was a small enough organization to still be contained 
completely within only two offices across the UK. It suggested that these streams’ 
close knitted makeup and its open forum meetings aided communication and the 
exchange of knowledge. Indianapolis director for the Miami commission revealed: 
“…we have a team working for Miami, a team working for [another 
customer]. So again you generate that; you've got to generate that to 
familiarity. So even with the director, they're always working for the same 
people and they tend to be very close knit sort of teams…”  
In addition, Indianapolis suggested that it had made its structure as flat as possible 
to enable communication, an approach which was seen to be in line with Claver-
Cortes et al (2007). Indianapolis was entirely owned by its directors and as soon as 
someone was promoted to director, they became part of the ownership structure. The 
feeling was that this aspirational driver had helped retain key staff with knowledge 
within the business. How this reflected against flat structure potentially causing a de-
motivational effect of slow career progress was not discussed. 
One interesting comment from Indianapolis’s MD was that the ‘all directors own a 
share of the business’ model was developed when the business was worth nothing. 
He questioned whether the business founders would have decided on the same model 
if the business had already been the size it was now. This finding raises a 
philosophical point about the commitment to the ideal LO structure over personal 
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gain, which was seen to be a key omission from Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model. It 
remains an interesting question, the answer for which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. This ownership model did, in Indianapolis’ opinion, give it a perceived 
advantage of not being ‘faceless’ as opposed to those contractors owned by remote 
shareholders. 
The flat organizational structure which Indianapolis had actually came about due to 
the removal of almost an entire tier of middle management during the recession. This 
was the same process by which many other organizations had achieved such a 
structure (Claver-Cortes et al, 2007). One of the directors pointed out: 
“The middle manager is gone, the people that [were] looking over people 
that are doing.” 
The feeling in Indianapolis was that the removal of this layer would actually improve 
the business as it was stifling ideas, ambition and empowerment. Indianapolis’ 
directors had put out the message that this was an opportunity for those who were 
once below this level to develop their careers. There may be the ironic observation 
that the opportunity for promotion into a level which had previously been made 
redundant and that therefore such opportunities may not be motivators. This was not 
explored during the case study research. 
Supporting the Indianapolis business further was its intranet system, ‘Word Up’, 
which was designed to allow employees to exchange knowledge, post good ideas and 
to celebrate success. This system was necessary due to the largely site based nature 
of its workforce and the fact that it encouraged ideas from those who were executing 
the physical works on site. Members of the focus group were trying to raise the 
quality and quantity of ideas and feedback through having a “…subject for the 
week…” which individuals were encouraged to feed back on. In addition, sending idea 
updates and organizational news assisted Indianapolis in keeping those remote from 
the office in touch. Jeon (2009) noted the necessity of a well programmed intranet 
system for enabling knowledge exchange. 
8.5.4 Chicago 
Chicago’s support was provided through its open plan office setup which it suggested 
improved informal communication. Given that informal communication was its 
primary source of knowledge exchange, this setup was seen to be a key element. 
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Chicago enjoyed the similar ‘flat’ structure seen at Indianapolis (Claver-Cortes et al, 
2007). In terms of systems support, one of the directors noted that Chicago had a 
“…large relational database that tracks every single project and every single 
person that's involved with every single project, both inside and outside the 
organization…”  
The database can be used to establish where knowledge was held within the 
business. Whether it was used proactively to exchange knowledge was, however, not 
assessed. All knowledge that was disseminated onto its intranet went through a 
working group and then the directors to ensure accuracy and relevance. 
In addition, Chicago’s intranet database could list each person by what formal 
training they had received and by the projects on which they had worked. This 
database would theoretically allow the business to select exactly the right person for 
a project (Jeon, 2009). In reality, such an outcome rarely happened as the 
mobilization process tended to dictate taking the next available person for the next 
upcoming project. 
Where the database system was very useful was during team meetings when project 
information could be called up instantly and live. The system sped up these meetings 
and knowledge exchange during their duration – the focus group suggested that the 
system had made a real improvement to how Chicago operated per se, with one 
focus group member commenting: 
“…we go through that regularly in our regular sort of team meetings and that 
has a log of basically every job that you know are coming up - the sort of 
pre-site, then sales, on-site, what’s been finished - and just having a chat 
round the table you can learn a few lessons…”  
In addition, there was an organizational newsletter which was distributed on this 
system for further information flow (following Jeon, 2009). 
Chicago’s current structure had grown out of its culture, although this had not always 
been the case. In its infancy, Chicago was a hierarchically structured organization. 
This culture was described variously by participants as “…friendly…” and 
“…inclusive…” in terms of internal culture and “…non-contractual…” in terms of 
customer relationships. New individuals to the organization tended to be hired to fit in 
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with this culture rather than solely on technical skills. Jashapara (2003) noted the 
requirement for a supportive culture to enable the shift to being a LO. 
Additionally, the focus group members talked at length about anyone within Chicago 
being able to talk to anyone else regardless of title. In addition, the social scene at 
Chicago was enthusiastically embraced by all employees. This scene in itself was 
considered to help build the culture and promote communication. A member of the 
focus group commented: 
“…you have got formal structure to the business and formal organization to 
the business but you know it blends really well into the informal sort of 
situation as well...”  
8.5.5 Dallas 
Dallas’ structure did not appear at first discussion with the directors to be truly 
supportive of free knowledge exchange. One of the directors revealed: 
“…we’re quite hierarchical from that construction level down but we believe 
that you have to be and that is how you run a tight ship and a construction 
project. That’s how you achieve your quality and your times through very 
clear rule definition…”  
Dallas also suggested that its structure was relatively flat which enabled an easy flow 
of information from top to bottom and vice versa. Dallas suggested that its approach 
was different from other organizations as employees still have relative access to the 
decision makers which was not the case in more deeply layered organizations. Dallas’ 
hierarchical approach appeared to work for them, but such an approach has been 
specifically noted as a barrier to learning (Matzdorf et al, 1999).  
In terms of processes, again Dallas was relatively informal. Key knowledge and 
learning was generally circulated, with Dallas’ director for the Washington 
commission advising that: 
“…most of the time because of the way we work with Washington 
everything’s sent by email. So people would get a document, a brochure or 
something sent through via email…”  
What was not clear was how the retention and utilization of that knowledge was 
measured, evidenced and managed, as e-mail can be a ‘fire and forget’ method of 
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distributing knowledge. Kane & Alavi (2007) noted that e-mail is best used for the 
unstructured exchange of tacit knowledge. Dallas did have a huge process manual, 
but most participants confessed that they could not recall the last time they looked at 
it. The written processes were viewed as more use as guidance for new employees 
rather than processes to follow in project delivery. 
The main process mentioned by Dallas for supporting knowledge exchange was the 
risk process. This, it was suggested, was the best supporting process to enable 
employees to learn about what needs to be managed closely on a construction 
project. One of the directors noted: 
“…taking implied tacit knowledge and making it into explicit knowledge the 
risk register is a very good way of giving someone a good signpost at the 
start of their part in a process as to where the rest of the people were 
involved prior…”  
Dallas’ supporting standard risk meeting agendas ensured that risks were not 
forgotten during the management and delivery process. Risk was the only arena 
where individual project managers did not have the autonomy to depart from 
prescribed procedure. Dallas’ use of the risk register for learning appeared unique 
and was a clear departure from current LO literature, none of which already 
referenced herein appeared to mention such an approach. 
Something that Dallas’ directors had promoted was a lack of meeting minutes, with 
one director stating: 
“[We] try never to keep Minutes anymore. Minutes are cumbersome, wastes 
time we just have next steps. We just come up with an action plan following 
the meeting with people allocated with the next steps…” 
This meant that only issues which required action came from meetings rather than all 
items discussed. The lack of minutes was, however, inconsistently applied, as Dallas 
operated a monthly review which was meant to pick up all issues on sites for 
discussion. However, this had become an obsolete process as issues tended to be 
dealt with long before they reached the meeting date. This process appeared to be 
obsolete and of little value, but appeared still to be operated. The absence of obsolete 
meetings is a central tenet of the LO (Senge et al; 1990, 1994) in that Senge et al 
suggests they ought to be reviewed, challenged and minimized. 
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Additionally, there was a regular, informal staff meeting which Dallas had instigated 
which the director responsible for each customer account attended. This meeting 
allowed anyone to raise any issues which the directors needed to action. The meeting 
was seen as important as it removed the opportunity for individuals to say they did 
not have a chance to speak to their director about an issue. The necessity of such a 
meeting suggested Dallas did not have a culture where individuals spoke to their 
directors as a matter of course. 
The main specific learning exchange meeting at Dallas was usually held in December 
when there was little work happening in the retail sector due to Christmas trade. A 
member of the focus group noted: 
“…Christmas it is a quieter period for us. That's when we tend to have a 
meeting which is about the most formal sort of meeting we get to. All set 
out, and the whole team comes round and we’ll have an agenda just to go 
through and basically pick up what learning we've had throughout the year…”  
It was at this meeting where individuals got to use storytelling as a way to describe 
situations they came up against, how they handled the situation, the outcome and 
what they learned from it. The storytelling process allowed learning and experience to 
be most widely disseminated across the business. The weakness noted for this 
process was that it did only happen once a year and that this might not necessarily 
be sufficient to disseminate the learning around the business effectively. Tyler (2006) 
noted that storytelling was becoming increasingly used in commercial organizations. 
8.6 Incentivization 
8.6.1 Cincinnati 
Further to the above issues, there was the incentivization provided to individuals to 
share learning. This can be seen as the ‘push’ motivation to go along with the ‘pull’ 
motivation provided by the business processes and culture discussed earlier in this 
chapter (following Hartmann, 2006). Cincinnati provided a tangible reward in the 
form of gift vouchers or leisure items for excellent ideas. The Cincinnati leader was 
proud enough to mention his: 
“…I think I’ve got one this month. I’ve got fifty quid Marks & Spencer’s 
vouchers coming my way, I think.” 
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In addition, there was the more intangible reward of having the idea announced on 
the front page of both of Cincinnati’s parent company intranets. This 
acknowledgement rewarded not only the individual through the recognition, but 
further promoted the submission of ideas with others who could see the rewards 
conspicuously displayed (following Hartmann, 2006). This approach was supported by 
senior management who encouraged their teams to submit ideas no matter how 
implausible they may seem at first. The ideas may not seem implausible to those who 
read them and could potentially spark further ideas within the organization. 
In addition, Cincinnati had incentivization at a business level. It had a performance 
business improvement plan for each upcoming year from one of its parent 
companies. According to their leader, there had been an environmental focus within 
this plan: 
“…we’ve been tasked with reducing energy consumption by eight per cent. 
And, a lot of it, quite a lot of [business incentivization] is in energy at the 
moment. Quite a lot of focus on sustainability and energy…” 
 Energy reduction incentivization publicized a certain area of the business where the 
organization was looking to drive improvement and therefore particularly required 
employee ideas. Cincinnati had looked at energy consumption in particular because 
concrete, a key element in the construction of the type of projects with which it 
typically dealt, was a poor performer in carbon footprint terms. 
8.6.2 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis had not historically incentivized its team to bring ideas to the table and 
share per se. Its approach was that the incentive was intrinsically that all should 
share knowledge in order to make their day jobs that bit easier. Since it had 
upgraded its intranet recently though, it had tied this in with a small incentive to 
bring ideas to the discussion forum (as suggested by Hartmann, 2006). The reward 
was £100 and was celebrated on its ‘Word Up’ intranet system. As one of the 
directors noted: 
“…we call them ‘pin up of the week’. It's just a bit of fun but it shows you 
know, it helps other people think “okay, I could have thought of that.”  
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The ‘pin up’ process had literally just started at the time of the case study work 
undertaken for this thesis and so it was still not clear whether this approach was a 
success. 
8.6.3 Kansas 
Kansas ran a ‘Pride’ award monthly for the best ideas brought to the directors from 
within the organization. The financial award was small as Kansas felt that the kudos 
of receiving the award was more important to the individual. The reason that the 
financial reward was small comes from the chairman. As the MD noted: 
“…[the chairman’s] theory is that “I pay you to do a job properly so why do I 
want to pay you a bonus on top for?” It’s a bit… But it’s a bit old school, do 
you know what I mean? But I can see where he’s coming from….” 
8.7 Summary 
Within this Team Learning chapter, as with the previous chapters 5, 6 and 7 the 
analysis again came from all six nominated contractors. Again, not all discoveries in 
all contractors were analyzed against all Team Learning elements. This was again due 
to the differences in depth of demonstration of this LO discipline between the 
contractors. It is noted in the Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations 
chapter 10 that no one organization demonstrated all of the elements of a LO and 
that the analysis herein, again similarly to chapters 5, 6 and 7 drew together the 
better examples in each Team Learning sub-section from the six contractors and 
contrasted them against each other and previous research. 
This approach, whilst it provided what could be suggested to be a best practice 
example of the deployment of Team Learning within a contracting organization, 
provided a idealist ‘tapestry’ which does not represent the reality for any one 
organization. In addition, some points brought out where there are notable failings in 
the six contractors to adopt LO processes which provided a contrast within the 
analysis. The same approach to analyzing the research was taken in the following 
chapter 9 which examined the Team Learning element of the LO model within the six 
nominated contractors. 
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9 Data Analysis and Discussion – The ‘Systems 
Thinking’ Element of the Contractor LO 
9.1 Introduction 
Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) LO model noted Systems Thinking as the broadest 
discipline which acts as a cornerstone for the other four, bringing the concept of the 
LO together as a coherent model. The basic premise of Systems Thinking is that the 
organization has to understand that its mechanisms are a complex and dynamic set 
of systems to which simple ‘fixes’ cannot be applied. Senge et al (1990, 1994) further 
suggests that many organizations do not fully understand the implications of their 
actions in that cause and effect are often assumed to be adjacent in time and space, 
but are not. Understanding the wider systems and how these systems react following 
a change is seen to be of paramount importance in the LO.  
In order to assess the presence of Systems Thinking, the research reported in this 
thesis looked for the contracting organizations’ ability against seven factors 
considered to be important for systems thinking. First is the ability to align individual 
roles. Second is the need to ensure co-ordination of processes within the organization 
to decrease the risk of internal systems working against each other. Third is 
Benchmarking organizational performance/systems against peer group which is 
important in order to understand wider business performance as opposed to simple 
inwardly-facing assessment. Fourth, setting up necessary learning loops such that the 
organization effectively learns how its actions affect its performance is assessed. 
Fifth, the ability to flex and adapt to the changing business environment without 
needing to overhaul the business is another important area and is explored in the 
flexibility section. Sixth (say what needs to be said about support services here) 
Seventh is a clear understating about how the contractors’ actions affect their 
customers is explored, which took Systems Thinking beyond the confines of the 
organization and out into Systems Thinking about the customer element of the supply 
chain. 
Each of the elements mentioned in the preceding paragraph are analyzed and 
discussed through the reflection of the observations within the six nominated 
contractors. Reflection is done not only against the back drop of Senge et al’s (1990, 
1994) work, but broader work from within and without the construction industry. 
Whilst Systems Thinking as a discipline within the LO model from Senge et al’s 
(1990, 1994) is not challenged within this chapter, it is important for credibility and 
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rigour to analyze and discussion the findings against the detailed, and more recent 
works referenced herein. 
9.2 Align individual roles 
Senge et al (1990, 1994) noted that organizations which display Systems Thinking 
should not have individual roles or departments working against each other. In 
addition, there should be exercises carried out at a problem-solving level to establish 
whether root causes of problems are not departments working diametrically to 
opposed goals. Senge et al (1990, 1994) provides examples of such incidences of 
misalignment such as purchasing departments whose role is to provide lowest capital 
cost parts (regardless of quality) to an assembly line whose role is to assemble a best 
quality product. Another example is seen to be a sales team whose role is to bring in 
new customers by offering any special deal necessary, then passing customers on to 
service delivery people whose role is to provide a defined service regardless of the 
sales deal offered to the customer. 
9.2.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati ensured that roles were renewed regularly on the basis of their current 
relevance. However, such changes were generally not well received by the individuals 
who considered such changes as a bit of a ‘paper exercise’ and, as such, not adding 
the value for which senior management planned. In addition, there appeared to be 
gaps where it was suggested that better role alignment might help organizational 
performance. One area where this type of job design had come in useful was in 
administrative roles in terms of ensuring there was no gap or overlap between roles. 
Its leader noted an example: 
“…what we did was say “Look, write down what each of the guys do and then 
we’ll sit down and say “Right, that’s Dave’s responsibility, that’s Sue’s 
responsibility” and they know where we’re going…” 
It appeared that there was little supporting literature to suggest what best practice 
role alignment within an organization should look like. Senge et al (1990, 1994) 
noted that without alignment of roles, Systems Thinking (and Shared Vision) was 
impossible, but offered no real practical roadmap to accomplish it. More recently, 
Anderson et al (2001) developed a system to measure alignment, but this was 
between two distinct organizations. 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 188 
In addition, Cincinnati used its succession planning process to help individuals align. 
When looking at moving an individual into its line manager’s role, Cincinnati asked 
them to respond to a set of questions to test current understanding of the role they 
were about to fill. The answers to the questions helped identify what gap in 
knowledge existed to be filled by the business before the individual can adopt that 
role successfully. The questions used were along the lines of: 
“What do you need from me to help you step up to this job?” and “If you 
were going to replace me, what would you do?” 
Candidates were also asked to grade themselves as honestly as possible in terms of 
what areas they were relatively strong and weak on in terms of the new role so that 
an individual improvement plan could be put in place to prepare the individual for 
their new role. Cincinnati’s succession planning therefore appeared to approach 
current best practice thinking (following Groves, 2007; Hills, 2009). 
When aligning the roles within the business itself, the focus group suggested that 
there was still work to do within the organization. For example, it accepted that there 
were still issues with the alignment between the estimating and commercial 
departments. There was an issue with the handover between the estimators and the 
commercial managers in terms of ensuring estimates were adequate for the project 
to be managed commercially, as suggested by one member of the focus group who 
said: 
“…the final bastion sort of defence, is between estimating and commercial. 
Where the estimators tend to go through to when we price a job, and then 
the commercial guys take it on board.”  
However, there was a management acceptance of this problem within Cincinnati and 
it was being examined for a solution. In addition, Cincinnati suggested that a lot of 
roles were fluid in nature and tended to come and go as the Pittsburgh work needed 
them to operate. Cincinnati had not assessed how successful these roles had been. It 
tried to remain fairly traditional in terms of the roles people adopted within the 
Cincinnati structure and tried to avoid ‘blue sky’ thinking in this area. 
There was, however, a worrying hubris to the rest of Cincinnati’s role alignment. It 
was happy to state that it thought that its approach was correct because 
organizational performance was good. There appeared to be little appetite to 
experiment with service delivery in this area. The approach appeared to contradict 
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Cincinnati’s earlier message about experimentation being encouraged. Harris (2002) 
noted a similar complacency to organizational learning within the banking sector. 
9.2.2 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis was trying to move away from the relatively rigid structure in place to a 
more fluid one. The reasoning was that Indianapolis did not want its employees to 
become focussed upon their title, but more focussed upon serving customers. One of 
its directors noted:  
“We are trying not to badge what we are trying to do. We’ve been driven 
recently by this structure. What I want to try to get back to is not having 
structure…” 
 This desire meant that Indianapolis tried to align its roles to its organizational focus 
upon being as flexible as possible. The approach appeared to be a move towards the 
self-directed work team suggested by Roper (2007) and allowed it to more easily 
take up and release slack in the workload without paying for people to be 
unproductive or having to hire more employees when work materialized. Flexibility 
enabled it to be more efficient for its customers through a minimization of waste. 
Indianapolis’ approach to personnel alignment could be reflected back to its wider 
approach to flexibility noted in section 10.6. 
In addition, Indianapolis felt that its approach prevented the hierarchical nature 
which organizations naturally gravitate towards, as people without titles were less 
likely to adopt ‘expected’ behaviours. One of the directors stated:  
“…everyone hates the ‘sparkies’ and it goes into the professional field as 
well. You know “oh the bloody architect” and stuff like that.”  
An example given was where it had combined its consultant architects, designers and 
engineers into one self-managed design team (following Roper, 2007) and dealt with 
one representative on that team. Indianapolis had removed the need to act as 
‘referee’ between consultants blaming each other for any project failings. 
Indianapolis was open about the fact that it developed its people in a way which 
made them marketable on the employment market. This was an interesting 
perspective which suggested that Indianapolis had accepted churn as part of the 
natural order of business. Its approach was to manage churn rather than to prevent it 
(following Siebert & Zubanov, 2009). In addition, Indianapolis ensured that those 
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who wished to remain in a certain role or level could do so. It was clear from the MD 
that those who wished to be an “…absolute ten out of ten job surveyor…but does not 
want to be a managing surveyor…” were just as important to the organization. 
Therefore it allowed individuals to align a non-managerial career path to the 
organization’s goals. 
9.2.3 Chicago 
Chicago’s directors talked about hiring the best people and then spending time with 
them to ensure that the organization understood their view of the world. Additionally, 
they took a ‘rational economic man’ (discussed in Morgan, 2006) view of employees 
needs. One Director stated: 
“...[employees] think more with their pockets probably than they do with 
anything else. So the thing you must have in place is a remuneration policy 
that is aligned with the outputs you require.”  
This statement suggested that there may not quite be a Systems Thinking culture 
within Chicago, but that it understood that the correct motivation needed to be in 
place from the organization in order to best align individuals. 
A further problem had been “…weeding out the [new hires] that don’t work out…” 
which Chicago’s directors suggested had not been successful. The MD suggested that 
he could identify those who were not of the right ‘type’ to succeed at Chicago within 
the first two months of employment. He was not, however, often strong enough to 
speak to them and suggest that it was not in everyone’s best interest that they 
continue to work there. It was suggested that this was also because if these new 
hires did not align with the culture, then they too could be seen to have had a poor 
experience (following Da Silva et al, 2010). This position was echoed by the focus 
group, who suggested there were those that did not ‘fit’ and who did not stay within 
the business very long. It may be argued that such a position suggests a potential 
recruitment practice problem. Systems Thinking, however, embodied a whole of 
organizational approach and therefore a recruitment problem suggestseda deeper 
problem within Chicago’s system which had not been addressed. 
Chicago’s MD suggested, however, that Chicago’s culture had grown out of the people 
who had joined over the years, commenting:  
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“I think organizations are sort of Darwinian objects, they evolve over time 
and new people come in, new gene sets come in and get discarded.”  
His view appeared to be diametrically opposed to the view espoused about new hires 
now – that they did not influence Chicago’s culture, and that they needed to fit the 
existing culture. Although the evolutionary theory of the organization has been well 
established from research into organizations such as Toyota (Muffatto, 1999), it may 
be that Chicago had reached a point of cultural alignment that it did not wish to 
change. This position further suggested that Chicago was more of a LO in the past 
than it was at the time the research herein reported was conducted. 
The lack of written processes within the business encouraged individuals to pass on 
the expected ways of working to new hires. One member of the focus group noted:  
“…what I’ve learnt when I started and I think I pass it down too. As I move 
up I think I pass it down to my site managers. There’s certain ways I like 
things done.”  
This approach encouraged a consistency in the way that roles were executed from 
one role holder to the next. In addition, Chicago went down a route of standardizing 
key areas, such as site setup, which allowed individuals to more easily pass roles 
onto each other as part of a learning process. Kim & Seo (2009) described such 
learning by doing as the predominant learning model in ‘trades’ based roles. The 
focus group suggested, however, that Chicago could have further improved the after 
sales service and standardization of site setup and thereby improved its standing with 
its customers. 
9.2.4 Dallas 
Dallas aligned its appraisals to the overall business plan through a cascade process 
and according to one of the directors: 
“The appraisal flows from the business plan so I’ll sit down and agree 
objectives and targets with the Board…the line managers take that and say 
‘These are the objectives and targets for our department this year”.  
Whilst this process appeared to be well aligned, the main weakness apparent was 
that all the flow of alignment came from the top down. There appeared to be little 
moving in the other direction. This one-way flow suggested imposed alignment rather 
than an alignment which all parties have the opportunity to influence, as suggested 
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by Senge et al (1990, 1994). A reference to training “…falling out of the bottom…” of 
the appraisal did not sound like a commitment to developing individuals, but more 
like a necessity to achieve the vision of the board. 
9.3 Coordination 
For the purposes of this section, the Oxford English dictionary definition of 
coordination will be assumed (www.oxforddictionaries.com):  
“The organization of the different elements of a complex body or activity so 
as to enable them to work together effectively: an important managerial task 
is the control and coordination of activities” 
9.3.1 Cincinnati 
One of Cincinnati’s parent companies implemented a ‘gate system’ to control its 
projects which underpinned what it did throughout the organization. Individual 
business units had very little latitude to decide how the system should specifically be 
implemented on their projects and for particular customer programmes. Its leader 
noted:  
“…the leadership from [country name removed for identification purposes] 
said…this is what we’re going to use. So you can either make it user-friendly 
for yourself or you can bitch and moan and go through sideways…” 
The disadvantage with such imposition was that Cincinnati needed to adapt the 
system for use with Pittsburgh. The advantage, however, was that it allowed any 
Project Manager (PM) to take on another’s project should the need arise, as the 
underpinning management system would be the same. Whether there was too much 
restriction (as the system did dictate when reports should be issued and in what 
format) from bureaucracy was debatable, but Cincinnati viewed the system as a 
strength as it aligned to its business strategy, as noted by Cooke-Davis et al (2009) 
who advocated the need for alignment of strategy and project management systems. 
Some systems in Cincinnati’s parent companies deliberately did not coordinate, due 
to the nature of its customer led programmes of work. One example of lack of co-
ordination was its 3D computer aided design (CAD) systems because customers 
usually had their own systems. Cincinnati’s leader advised:  
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“What you find is, with the type of business we’re in, the client will have a 
system. So we’ll have AutoCAD. We’ll install AutoCAD. You want it done in 
Micro Station. We have people who can do that.”  
Cincinnati’s parent companies responded to this change by investing in the skills 
necessary to operate the systems rather than purchasing the systems themselves. 
Cincinnati was therefore able to adopt and adapt to Pittsburgh’s system easily. If a 
customer did not have a system, Cincinnati’s parent companies could acquire a 
temporary license for a system with which to carry out the project design. The 
approach demonstrated an excellent understanding by Cincinnati’s parent companies 
of how they were part of the wider system that was the UK construction industry. 
There was a potential Systems Thinking disconnect identified within one of 
Cincinnati’s parents in terms of the way that projects were won and then delivered. 
The manager of the delivery of Cincinnati’s programme stated that it was his job to 
“…deliver what [the sales & marketing team] have said…” The statement suggested 
that the delivery team had little involvement in the process of winning work. This 
scenario would potentially cause a similar situation to one put forward by Senge et al 
(1994) where one department was targeted in such a way that the way that it acted 
to achieve its targets caused problems for other departments. Cincinnati appeared to 
compensate for this apparent lack of co-ordination in its Systems Thinking by relying 
upon a resource utilization system and having representatives from each department 
seated on the board of directors. The representatives reviewed each potential bid and 
questioned resource availability and how service would be provided before any bid 
was approved. 
9.3.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee took a slightly wider view of the coordination role in that it had a team 
dedicated solely to translating design information from the customer’s consultants 
into a buildable product. Tennessee’s MD put it: 
“…we’ve actually got people who translate sometimes the nonsense that we 
get from the consultancy field into something that we can actually build…”  
This approach demonstrated Systems Thinking in that Tennessee understood how it 
could add value to the full construction process outside of what might be considered 
its ‘usual’ remit. Tennessee suggested that improving ease of construction of the 
asset gave it the ability to remove wasted cost and/or time and improve the quality 
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of the finished product, as suggested by Lam & Wong (2008). It encouraged the 
design consultant, if there was one, to consider the project as a whole process rather 
than simply a finished product. 
9.3.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis suggested that its coordination came from its five directors of its five 
major accounts working closely together and employing their differing yet 
complementary skills. A focus group member noted: 
“Each director is responsible for an account but within that system also each 
director has got his own skillset.” 
Supporting each director were two associates who also had a mixed background and 
worked closely together to understand each other’s workloads. Furthermore, the 
responsibility and ownership passed through all levels of the organization which 
encouraged the teams to self-coordinate (following Roper’s (2007) research on self-
managed teams). 
There may have been a slight coordination disconnect in terms of the feasibility team 
winning work and then passing it to the delivery departments, but Indianapolis was 
broadly happy with the way the process operated as the passage of work came 
through the directors who managed delivery anyway. Furthermore, Indianapolis 
rarely tendered competitively for work and preferred to focus upon its “blue chip, 
repeat work” customers as these customers were considered to be more reliable, 
Indianapolis understood them and it was easier to coordinate and manage the work 
to deliver an excellent product. A member of the focus group noted:  
“…Do a good job and the money will come.” But it's all about the delivery. 
And I would say we're more delivery-focussed than cost-focussed…” 
Indianapolis also appreciated the gap between how different individuals perceived the 
business. Such appreciation meant that whilst its vision might be more developed at 
board level and cascaded down rather than developed by the whole organization, the 
level of communication at least gave individuals understanding of what was 
happening throughout the business. Christenson & Walker (2008) noted that a well 
communicated vision (shared or otherwise) was still crucial to project success. The 
focus group accepted that some things may take longer than others to filter through 
Indianapolis, as one member commented: 
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“It takes time to drip down. But hopefully it's a fairly consistent message that 
goes down.” 
This comment suggested that the Indianapolis intranet was not as widely used as it 
might be.  
9.3.4 Chicago 
Chicago too ensured coordination of departments by keeping its senior staff involved 
with a cross departmental view of what was going on within the organization. In 
addition, the directors understood the limitations which each profession brought to 
the table along with its expertise. Chicago’s MD advised that: 
“…if the commercial side of the business is left to its own devices you'll never 
get a project delivered because it'll take forever to procure anything…”  
Chicago’s solution to this limitation was to make such departments responsible for 
the projects and make the other departments subservient. Any coordination issues 
that could not be sorted out by the PM were escalated to senior management. 
Chicago had learned the lesson to have the PM in charge from a previous situation 
where several professions were reporting to line management rather than task 
management. One of its directors stated: 
“…rule of thumb is that commercial is always subservient to project 
management. And that any one project always has a single individual whose 
responsibility it is to safely and profitably deliver that project.”  
Whilst the PM-led approach solved the problem that Chicago had, the solution did not 
appear to be true Systems Thinking. For example, PM design decisions may adversely 
impact the commercial team. It may be that this solution that was employed may 
cause different problems in the near future (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
9.3.5 Dallas 
Dallas created a Systems Thinking environment by giving senior individuals and their 
teams the opportunity to work within other departments. This experience helped 
employees understand how their actions impacted upon each other (following Senge 
et al, 1990, 1994). For example, estimators could support with quantity surveying; 
quantity surveyors could support with estimating and project management. There 
was, however, an issue of the individual ‘businesses’ (offices) competing with each 
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other for the same work which had yet to be resolved, as one of the directors pointed 
out: 
“…the problem of the group though is the cooperating companies do stand on 
each other’s toes. It’s probably a failing where two companies could go for 
the same job that’s on the borderline of their areas…”  
This problem had still to be resolved and suggested a lack of Systems Thinking in this 
area. 
For its repeat customers, Dallas was much more coordinated. When the business 
development team had acquired more Washington projects than its delivery team 
could complete, the business development team contacted Washington and returned 
one major project giving the reason that Dallas wished to maintain the quality of its 
service over the pursuit of turnover and profit. The directors noted: 
“It was a big decision at the time to turn £7m worth of work down, a few 
gritted teeth and whatever but it was the right decision...”  
There appeared to be no literature outlining a process for rejecting such work in the 
construction industry, suggesting therefore that this decision making process for 
construction would represent a new line of enquiry. It may be suggested, therefore, 
that this finding may be seen to make a contribution to practice in the construction 
industry. It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this point further 
and this is an area for future research. 
The focus group was more critical about the link between the various departments. 
The suggestion was more that there was a good interaction and exchange where time 
permitted and that for the rest of the time, there could be a lack of understanding 
between departments. One focus group member advised:  
“…the estimators will do their bit and that's the estimate, you've got the job. 
And then it will just be a handover…I mean I'll finish one job and then, ‘Oh 
you're doing this, bang.’ And the price is agreed…”  
On the whole, however, it was suggested that this approach did not cause major 
problems due to the level of understanding between departments but it did not 
appear to represent Systems Thinking (Senge et al; 1990, 1994). 
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9.3.6 Kansas 
Kansas did not find ensuring coordination between departments difficult, mainly due 
to its small size. Furthermore, it held regular directors’ meetings which gave the 
organizational leaders visibility of what their counterparts were doing. Similarly, 
surveyors were interchanged regularly between project types and roles such that 
each gained an understanding at a functional level of how each client stream worked. 
Kansas’ MD noted: 
“…we let them work on each other’s projects, we encourage that.” 
There was one notable omission from Kansas’ coordination system and that was 
Kansas’ joinery shop, which operated independently. The MD suggested:  
“The only ones who tend to work on their own quite a lot are the joinery 
surveyors, because theirs is a little bit more specialist…”.  
This statement suggested a potential important disconnect between manufacturing 
and project management at an operational level. It may be argued that this 
disconnect was offset by the high experience of the joinery shop director who 
understood construction programmes and prioritized his work accordingly. He could 
recognize when one PM was ordering joinery too early to create float. The fact that he 
needed to be able to recognize such situations suggested a lack of ingrained Systems 
Thinking within the construction PMs. That Kansas relied on an individual to manage 
the process, rather than an ingrained cultural awareness, suggested a lack of a true 
Systems Thinking culture (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
9.4 Benchmarking Organizational Performance/Systems 
against Peer Group 
Benchmarking can be defined as “contextualizing the current performance of the 
organization through comparisons with other organizations in order to improve” 
(Askim et al, 2010). Whilst it is accepted that this is not the only definition available 
in contemporary LO literature, this definition is useful to outline the concept being 
analyzed in section 10.4. 
9.4.1 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis relied largely on its customers to set its benchmarking, which it then 
aligned with internally. One of the directors noted: 
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“…our teams or our individuals’ KPIs are linked to our client’s KPIs…” 
All members of the team were jointly responsible for achieving certain standards 
which ensured that it achieved its customer benchmarks. Its customer aligned 
internal benchmarking model was still under development and it suggested at the 
time of the research undertaken for this case study that it was still three months 
away from completion. Indianapolis (and Cincinnati) took their benchmarks from their 
customer rather than using latest best practice to develop their own, which can be 
contrasted to Gapp & Fisher’s (2008) Total Quality Management (TQM) approach 
where the benchmarks were developed by the supplier, but with a total customer 
focus. Such an approach suggested another departure from Senge et al’s view, as the 
customer was the driving force behind learning within these organizations rather than 
merely being the focus of such learning (Senge et al, 1990, 1994). 
9.4.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee was more advanced in its range of benchmarks employed, but again only 
benchmarked internally on matters of process. Externally, it did take a lead in 
benchmarking its performance from the customer perspective by implementing 
customer feedback forms. Seeking direct customer feedback was seen to be 
something the construction professional services industry had done for years 
(following Amidu et al, 2008), but was not the norm for contractors. Tennessee’s 
forms were aligned to the business culture and rewards system through the fact that 
a donation was made to charity for each one returned and 5% of Directors’ bonuses 
were linked to results on these forms. The MD noted: 
“…we pay money to charity for each one that we get back which encourages 
them to come back, keeps the numbers up…5% of directors’ bonus is 
actually related to those forms alone.” 
In addition, the feedback results were posted prominently by the MD within the 
organization so excellent achievement became visible. The MD commented 
“…we then have a system of notice boards…each board has ten notices on it 
and those ten notices are changed on the first of each month every month 
without fail…” 
 There was, however, a cultural question raised when it was revealed that the posting 
of results was used more to focus on those who had not achieved the best scores. 
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Especially good feedback letters from customers were posted around the business for 
all to see. This feedback was thought to provide positive motivation across the 
business for PMs to get their project posted. 
9.4.3 Dallas 
Dallas did not really employ benchmarking to assess its performance; rather it stated 
that a customer returning to do business again was its benchmark. One of the 
directors stated: 
“Our benchmark is the client coming back. I don’t think there’s a better way 
is there?” 
The weakness of the approach was that the only way to identify poor performance 
presumably would be the loss of a customer and thus it may be argued that Dallas’ 
approach fell short of current best practice (c/f Gapp & Fisher, 2008). Dallas also 
relied on customers such as Washington to carry out the benchmarking on its service 
and inform it when service was not satisfactory. It may be argued that such an 
approach to benchmarking was reactive as it had to wait until interaction with 
Washington before it could understand how it compared to its peer group. The only 
internal benchmarks that it recorded were profit level and health and safety. 
9.4.4 Kansas 
Kansas’ benchmarking appeared to be entirely internal and entirely financial. Kansas 
team leader for the Oakland commission commented: 
“…we haven’t got KPIs in our business, you know they just don’t…they don’t 
exist.” 
Kansas’ benchmarking of its financial performance had driven some Systems Thinking 
along the lines of a Lean approach. The team leader also stated:  
“As soon as [product] left [Kansas premises] and went on to a lorry, time 
was ticking that they started eating away, eroding into that profit...So then 
we had to put something in [the contract] which could get us the value back 
from those visits…” 
Like Dallas, this approach was far below current best practice (c/f Gapp & Fisher, 
2008). 
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9.5 Learning loops 
Argyris & Schon (1974, 1978) coined the terms single and double loop learning. 
Single loop learning he suggested is of the ‘identify error, correct error’ type. Double 
loop learning is where an error is detected and the correction involves the alteration 
of organizational norms, policies and objectives. In order for an organization to be an 
LO, double loop learning must be present. As can be seen from section 10.5, much of 
the learning loop activity within the participant contractors depended upon single loop 
learning. 
9.5.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati concentrated on ensuring that good and innovative design ideas were fed 
back into standard design. Such feedback was carried out by its dedicated team who 
harvested such ideas and tried to ingrain them into service delivery. Its approach was 
not always successful and was an area that Cincinnati was actively looking to 
improve. Cincinnati’s approach was some way from best practice as set out by 
Kroners & Goffin (2007), who noted the use of Post Project Reviews as best practice 
learning vehicles. As one member of the focus group noted: 
“…some of the information that comes into the alliance isn't always 
necessarily disseminated, but they are improving that.” 
The focus group suggested that improving the informal communications by locating 
all its employees on one floor helped to improve the learning loop. 
9.5.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee tried specifically to structure its operations to defend against repeating 
mistakes. It observed that the problem with having a single PM on a project was that 
if he/she disappeared permanently, or even temporarily, there was the risk that 
his/her knowledge went with him/her and that mistakes could be repeated. 
Tennessee mitigated this risk through the separation of the project and contract 
management roles. It accepted that separation added overhead, but that it ensured 
that knowledge about a project did not reside within one individual. This strategy 
helped to avoid mistakes and made it easier to share knowledge in a process that 
aided effective feedback. 
Tennessee’s MD viewed the contract manager role as key to its learning as an 
organization, commenting:  
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“…we actually have contract managers above project managers. Now, okay 
that’s an extra overhead in a way, but it’s quite crucial to the smooth 
running of the company.”  
The contract manager spent perhaps only a fifth of the time on a project compared to 
the dedicated PM. S/he did not understand the detail of any one project, but through 
such interaction, s/he understood the important issues on numerous projects. Such 
interaction made the collection and deployment of knowledge easier. Further to the 
contract manager, Tennessee had a core team that understood each customer’s 
programme of work from the strategic perspective. This team ensured that the 
learning from the contract managers was dissipated to ensure one learning curve for 
each issue, rather than several. Thus, the contract manager was seen to play a 
pivotal role in the learning loop. 
9.5.3 Indianapolis 
Indianapolis had a frustration around learning loops in that they did not happen to 
the extent that it would like. Some senior individuals within the organization tried to 
lead by sending information out and actively requesting feedback, but this proactivity 
did not seem to have helped. In addition, individuals still created innovation on 
projects and did not feed back to the organization. Leach et al (2006) noted that the 
most creative and successful ideas were generated and implemented within 
organizations when informative feedback was present. The language used when 
Indianapolis discussed this topic was one of frustration (for example, the use of the 
word “…haphazard…”) rather than the language of investigation. 
Indianapolis employed more ‘push’ techniques to try and encourage individuals to 
create learning loops, but appeared to have omitted the step of examining why loops 
had not developed as part of the day to day working practices. As one of the directors 
suggested: 
“We are also trying to tie it in with our communication which is going out to 
them. Providing the feedback via a mechanism which they’ve been – well 
they won’t even know that they’ve been suckered in. They’ll think ‘well this 
looks good. Let’s have a look at that.’ And actually I think that, and they 
will hit the button and it will provide us with the feedback.” 
What Indianapolis tried also to do was encourage site labourers and craft workers to 
feed back on what processes worked best on site, following Leach et al (2006). 
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Indianapolis viewed these individuals as those most likely to have good ideas that 
could be applied on site. 
Indianapolis’s struggle to gain feedback was interesting, given the positive way focus 
group participants spoke about the learning loop enablers in place, with one member 
stating:  
“…because it's quite a flat structure as well, it's quite easy - as I say even 
four or five years ago when I was a packing manager, it was always an open 
forum…”  
Leach et al (2006) noted the amount of feedback as a key idea enabler, which the 
availability of open forums should increase. The focus group discussed an open door 
policy, an enthusiastic management willing to listen, freedom to experiment, a flat 
structure, post project reviews, the intranet and a customer base who expected 
innovation. Despite these approaches, the problem seemed to be the motivation of 
people to put ideas forward. The most successful strategy appeared to be the post 
project reviews, the results of which were fed back to the Indianapolis directors to 
roll out into new projects and into its customer Miami’s centre of excellence. 
9.5.4 Chicago 
Chicago’s directors suggested that having set customer teams was an excellent 
enabler for learning loops. One director asserted: 
“…it completely relies on there being relatively small teams of people pointed 
at a particular end user market.” 
In addition, a feedback report produced by the customer team director was circulated 
monthly and included a lessons learned section. The report was circulated during a 
lessons learned meeting at the end of each project. The lessons learned session 
included a question and answer session, a round table session which encouraged 
knowledge exchange. The outcome of these meetings was then circulated via e-mail 
to others in the business. Having a formal process for lessons learned was 
recommended by Kotnour & Kurstedt (2000). Additionally, Chicago carried out review 
sessions with Minnesota which consisted of sixty standard questions, the responses to 
which were circulated and used to create improvement actions. 
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9.5.5 Dallas 
Dallas suggested that most of its current processes were built up through its learning 
loops or ‘SIMS’ system as it is known within the organization. The process involved 
discussing mistakes made and altering processes to avoid them happening again. The 
directors reviewed a project and site with its team, e-mailed out the findings and 
learning throughout the business and then followed up with an end of year review 
where all major changes were reviewed to ensure organization-wide implementation. 
One of Dallas’ directors noted: 
“…we’ll say basically ‘these are the good points, these are the bad points and 
what we’ve seen on site this is new stuff… this is what the impact it will have 
on your business on your development when you’re building it next year…”  
This process was viewed by all as being informal, yet effective. Dallas’ view of its 
current informal system being effective may be due to a lack of exposure to a best 
practice formal system, such as recommended by Kotnour & Kurstedt (2000). 
9.5.6 Kansas 
Kansas admitted that its learning loops were not as advanced as they might be and 
that it usually was only the projects which went wrong which went through a review 
loop (referred to as an After Action Review by Oakland). It suggested that the 
learning from the projects which go well was likely to become lost. The MD noted: 
 “When something goes wrong, they all want to sit around a table and talk 
about it. “Why’s it gone wrong?”…So what tends to happen is you get all the 
bad learning…” 
 Kansas did not elaborate as to whether such ‘negative feedback’ was sought at an 
individual level which, as Belschak & Den Hartog (2009) noted, could produce 
counterproductive results. 
The focus group, however, appeared unsure of whether and how the organization 
used learning loops. They assumed feedback was dealt with at director level where 
deemed necessary. One group member stated: 
“…they (director level) can deal with that, you know feedback from Jason or 
anybody…” 
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It was accepted that at the end of each year on a large project (and at project 
handover) feedback was provided to understand how things could be improved. The 
annual reviews were used to improve the performance of the specific project. The 
review carried out at the handover stage was used to develop feedback for the next 
large project, but they were done at director level and focused mostly on cost issues. 
The focus group noted that the smaller projects were fast tracked and thus lacked the 
time for learning loops to be employed. 
9.6 Flexibility 
Morabito et al (2009) defined organizational flexibility as: 
“The capacity to rearrange or reconstitute a system configuration to adapt to 
an internal or external imperative”. 
This definition will be assumed throughout the section 10.6 and all analysis is 
reflected against this definition. This has been done as the definition above refers well 
to the imperative set out in the customer interviews for the need for flexibility. Such 
customer requirement could be defined from the perspective of the contractors as an 
external imperative. 
9.6.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati coped with the need to flex its operations through the use of 40% agency 
staff within its workforce. This staffing strategy helped it to cope with dips in 
workload such as the one experienced during the recession. It considered agency 
individuals to be as much a part of Cincinnati as direct employees. In some cases 
agency employees had worked for Cincinnati for many years. In addition, there was 
research that suggested that the presence of temporary employees enhanced 
learning (Wiersma, 2007). Agency staff could be called on and released at relatively 
short notice. The agency workers were inducted into Cincinnati appropriately, even 
though they were not direct employees. The combination of direct and agency 
staffing allowed Cincinnati to maintain quality and flexibility of service concurrently. 
In addition, being a JV allowed Cincinnati to call on its parent companies for 
resources. Conversely, in slower times it could return individuals to those 
organizations. Its parent companies also operated in numerous customer industries 
Cincinnati’s leader stated:  
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“…it is like having a chair with several legs – you can saw one off and still sit 
on the chair, it doesn’t fall over”.  
This statement suggested that having organizations like these as parent companies 
gave it significant advantages over its peer group. Ho et al (2009), however, noted 
the difficulties in managing JVs from a resource perspective and that the governance 
structure had to be correct to ensure smooth operation. Cincinnati’s success 
suggested that its governance structure was correct. 
9.6.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee struggled slightly with flexibility in terms of moving people from one 
sector to another due to the fact that it was a diverse organization. Therefore, whilst 
individual skills might be transferable, there was the issue of bringing individuals’ 
technical awareness on particular industries to an acceptable level. It did, however, 
suggest that its staff possessed the necessary self motivation and professionalism to 
self-educate as necessary. Such a process must assume that the individual could self-
assess skills needs accurately, something which Dunning et al (2004) had discovered 
was sometimes not the case. This position suggests a development gap in 
Tennessee’s ability to flex the organization. 
Another issue in this area was communication with the customer in a way that s/he 
understood. Tennessee’s MD noted:  
“…the main issue is more at high level about your ability to effectively 
communicate with your customer base in the language that the customer 
base actually understands…”  
So whilst Tennessee may move someone with the correct technical skills into a 
customer team, it must ensure that person understood the customer’s ‘language’. 
In addition, Tennessee’s MD suggested that its regionalized structure helped it to 
flex. Each one of the regions stood alone as a business unit, and did not need to rely 
on control from the centre. The MD stated  
“…you’re not actually talking about having to worry about a [£value] 
company if you’ve got, say, twenty business units in it. Each one is only 
[£value] and there you can see very clearly what it is you need…” 
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Units could, however, support each other through providing, or receiving, staff and/or 
projects in times of flexing necessity. It did, however, acknowledge that due to the 
nature of construction, it was easier to move work across geographical boundaries for 
professional personnel than for skilled labour. 
9.6.3 Indianapolis 
Flexibility appeared to be the element which Indianapolis viewed as its key 
differentiator from its peer group. Most of the responses to questions during the case 
study reflected on its ability to be flexible in terms of how it serviced its customers. 
Indeed, Morabito et al (2009) noted that flexibility was an element of many 
successful 21st Century organizations. One of the Indianapolis directors stated: “I 
think the company works better when it’s working at 110% [of capacity].” The desire 
to work at such capacity made it focus upon being flexible in order to perform and 
develop the business. Indianapolis understood that its customers were in a constantly 
flexing retail market and that it had to flex accordingly. In order to assist Indianapolis 
with being flexible, it did not enforce a strict contract as did some other customers in 
the industry. 
Indianapolis’ directors were, however, struggling to contract in response to the 
recession prevailing at the time of the case study research. One director advised: 
The last lot we did in March and we did about 30, they were the ones, you 
know really hard; people we didn’t necessarily want to lose, people we 
liked. You know their personal circumstances, you know the market and it's 
devastating. It’s devastating for the firm and as individuals because you 
know we know the wives names, you know the kids names; you know how 
old the kids are. And you're absolutely devastating people's lives. And that 
again goes back to the sort of culture, what we're about. We try to have 
this sort of family firm feel to us, and you're destroying people's lives, so 
that’s a really hard thing to do. 
Given the ‘family’ culture it possessed, releasing people in such downturns proved 
difficult for Indianapolis. 
Indianapolis did, however, also make use of agency personnel to aid the flexing 
process, albeit it was very selective about whom it used (following Wiersma, 2007). It 
was keen to set up an agency ‘pool’ with its competing suppliers to its key customers 
in order that the best agency talent was retained. The idea was that a list of 
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‘approved’ agents was shared between the organizations and was called upon as 
workload flexed. One of the directors noted: 
“…we used to have a guy who owned his own agency company working for 
us. So he would work for me and I would use his agency people because he 
understood the business.”  
Such an idea allowed all parties to flex with the workload whilst maintaining the 
quality of service and retaining the maximum amount of knowledge within the supply 
chain. Indianapolis had not been able to garner the interest from its competing 
suppliers to Miami. Indianapolis suggested that an idea like this would have to be a 
customer-led initiative. 
Indianapolis’s flexibility extended to its stated lack of rigid processes, which allowed 
its employees working on individual projects to be able to introduce new ideas 
(following Morabito et al, 2009). This lack of rigidity was clearly demonstrated in the 
focus group, with a group member commenting: 
“…if you asked everyone in the firm to draw a company structure it would 
probably be slightly different...We're quite happy to leave it like that I think 
really, because it means we can leave it a little bit flexible…” 
 Indianapolis suggested that this level of agility was necessary due to the increasingly 
demanding nature of its customers. In addition, its relatively small size compared to 
other tier one contractors in the industry was an advantage in terms of its ability to 
flex, given the small management team, narrow customer base and shallow 
structure. 
9.6.4 Chicago 
Chicago’s MD was blunt about the need to flex in the face of a changing environment. 
Chicago’s position was one of needing to hire and fire in response to market changes, 
whilst trying to retain the core of the best people, as one of its directors suggested:  
“…unfortunately that's what you have to do. That's the tragic thing in this 
business that it's incredibly peaky and it's very hard to plan…” 
 Chicago tried to plan its flexing by speaking to Minnesota and others about the 
frequency, size and nature of upcoming projects to avoid the need for redundancies, 
although the aforementioned statement suggests a lack of scenario planning (Senge 
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et al; 1990, 1994) at an organizational level. Chicago was proactive in passing on 
cost savings to customers where the recession had driven its supply chain costs 
down. Proactive flexing avoided customers forcing the issue by asking for cost 
reductions in times when customers knew construction costs were declining. 
It was acknowledged by Chicago that there was a need to improve productivity. The 
irony was that it was suggested that there was not enough time to work on this 
aspect and was an area that Chicago was looking to improve in the future. The MD 
asserted: 
“…I don't think we concentrate enough in this industry on productivity. That's 
the part of the whole construction process which I personally would like to 
spend more time looking at…”  
This viewpoint suggested a lack of ‘sharpening the saw’ (c/f Covey, 2004) view of the 
organization with individuals spending time working with inefficient processes instead 
of taking time out to improve those processes. 
9.6.5 Dallas 
Dallas stated that it felt ahead of its competition in terms of flexibility. Individuals 
talked of previous organizations they worked at where the attitude was “…Oh that’s 
his job, that’s his job, that’s his bit…” which was a culture that current employees 
were happy to say was not present within Dallas. Its culture was very much to 
understand what the customer needed and then to be as flexible as possible in 
ensuring that it was delivered (following Morabito et al, 2009). The only limitation to 
this approach was that Dallas would never flex to the point where it put the 
organization at risk. It would not, for example, deploy staff onto Washington projects 
to gain turnover at the expense of quality. 
In terms of flexing to get a project started quickly, Dallas had been in the situation 
where the MD had personally set up and managed the site for the first week until a 
PM had been made available. Dallas’ MD postulated: 
“…we’ll start Monday on this extension or refit we’re there Monday. We’ll 
find a way. If that means him, I or Mike or Don sitting on site for a week 
we’ll go up and do it. And if we really can’t do it which isn’t very often you 
have to accept ‘Washington you’re better off looking somewhere else 
because we won’t let you down’.” 
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The preceding assertion is interesting as it was seen to reinforce Dallas’ approach of 
rejecting work which it felt it could not deliver to the required quality. In addition, 
Dallas focussed on retaining customer knowledge within the organization even when 
there was little work being undertaken with a particular customer at a particular time. 
Dallas looked only for organic growth, which it had the luxury of doing due to the fact 
that it was not a PLC. One of Dallas directors noted: 
 “I’d rather do five jobs properly than just get away with six jobs or seven 
jobs perhaps badly. There’s no benefit to us long term on that. [Washington] 
know we want to grow gradually.”  
Further research into Dallas’ approach to growth is seen to be required. As McKelvie 
& Wiklund (2010) noted, there is little research into such growth strategies. 
Dallas’ processes had been set up specifically to cope with the flexible nature of the 
retail construction arena. It had set up a three year expansion plan alongside 
Washington so that the two businesses could develop in harmony. One of Dallas’ 
directors stated:  
“… that’s a fantastic thing for a customer to say “Look how do we work 
together for the next three years?”  
The recession, however, destroyed that plan and the strategy was revisited by both 
parties. Dallas stated that some of its peer group had complained to Washington 
about the impact of reduced workload, but that its approach had been more 
constructive and yielded better results. To help cushion the blow, and to ensure the 
retention of knowledgeable individuals, Washington offered Dallas projects outside of 
its historic geographic area, which Dallas had been required to flex geographically to 
be able to deliver. Such a level of customer involvement in the running of a supply 
chain organization again appeared unique within contemporary research. 
Some of the senior Dallas PMs discussed willingness to ‘step down’ to assist on a 
project. For example, a PM went to a project and took the hierarchically lower 
position of site manager under an existing PM in order to ensure that the project was 
delivered satisfactorily. A member of the focus group stated:  
“…I'm a project manager I'd normally run them, you can actually be put in as 
a site manager or an assistant to someone else…” 
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The existing PM may not possess as much total experience as the new ‘assistant’, but 
the important thing for Dallas was not maintaining the hierarchy, but maintaining 
individuals who understood the customer in key management positions. Again, there 
appeared to be little contemporary research which suggested such willingness to flex 
roles like this in other organizations. 
Dallas had mixed the flexibility to work in the manner that customers such as 
Washington required with the requirement from those customers to challenge poor 
customer decisions using a ‘risk and reward’ approach to its advice. The decision 
challenge element appeared weaker than customers suggested they looked for from 
their excellent contractors. One of the directors stated: 
…if [Washington] want to do something in a specific way it’s not up to us to 
challenge them and question what they’re doing, we just go with them. 
What we do is we don’t sit there and say “Yes sir” and “No sir” and all that 
what we’ll do is say “Fine if you want to do it that way great. We can do 
that but the implications of doing it your way is x, y and z. 
Dallas’ position mapped to the view from the customers set out earlier in this thesis 
that appropriate challenge of their decisions by first tier contractors was a 
demonstrator of excellent performance. 
9.6.6 Kansas 
Kansas noted that its need for flexibility was to be able to react to the moving market 
place. It stated that flexibility was moving from being proactive and planning to flex 
for upcoming business environment changes to almost ‘panic’ mode reaction to a 
rapidly moving market. From the directors came a comment that: 
“…you go in a panic mode - it’s not so much panic it’s just more reactive. 
Once you’ve got through that reactive mode then you can sit back and 
be…more proactive.”  
Such an experience suggested a lack of scenario planning (Senge et al; 1990, 1994), 
which aligns with the fact that there are no notes attributable to Kansas to record 
under the Scenario Planning section of this thesis. The above commentary also 
confirmed that quick reactive behaviour within Kansas did cause problems later on in 
the process (Senge et al; 1990, 1994). 
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One way in which Kansas had ensured an ability to flex was to retain a multi-skilled 
workforce. A member of the focus group noted:  
“…they might be a carpenter but they can, you know some of them can lay 
bricks, lay floors, cut ceilings and plaster”.  
This was a relatively recent development in Kansas’ makeup. In addition, tradesmen 
(sic) historically tended to become compartmentalized within one customer 
programme of work. Nonetheless, such compartmentalization had changed and 
individuals were encouraged to move between customer programmes to gain the 
experience necessary to give Kansas flexibility. Chang et al (2005) noted that the 
multi-skilled workforce approach was already prevalent in manufacturing. 
9.7 Support services 
For the purposes of this thesis, support services were defined as those ‘essential non-
value-add’ services which supported the ‘value-add’ services being provided directly 
to the customers by the contractors (Womack & Jones, 2005). For example, 
customers received design, specification, construction and specialist advice services 
from the contractors as value-add services. Supporting these services would be 
essential services such as human resources, information technology,  and secretarial. 
Whilst the customer was unlikely to have interaction with these services, they were 
essential in the overall provision of service to the customers. 
9.7.1 Tennessee 
Tennessee, being the largest of the case study organizations, recognized the potential 
for support services to do more to obstruct what the organization was trying to 
achieve than actually support it. The presence of such understanding was seen to be 
a key tenet of Senge et al (1990, 1994) when assessing the presence of Systems 
Thinking. The phrase “…I’m from head office, I’m here to help you…” was humorously 
suggested by the MD as being one to strike fear into the workforce. Tennessee 
recognized that profit and growth for the organization was not generated by the 
accounts or IT departments and it took steps to ensure that “…the tail doesn’t wag 
the dog…”. To ensure a situation where support services did not come before 
customer service, it engaged more closely its customer facing units with its support 
services. 
It achieved such engagement in two ways. First by engaging support services more 
closely in the delivery process. Second, by including them in internal customer 
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service delivery workshops. This approach gave these departments a better 
understanding of how they could support the organizational vision. The outcome was 
a better mechanical and cultural alignment of the support services to the customer 
delivery units and to each other, following best practice Systems Thinking in Senge et 
al (1990, 1994). This approach was considered to be another excellent demonstration 
of Systems Thinking having improved the operation of the organization. Tennessee 
appreciated that there would be an ongoing piece of cultural change work. It never 
wanted to be in the situation where it could not alter a department’s way of working 
while that department hid behind the “…this was the way things were done round 
here…” argument. 
It was interesting to note that many of the comments on support services from the 
other case study organizations did not go into the same depth as those of Tennessee. 
Therefore nothing further can be added to this section from the research into those 
organizations. It suggested that there was not the depth of Systems Thinking in this 
area as there perhaps should have been, albeit the precise reasoning is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to study further. 
9.8 Systems Thinking about the Customer 
This section dealt with incidents where contractors extended their Systems Thinking 
(Senge et al 1990, 1994) beyond the confines of their own organizations and into the 
customer organization. From this perspective, the contractors understood the impact 
of changes in their systems upon their customer’s systems and visa versa. In 
addition, contractors were demonstrating an understanding about how best to 
operate their customer’s systems for them to avoid negative or unwanted results 
remote from the immediate action (Senge et al 1990, 1994). 
9.8.1 Cincinnati 
Cincinnati tried to understand the difference between what its customer Pittsburgh 
wanted and what it actually needed. This was because it understood that Pittsburgh 
was a many faceted entity with numerous stakeholders. In Cincinnati’s case, it was 
employed and instructed by Pittsburgh’s engineering division, but the product it 
provided was used by the operations division. To solve this apparent dichotomy, 
Cincinnati set up meaningful relationships and dialogue with the operations division to 
ensure that it was informed as to what products were being provided. Ling et al 
(2006) noted that a key determinant of project success was the contractor’s ability to 
understand customer needs. 
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9.8.2 Tennessee 
Tennessee continuously questioned, listened to and acted upon discussions with its 
customers. It carried out satisfaction surveys, as do many organizations (c/f Mbachu 
& Nkado, 2006), but it suggested that these were different in the way that Tennessee 
reacted to the feedback. As noted earlier in this thesis, directors’ bonuses were linked 
to ensuring the feedback from its key customers was excellent. This strategy ensured 
that Tennessee focused on customer relationship building and addressing issues of 
displeasure. One example was the approach to managing out defects from the 
construction process as it was an area that had consistently hurt Tennessee’s 
customer satisfaction scores. 
In addition, it understood that not all customers want innovation and that some 
wanted tried and tested solutions. It therefore focused its distribution of ideas to 
where they were seen to be most effective. It gained an understanding of which 
customers responded to which types of solution and therefore demonstrated clear 
learning from interaction with the business environment. In addition, Tennessee’s 
revelation departed from most of the contemporary research which tended to focus 
upon how MORE innovation could be brought to the construction industry at customer 
behests (c/f Vennstrom & Eriksson, 2010). 
9.8.3 Indianapolis 
Carrying out the case study on Indianapolis revealed that everything it did was 
focussed upon its customer and how it improved service. This focus was particularly 
clear when it came to carrying out the peripheral actions which it knew maintained 
customer delight. The MD noted actions such as investing money in the local 
communities where its projects were proceeding. Smith (2003) noted that the 
industry needed to improve its community relations if it was to improve its image. 
Indianapolis directors noted their approach, with one commenting:  
“…the accommodation that we were using as a site set up. We were going to, 
with our £1,000 plus just convert it into a building for the community.”  
Another conscious decision from Indianapolis was choosing not to pursue all monies 
due under strict contractual terms. Indianapolis noted that other contractors did not 
display such behaviour and viewed its different behaviour as an investment in its 
customer relationships. 
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Indianapolis possessed a keen understanding of its position within the investment 
appraisal arena for Miami. For example, it understood that to a certain extent, 
Miami’s decision making processes were not predicated upon whether the capital cost 
of a product was £10 or £10 million, but upon the Return on Capital Expended 
(ROCE). One of its directors opined: 
“…that's an option that we can give, and it makes the whole investment 
return better figures. So that's all about, you know, what we're trying to do. 
We're trying to be a lot more than just builders.” 
 Indianapolis tended to make its construction decisions on the basis that an 
understanding of the impact upon Miami’s retail sales through disruption or late 
completion was paramount. Indianapolis’ approach appeared to be an extension of 
Roper (2001) who wrote on aligning real estate strategy with corporate strategy from 
a purely customer-centric perspective. 
A further example of Systems Thinking was the way that Indianapolis interacted with 
Miami’s customers, the public. It tried to communicate on behalf of Miami about what 
was going on during a store refurbishment project and how it would benefit the public 
once it was complete. This tactic further demonstrated Systems Thinking in terms of 
understanding the impact of Indianapolis’ actions upon its customer’s business. Its 
approach extended to simple things such as thinking about how the paying public felt 
about an element of the completed project and tailoring it accordingly. The approach 
extended to the parking of works vans, with one director asserting:  
“…if we're doing that you've got to think about where your vans are parked. 
So all the customers want to park outside the front door…make sure we're at 
the worst possible place…”  
Indianapolis’ approach was another area where the research reported in this thesis 
may be seen to make a significant contribution to current research as there appeared 
to be no contemporary research reporting such an approach. 
9.8.4 Chicago 
Chicago’s Systems Thinking about the customer demonstrated an understanding of 
how and why a partnering arrangement worked. One of its directors observed: 
 “…both parties have to have the right head on if you like. And once they get 
to meet each other, it's a bit like getting married really.”  
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The key point was that if Chicago approached its projects looking only for profit 
and/or Minnesota looked only for lowest cost, the relationship would fail. It meant 
that both parties had to Systems Think about how their behaviour impacted upon the 
behaviours of other parties involved in the programme (following Senge et al; 1990, 
1994). 
Chicago’s directors suggested that customers and contractors needed to understand 
that short term gains were available for departing from a partnering stance, but that 
those gains were not sustainable. One director stated: 
…you have to have clients who know full well that if they went to the 
market to buy a linear metre of partition or whatever it is, they would be 
able to find it cheaper than using the delivery vehicle they've got, they've 
got to realise that. And equally the contractor has got to understand that he 
can't have things all his own way…the essence of these things is trust. 
Chicago’s overall culture and approach, therefore, was not only to deliver an excellent 
and timely customer service, but also only to work with customers who understood 
that this type of service comes at a premium price. It displayed a ‘customer comes 
first’ and ‘can do’ culture which required it to understand its customers’ needs. It was 
an interesting perspective which which it may be argued suggested that Chicago 
believed the norm within the industry was to be low customer focus, low service and 
low profit margin. Such a perspective appeared to align with Love et al’s (2004) 
position of customer orientation in the industry and suggested that his 
recommendations had not been fully adopted. 
9.8.5 Dallas 
Dallas had an understanding of the interaction between what some members of its 
customer organizations wanted and what others (who hold the budgets) could afford. 
This understanding suggested that Dallas had learned to Systems Think on behalf of 
its customers. In addition, Dallas understood that there would always be projects that 
would not turn out as hoped and/or projects where it could not live up to customer 
expectations. It understood that the best thing to do was accept that these were 
inevitable due to the unpredictable nature of the industry and to learn from the 
outcomes. The extent of Dallas’ understanding of its customers’ systems extended to 
its customers’ customers. As one of its directors observed: 
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“…one of the PMs walking through the car park and a woman says about 
getting a bag to the store and they’ll get one of the labourers to carry her 
bags to the stores…”  
The fact that Dallas saw this as differentiating behaviour offers a contrasting view to 
Love et al’s (2004) customer focus adoption. 
In addition, Dallas helped to train and support its customers’ professional teams as it 
assisted Dallas to execute its role in a better way. It suggested that if the customer’s 
representative failed at his/her job, everybody on the project failed. Dallas’ directors 
suggested that such customer focus came from the individuals within the business 
rather than being an edict from management. One director stated: 
“…we are very, very good at delivery and we are very committed to our 
customers. That’s done…that’s a personal will from the staff as much as it is 
a need for the business.”  
Such a customer process orientated approach is espoused by Dickson et al (2009). 
It may be argued, therefore, that Dallas’ management systems had been moulded to 
and by its interactions with major customers, such as Washington. Dallas avoided the 
perceived weakness of larger members of its peer group of trying to impose a project 
management system upon the customer. Dickson et al (2009) noted the need for 
‘process thinking’ when dealing with customer relationships. Dallas’ current approach 
had, however, not always been the case.  
It was noted that some directors who managed the Washington commission used to 
take a more aggressive and contractual position than was taken today. The 
deployment of the correct personalities in addition to skills was something that Dallas 
was bringing to the fore. A member of the focus group observed: 
“…one PM who is working on one job has sort of come up from the ranks so 
to speak and he is very good and focused. He's probably not as customer 
friendly as some people but he's ideal for a new build where you haven't got 
the customer interface.” 
Dallas’ senior management demonstrated its deep understanding of its customers’ 
strategies by giving a long narrative about what it understood those strategies to be 
and how Dallas’ actions directly or indirectly supported the strategies. This allowance 
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of access by such customers as Washington had allowed Dallas’ directors to develop 
with a real long term perspective of where it needed to be. One senior manager 
commented that:  
“…Washington because they’ve got that long-term vision allows us to 
understand and gear ourselves. So we will sit at the meeting discussing the 
half year results with information from Washington’s about what they expect 
to give us next year...” 
Dallas, it appeared, had taken Systems Thinking about the customer to the point that 
it may not be the best position for the organization itself. Nevertheless, its directors 
viewed this position as a key strength of the organization. A director stated: 
“You can go to Dallas [location] Office and Dallas [location] Office, and you 
wouldn’t, beyond the flag, recognise anything about what they do or how 
they do it. Because there’s a general manager in charge of that office, who 
will marry his business as close as possible to the market surrounding him…”  
Dallas’ approach appeared to be a cut down ‘workforce diversity’ approach as used by 
multinationals to adapt to the different business cultures they encountered (c/f Choy, 
2007). 
9.8.6 Kansas 
Kansas demonstrated customer Systems Thinking behaviour by looking internally as 
to how it behaved in response to customer expectations. During the recession, some 
customers asked for deep discounts, but Kansas attempted to educate them that this 
was not a viable long term strategy from any of the parties’ perspectives. The MD 
stated:  
“…all of a sudden [customers are] thinking “Hang about it’s sale time.” So 
they’re going back to their supply chain going “I want it for this.” And they 
know their supply chain to a certain extent is going to say “Yes.” Because 
they want to keep the lights on in the building, so they’re doing it for that. 
But what they’ve done, they’ve broken the loyalty level.”  
Kansas’ approach mapped almost exactly to Crosby’s (2009) advice to focus on long 
term gain over short term benefit in a recession. 
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Kansas was in fact looking to scale back its efforts to understand customers as it had 
started to note the cost-benefit of such an approach. It noted that having its own 
joinery division was actually a disadvantage in this arena due to the fact that it 
provided too many free product samples. Whilst this was an excellent way to 
understand its customers, as it did not get paid for the samples it began to realise 
that in many cases it saw no reward for such activity. Its MD noted:  
“Once we’ve taken a client on he becomes part of a family for a better word. 
And we spend lots and lots of time with them, making sure they’re happy 
with what they’ve got. And sometimes the reward back in value, for a better 
word, it just doesn’t come….”  
Kansas two positions suggested that customer Systems Thinking was only of value 
where it dealt with an educated customer. 
9.9 Summary 
Within this Team Learning chapter, as with the previous chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 the 
analysis again came from all six nominated contractors. Again, not all discoveries in 
all contractors were analyzed against all Team Learning elements. This was again due 
to the differences in depth of demonstration of this LO discipline between the 
contractors. It is noted in the Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations 
chapter 10 that no one organization demonstrated all of the elements of a LO and 
that the analysis herein, again similarly to chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 drew together the 
better examples in each Team Learning sub-section from the six contractors and 
contrasted them against each other and previous research. 
This approach, whilst it provided what could be suggested to be a best practice 
example of the deployment of Team Learning within a contracting organization, 
provided a idealist ‘tapestry’ which does not represent the reality for any one 
organization. In addition, some points brought out where there are notable failings in 
the six contractors to adopt LO processes which provided a contrast within the 
analysis. 
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10 Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations 
10.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the findings of the field research with 
respect to the research question noted in the section ‘Answering the Research 
Question’ below. The section includes a new proposed model of the LO that is 
considered to extend Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model to best fit the construction 
industry. Additionally, some sub disciplines to Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) existing five 
disciplines are noted for inclusion in a construction industry model of the LO. 
First piece of this chapter provides the reader with a summary of the project as 
undertaken in about a page. This is provided such that those who wish to simply read 
this chapter 10 have an idea of the work that has gone before. In addition, it provides 
those who have read the full document with a short reminder of the overall journey. 
The second section of this chapter focuses on ‘Answering the Research Sub 
Questions’ which were posed at the start of this thesis and which needed to be 
answered in order to answer the main thesis question. These questions centred on 
understanding what excellent performance looks like to the construction customer 
and what types of organization(s) provided such performance. This section is in two 
parts. 
The third section, ‘Implications for Business’, sets out a short series of 
recommendations for the construction industry. These recommendations comprise a 
set of practical applications for which the industry and organizations within it ought to 
consider adopting on the journey to becoming a LO. These recommendations are 
seen to make a significant contribution to construction industry practice. Whilst these 
recommendations are aimed at the construction industry per se, and have been 
developed as an outcome of the herein reported exploratory research, it may be 
argued that the recommendations could be adopted by other industries with similar 
operating models. 
The fourth section offers a short note on ‘Delimitations of Scope and Key 
Assumptions’ followed by the fifth and final section on ‘Recommendations for Future 
Research’. It is hoped that these recommendations are adopted and taken forward by 
future researchers in the LO and/or construction industry, or similar, fields. 
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10.2 Summary of the project as undertaken 
In order to bring the research to a close, this section sets out in abbreviated form: 
the methodology, and the methods deployed to answer the research question. 
The research methodology was carried out from a mid-point between the nomothetic 
and ideographic perspectives. From an ideographic perspective, the research herein 
reported aimed to enter the everyday events of the organization in order to let the 
nature of that organization reveal itself. The initial phase of the research involved 
semi-structured interviews with customer organizations who declared an interest in 
the research itself. Of 30 major construction customer organizations approached, six 
agreed to participate. 
During the initial phase of the research, the customer organizations identified a 
number of clear areas of excellent contractor performance. The clear position was 
that the standard output performance indicators of project completion to time, cost, 
quality, and health and safety were no longer indicators of excellent performance in 
the industry. These indicators were now the minimum performance required to satisfy 
the customer and there was seen to be a further suite of more behavioural measures 
which were the indicators of excellent performance. These findings were drawn 
together in a single model for procurement and performance management. At the 
conclusion of the interviews, the customers nominated one excellent performing first-
tier contractor for case study. 
The contracting organizations nominated as excellent performers fell largely into the 
‘medium sized’ bracket of the construction industry. Indeed, some of the participating 
customers noted that the larger contractors were actually poorer performers at 
behavioural aspects of service delivery. The nominated contractors’ processes were 
examined against the Learning Organization framework provided in Senge et al 
(1990, 1994) to establish the extent to which recognized Learning Organization 
processes were being employed. 
The use of the multiple case study approach used for the research into the contractor 
organizations themselves was employed so that identification and understanding of a 
few key causal LO processes could be obtained. As such, it never became necessary 
to expand the research to the point where an understanding of the workings of any 
one entire organization was obtained. The pragmatic approach of employing focus 
groups and interviews as the basis of the case studies was therefore vindicated as the 
correct one. The interviews and focus groups were augmented with the use of field 
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notes, observations and review of documentary evidence which brought a level of 
richness to the data. 
10.3 Reflection on the Customers & Nominated Contractors 
It is useful to reflect on the pairing of customer and contractor to provide an 
understanding as to the relationship between the two and how these provide insight 
into the way the organizations generate the behaviours observed during the research. 
10.3.1 Oakland – Kansas 
This was an interesting relationship from the perspective that Oakland gave the 
perception of being the most innovative and forward thinking of the customer 
organizations researched. However, Kansas displayed the fewest of the LO 
characteristics of all the contractors – at least for the purposes of the research behind 
this thesis. This conclusion is relatively easily drawn from the fact that in most of the 
LO disciplines discussed herein provide little discussion no Kansas’ processes. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this: either Kansas has other mechanisms at 
work which allow them to deliver excellent performance to Oakland, or that the 
research methods were not sufficient in Kansas’ case to uncover LO processes. Whilst 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to draw such conclusions, it was an interesting 
observation to make as part of the learning journey. 
10.3.2 Washington – Dallas 
There was good alignment between the messages given to the author from 
Washington (customer) and Dallas (contractor) particularly in terms of the hand-in-
hand development of the contractor’s organization. It was clear from the deeper 
research carried out into the contractor organization that the message was consistent 
through the teams and there was full understanding of Washington’s objectives. 
Dallas were clearly excellent at cycling learning for the benefit of Washington and the 
author came away with the impression that this partnership had many years future 
ahead of it. Dallas’ use of risk registers as learning tools was particularly interesting 
as this is something not generally done within the construction industry. 
10.3.3 Miami – Indianapolis 
Similar to the Washington – Dallas relationship described above, the relationship 
between Miami (customer) and Indianapolis (contractor) was actually slightly 
stronger and slightly more closely aligned. From the data gathered, Indianapolis 
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appeared to be the most innovative of all the contractors surveyed and its team 
appears to ‘live and breath’ the Miami philosophy. Given that both Washington and 
Miami are retail sector customers, it may be that this sector creates the best learning 
environment; but without a more exhaustive research piece with more participants 
from the same sector, this conclusion cannot be drawn. 
It can be noted from the content of this thesis that Miami and Indianapolis appear 
more frequently within the text than the other pairings. This situation is reflective of 
both the excellent alignment between the two, but also the depth of the learning 
environment created. Miami uses its ‘Centre of Excellence’ specifically for the creation 
and sharing of knowledge, and Indianapolis ensure that all members of the delivery 
team learn quickly and deeply about what Miami requires as a customer. 
10.3.4 Minnesota – Chicago 
Given the status of Chicago being a single supplier to Minnesota, a better alignment 
of the language used by the customer and contractor was anticipated. However, 
Minnesota’s position was very much one of wanting excellent delivery of projects 
without being too worried about the mechanisms behind them. Chicago, however, 
was very clear about its vision and how this translated in continual learning and 
performance. Therefore, Chicago appeared to be the organization that had taken the 
greatest steps down the LO path without the explicit support and drive from a 
customer organization. 
Chicago’s MD was probably the most visionary of all the contractor MDs interviewed 
for this thesis. It was clear that his strong vision was part of what made Chicago a 
successful supplier to Minnesota. In addition, it was clear that the Minnesota team 
shared that vision and were aware of the fact that they needed to continue to 
differentiate themselves from potential competition in order to retain their ‘sole 
supplier’ status. This awareness appeared to be the catalyst which drove Chicago to 
continue to innovate its service provision. 
10.3.5 Houston – Tennessee 
Houston as a customer, was quite broad about its definition of excellent performance 
with most categories discussed receiving a description of important or very important 
during the interviews. This situation could have meant that the work with Tennessee 
could have provided a equally mixed message about how it provided excellent 
performance, but it was relatively clear on vision and strategy and how to work with 
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Houston. In fact, this relationship between customer and contractor was interesting in 
that Houston made it clear that Tennessee did not perform best in its highest 
weighted KPI (cost of delivery), and yet was still considered to be best performer. 
This demonstrated how much customers like Houston had started to value 
performance factors above the traditional construction measures, like cost. 
Tennessee appeared to have the longest commitment of learning of all the 
contractors in terms of time spent developing internal initiatives, but appeared to be 
less aligned to its nominating customer than the other contractors. This may have 
been due to Tennessee’s size and number of customers in comparison to the other 
nominated contractors. 
10.3.6 Pittsburgh – Cincinnati 
Given the embedded nature of Cincinnati within the Pittsburgh organization, it was 
unsurprising to observe a good deal of alignment and partnership between the two. 
Furthermore, the fact that Cincinnati was a JV set up specifically for the delivery of 
service to Pittsburgh should aid that alignment. Nonetheless, Cincinnati was not the 
only organization in this same situation and therefore it was able to raise its 
performance above that of its peer group. What was clear from the research in this 
area was that Cincinnati was seen as ‘contractor of choice’, from those within the 
Pittsburgh ‘Alliance’, for taking innovative steps with Pittsburgh’s programme of 
works. Having reached this position gave Cincinnati a further advantage, as long as it 
kept performing well in innovative areas. 
What was not clear from the research was to what extent the learning would be 
recycled and maintained when the JV no longer existed. The larger parent company 
which supplied the ‘engineering’ element was better placed from a knowledge 
retention perspective. This was due to the fact that the works for Pittsburgh were 
predominantly engineering based and the construction works were to support the 
engineering element. The author is still very involved on a professional level with 
Pittsburgh and it will be interesting to observe as time progresses if, and how, such 
learning is recycled. 
10.4 Answering the Research Question 
The answers to the original research questions must be established. The overall 
research question was: 
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To what extent do excellent performing UK construction contracting 
organizations demonstrate and employ recognized Learning Organization 
processes? 
From the case studies herein reported it became clear that, using Senge et al’s 
(1990, 1994) model, none of the organizations examined within this thesis could be 
construed to be a LO. However, each of the organizations, to a greater or lesser 
extent, had adopted some of the LO principles. What was also clear was that the 
nature of the construction industry required a much greater customer influence over 
the operation of the contracting organization than in some other industries. Senge et 
al’s (1990, 1994) case studies, for example, were drawn from a manufacturing base 
where the supplying organizations didn’t have the large reliance on a small number of 
customers. It may be argued, therefore, that what was needed was an extended 
model of the LO which supported the theory and also included the practice of the 
operation of the construction industry. 
The above position was drawn from the observation that none of the case study 
contractors could suggest that they had processes and/or a culture in place to 
support all of Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model. The conclusion must be viewed 
against a backdrop of the thesis author’s interpretation of the LO model, particularly 
given the critique of the model as “…anything goes…” (c/f Ortenblad, 2007). There 
was seen to be, however, a clear uptake and embedment of some of the principles, 
which were demonstrated by the results reported in the previous chapters. In 
addition, it may be proposed that there were some clear additions and amendments 
to the LO model emerging from the construction industry. Although such additions 
and amendments were not seen to be unique to the industry, they were certainly 
considered to be necessary when applying LO theory to the construction industry. 
10.4.1 Findings and Emergent Models – Amendment of the LO with respect to 
Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model 
Barlow & Jashapara (1998) suggested that partnering and collaborative arrangements 
were often instigated by customers and that customers potentially should spearhead 
the move towards a LO supply chain. Chan et al (2005) critiqued this position, 
suggesting that Barlow & Jashapara’s (1998) proposition was a dangerous 
assumption without further research to confirm it. In addition, Chinowsky et al 
(2007) touched upon the journey from KM to LO being partially at the behest of the 
customer within the construction industry.  
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However, the research herein reported may be seen to suggest that the position of 
customer involvement in the operation of first tier construction contractors had 
advanced from the aforementioned positions. Contractors possessing long term 
partnering and collaborative arrangements with their customers were not only taking 
their lead from the customer for the relationship but also were actively allowing their 
customers to guide the strategic growth or their organizations. This guidance ranged 
from the expansion of service provision right through to assistance with geographic 
expansion. 
Furthermore, customer support was considered necessary due to the construction 
industry model of the customer being more involved in the design and construction 
phases of their product coupled with the fact that a single construction customer can 
represent a large volume of their contractors’ turnover (up to 20% was not 
uncommon). Furthermore, the low contractor profit margins driven by a lowest price 
tendering culture (often 2-3%) left little money for internal investment (Egan, 1998; 
Latham, 1994). The support of an informed customer who did not use a lowest price 
tendering process was therefore necessary. 
In addition, there was evidence that first tiers Contractors were importing business 
processes directly from their customers. Such behaviour may be seen to suggest that 
LO contractors may be learning to be an extended part of their own customers’ 
organizations. The behaviour was reminiscent of the rollout of Lean techniques in the 
manufacturing industry where organizations such as Toyota adopted lean processes 
internally and then rolled these out through their supply chains. The final result of 
Toyota’s actions was that almost all of the automotive manufacturing supply chain 
was working with the same lean processes. It might be in the future that the 
relationships in the construction industry move towards a standardized approach 
similar to the automotive manufacturing industry. 
It may be argued, therefore, that the LO research positions of Barlow & Jashapara 
(1998), Chan et al (2005), Chinowsky et al (2007) and Senge et al (1990, 1994) 
need to be extended. The customer may be considered not only as an advantage to 
creating an LO in the construction industry supply chain, but also as an essential 
element of a LO. For the purposes of this thesis, an extended LO model was 
considered as follows.  
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Figure 10.4: Extended LO Model for the construction industry 
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Source: Developed for the purpose of this thesis 
This extended LO model adapted Senge et al’s model (1990, 1994) and extended the 
five disciplines. The model may be seen to demonstrate Systems Thinking 
encompassing the other four disciplines. Furthermore, it may be seen to include a 
sixth external discipline of customer support. This discipline was seen to be essential 
to the other five by encompassing Senge et al’s model (1990, 1994) in its entirety. 
The research herein reported was considered to have uncovered further extensions to 
the LO model which may, or many not, be unique to the construction industry. It may 
be argued that these elements should be included as elements of the first tier 
construction contractor LO model immediately. In addition, it may be suggested that 
they are further researched for presence within other industries/cultures. The 
suggested extensions are noted below: 
10.4.1.1 Mental Models 
There were no additions to this element of Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model as by its 
very nature, changing Mental Models was seen to be about changing assumptions 
behind any existing model in order to challenge it. The items noted under this section 
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were seen as clear examples of innovations which demonstrated changing Mental 
Models within the construction industry. 
Construction organizations were seen to be changing the mental model of ‘defects 
liability’ to one of ‘after sales service’. The concept of after sales service and 
managing defects was a concept well established in other industries (Bundschuh & 
Dezvane, 2003). The traditional view of defects as a necessary evil of construction 
(Egan, 1998; Latham, 1994) has long been critiqued. The change in terminology and 
in mindset was seen as an innovative way of minimizing the impact of defect liability 
upon the customer and therefore his/her view of the value of the contractor’s 
offering. 
Construction organizations were trying to make their projects attractions rather than 
inconveniences for their customers. This altered Mental Model was especially useful 
within the retail industry where the contractors’ customers dealt directly with the 
public who were most likely to be inconvenienced by a project on a live site. The 
consideration of making the project in some way a novelty to the public through 
various visual and interactive aids demonstrated a shift in the mental model that the 
project was an end in itself. Contractors were starting to understand that their 
customers’ businesses were the ends which the project was a means to support. 
Construction organizations also were starting to view their understanding of 
construction and the customer’s business as an opportunity to change their offering 
to incorporate consultancy style advice. Such an understanding of the link between 
contractor business offering and customer business offering provided a powerful 
knowledge base upon which contractors could assist with decisions that stretch far 
beyond the project itself. Such behaviour was a further example of the contractors’ 
new Mental Model that the project was simply a means to a further business end. 
10.4.1.2 Personal Mastery 
Construction Organizations were starting to look for cultural and learning alignment 
within their supply chains. Such a yearning was similar to the approach taken by 
Toyota in the rollout of ‘Lean’ which Toyota fully expected its supply chain to 
embrace. Therefore their employees and those of their supply chain would work 
towards a level of Personal Mastery together. For such an approach to be adopted 
wholesale in the construction industry would require a significant cultural shift. 
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The operation of Personal Mastery was clearly different in smaller construction 
organizations which relied on the flatness of the structure to support idea generation 
and implementation. Whether this difference confirmed the presence of Personal 
Mastery within such organizations as a natural phenomenon, or whether it suggested 
that there was no need for Personal Mastery within smaller organizations was seen to 
be a matter for future research. 
To allow Personal Mastery to flourish, there must be alignment between how the 
organization, and the individual, viewed ‘failure’ and its consequences. This concept 
was not one which Senge et al (1990, 1994) or more recent writers made explicit, 
but a lack of such alignment might stifle Personal Mastery if the individual did not 
possess understanding of the alignment. The fact that the industry was becoming 
willing (and able) to admit mistakes without the fear of legal action was relatively 
new in the industry and a departure from previous research (c/f Rooke et al, 2003). 
Linking the two concepts in this paragraph suggested that the environment for 
Personal Mastery to flourish may be present in the industry. 
10.4.1.3 Shared Vision 
Excellent contractor ‘new starter inductions’ which included customer values and 
goals which aligned the culture and vision of the contractor with their customer were 
seen to be a new process. Such a process not only fuelled the Shared Vision within 
the contractor organization, but also allowed for Shared Vision between the 
contractor and customer. Customer interaction assisted in the development of Shared 
Vision, which further strengthened the alignment of vision between contractor and 
customer. A widening of the Shared Vision principle was considered to be an 
extension to the current LO model (Senge et al; 1990, 1994). 
The contractor who adopted a ‘family’ style culture was seen to demonstrate a clear 
enabler to the construction LO. The concept of a family culture within an organization 
was an under explored one which appeared not to feature prominently in Senge et 
al’s (1990, 1994) work nor the later research. It may be argued that such a concept 
requires further research as consideration to being an extension to the LO model. For 
the purposes of this thesis, it has been included as an enabler in the creation of the 
Shared Vision, but further research may better place it elsewhere within the LO 
model. 
Empowerment as an intervention for ‘any employee’ in the process was starting to 
occur which was seen to be similar to the ‘Lean’ model deployed by Toyota. The 
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principle of empowerment within the LO has long been critiqued (Symon, 2002) as 
being an unrealistic utopia. The reality was seen to be that non-management simply 
became the monarchs over unimportant decisions. The concept of those working 
within the process being able to halt or alter it mid-flow was perhaps a mid-step 
between having all workers involved in all decisions and having them manage 
unimportant ones. 
10.4.1.4 Team Learning 
The use of the risk register and process as a Team Learning tool appeared to be 
unique to the construction industry LO as it appeared not to be mentioned in any 
other LO literature. It may therefore be argued that the incorporation of risk 
management as a Team Learning tool could be adapted into the LO model. How 
exactly this tool best fits may be considered as a subject for future research. 
10.4.1.5 Systems Thinking 
Organizations needed to understand that what the customer wanted was not always 
innovation. Sometimes just an excellent standard of service was required. Senge et 
al’s (1990, 1994) work did consider the customer to a reasonable extent, but what it 
appeared not to deal with was where learning should be focussed in terms of 
identifying directions for innovative customer service and excellent standard 
customer service. 
There was a clear willingness for individuals within excellent contracting organizations 
to take a temporary step down in role in order to maintain service to the customer. 
Such an approach belied a potential lack of organizational politics within such an 
organization. A key criticism of Senge et al (1990, 1994), which may be considered 
to require further research, was that the LO model did not adequately deal with, or 
allow for, the presence of organizational politics. 
Excellent contractors were providing appropriate challenges to perceived poor 
customer decisions. Where challenge was not possible, information on the 
implications of such customer decisions was provided instead. Contractors were able 
to think like the customer when interacting with the customer’s stakeholders and 
customers. Such interaction appeared to be an omission from Senge et al’s (1990, 
1994) model. The extension of contractors’ organizational learning beyond the 
confines of the contractor organization and into the customer organization could be 
the next extension to the LO model. 
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In addition, there appeared to be a clear understanding of the long term effects of 
taking on more work than the organization could successfully deliver. Whilst this 
position was a central tenet of Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) LO model, it was not usual 
behaviour for a construction contractor. Latham (1994) and Egan (1998) noted the 
industry’s propensity to place growth of turnover above quality. It was therefore 
worthy of note that excellent contractors were applying Systems Thinking in this area 
to good effect. 
10.5 Answering the Research Sub-Questions I 
In addition to the main research question, a series of ‘enabling’ sub-questions were 
proposed. These questions needed to be answered in order to answer the overriding 
research question or to give the answer to the research question a contextual 
background. The first two of these questions were: 
What do customers recognize as excellent performance from their first tier 
contractors? And 
What criteria may be used to identify those who provide better service? 
The research herein reported discovered an updated framework which answers the 
above questions and has potential implications for how the construction industry and 
its customers interact. That framework is now discussed. 
10.5.1 Findings and Emergent Models - Excellent performance from the perspective 
of the construction customer 
10.5.1.1 Performance Management  
Following on from the research herein reported, there needs to be a paradigm shift in 
the way in which the industry measures and manages its first tier suppliers. The 
research suggests that customers should expand their performance management 
beyond the use of output KPIs. Customers who keep extensive output KPI suites may 
have to reduce these in order to incorporate the following input measures. The 
framework to be able to measure such areas is suggested as an area for future 
research. 
Emotional commitment and ownership of the programme. Top management 
commitment is an intangible quality provided by the better contractors which is 
difficult to measure in any clear way. Construction customers need to purchase first 
tier contractor management capability in addition to technical capability. The 
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responsibility for the delivery of a construction programme can thereby rest with the 
first tier contractor rather than the customer. Coupled to commitment needs to be an 
appropriate level of EI as suggested earlier in section 4.2.2.2. EI is defined by Palmer 
et al (2000: 5) as “…how effectively one deals with emotions both within oneself and 
others…” Such intelligence is viewed as a key input factor in creating excellent 
performance as the contractor can better align themselves to their customer. 
Effective two-way communication. Contractor performance improvements can be 
a function of good dialogue between customer and contractor. A detailed engagement 
is necessary to establish long term development plans between contractors and 
customers to achieve the goals of both organizations. Creating a formal alliance with 
their first tier contractors involves communication at many levels. Effective and 
consistent communication is taken for granted within alliance/partnership 
relationships; with the ability of the contractor to listen actively being a big 
differentiator. The importance of the ability to listen actively, which may be defined 
as “…a dynamic process that can be broken down into three different behaviours: 
paraphrasing, inquiry, and acknowledgment…” (Bordone, 2007:9) is not something 
reported in recent contractor performance literature (Yeung et al, 2008). 
Contractor developing their business to align with the customer. Customers 
are looking for attitude and behaviour as the key deciders when they are aligning 
with contractors. There has been a departure from hiring on pure competency as 
customers understand that with the correct attitude and behaviour, competency can 
easily be developed. Customers are actively looking for contractors who come to 
them with these qualities already demonstrated. This requirement is becoming 
evident in customers’ hiring of first tier contractors, as the questions being asked are 
beyond the traditional procurement question of ‘how many similar projects or 
programmes have you delivered?’ Obviously this question is still important, but 
without the right attitude and behaviour, it will not carry as much weight in the 
current market place. The extension to the previous research (Chan et al, 2006; 
Kagioglou et al, 2001; Lam et al, 2007) is that excellent performance in attitude and 
culture is simply about organizations keeping their promises. 
In addition, this concept of alignment has extended to customers assisting their 
contractors with their own business development. Some customers are actively 
leading their excellent contractors into new geographic areas and/or towards 
executing projects slightly beyond their field of experience. This position suggests 
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that customers are becoming more active in the management of their construction 
supply chains and helping their excellent performers to grow. 
Effective and appropriate challenge of customer decisions. Customers realize 
that contractors who act as ‘yes men’ (sic) when the customer is making an obvious 
error are not providing excellent service. Contractors still, however, must be wary of 
trying to dictate what should be important to the customer. The allowance of such a 
challenge is another move towards the model of contractor as consultant; by 
assisting the customer to deliver what is important without making a mistake whilst 
so doing. 
Commitment to constant dissatisfaction, at the business and programme 
levels. Satisfaction is viewed by customers as a journey with perhaps no ultimate 
destination, similar to the approach to becoming an LO (Senge et al; 1990, 1994). 
Excellent contractors are those who know that no matter how well they have done 
something, they should always be dissatisfied with it and look to perform better next 
time. This is not to suggest that customers wish their supply chain members to be 
unhappy in themselves. 
Transparency of business performance. Customers wish to work with contractors 
who are honest about their strengths and weaknesses. Contractors also must have a 
clear strategy for improving these areas. 
Consistency of attitude, behaviour and culture. ‘Business personality’ might be 
another way of describing this performance criterion. A truly consistent business 
personality manifests itself as a consistent message given out by the business leaders 
of first tier contractors and those who are engaged to provide service to the 
customer. Customers who take on first tier contractors based upon strategic 
messages about what/how that contractor can deliver require the same message to 
be spoken by those delivering. 
Delighting the customer's stakeholders. Contractors must safeguard their 
customers’ reputations through appropriate interaction with the customers’ 
stakeholders. This criterion is especially important if those stakeholders are the 
buying public, even more so if the interaction is in a face–to–face environment, such 
as high street retail. Contractors must therefore understand their customers’ 
businesses well enough to be able to handle that interaction to the same standard as 
the customer him/herself. What customers require is a contractor who will act as if 
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they are an extension of the customer’s own organization and maintain the same 
pride in their business. 
Protecting the customer's business from the impact of construction. The 
minimization of the impact upon the customer’s business of the programme of works 
themselves is not one which appears to emerge in recent research to any great 
extent. Chan & Chan (2004) and Atkinson (1999) discuss the positive impact of the 
finished product upon the customer. These positions can now be extended to include 
the ability of the contractor to minimize impact on the customer’s business of the 
construction programme. It then follows that contractors need to have a good 
understanding of the customer’s business. 
Flexibility and responsiveness to programme change. Flexibility and agility are 
elements that cannot be delivered immediately and a period of time is required 
between a customer change in message and the change in direction from the 
contractors. If a customer explains what needs to be done differently on a 
programme, they expect contractors to be able to respond within a reasonable 
timeframe. Flexibility and agility are also required in order for the contractor to be 
able to flex successfully to the ebb and flow of work during a long programme of 
construction works. 
Focussed innovation and learning with tangible outputs. Innovation is a way 
that the contractor can add value to the construction process that is beyond the 
contract or project specification. It can be viewed as a key differentiator which does 
not always have its own KPI, such as the ability for the contractor to think on their 
feet when encountering issues on site. Alternatively, innovation can manifest itself as 
being able to give input at the design development stage which assists in designing 
out waste at a project level. This position would extend the research of Beatham et al 
(2004) and Kagioglou et al (2001) suggesting that innovation cannot simply be 
measured in financial terms. 
Summary 
Customers ought to develop a framework around these aforementioned performance 
criteria in a way that best suits their business requirements. The results element of 
this thesis provides an in-depth recommendation of a starting point for a best-
practice model. It is accepted that this model will require a certain amount of deeper 
thought and preparation than a simple output KPI suite. The extra effort, however, 
would be more than repaid in terms of the customer being able to better manage the 
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contractor in driving the required behaviours. There would be no room for 'box 
ticking' in order to achieve KPI measures at the expense of what may really be 
important to the customer. Many KPI suites currently in use suffer from such issues, 
such as the earlier example of targeting numbers of defects rather than the ones 
important to the operation of the customer's business. Furthermore, it would alleviate 
the annoyance of contractors who do end up harming their own KPI scores by 
focussing upon what they know is really important to their customer. 
These new best practice performance management factors can, if necessary, be 
measured quantitatively, but the more important issue is that they are identified and 
proactively managed. If these factors are to be measured as an 'input KPI suite', then 
the customer will need to define exactly what behaviours s/he needs to demonstrate 
under each one. The required behaviours will have to be clear enough to be adopted 
and followed and be focussed enough that improving them will add real value to the 
customer's programme. In this way, areas which delight customers will be managed 
alongside those which simply keep them satisfied, as tends to be the case with most 
quantitative output KPI suites. 
It is suggested that these input factor KPIs are updated quarterly as part of a 
managed performance improvement programme. Performance improvement 
initiatives can be put in place to support and improve each of the behaviours. This 
approach is recommended as a long term strategy for performance improvement that 
will progress the contractor businesses at the same time as driving excellent 
performance to the customer. The customer and the contractor should work together 
to establish the finer points of the required performance and when the performance 
level should be reached. The initiatives can then be crafted to achieve the required 
level of performance and this performance level can be a further measurable item. 
In addition, output KPIs will be improved through the management of the excellent 
performance inputs. Driving longer term improvement at the input level is more likely 
to drive a sustained improvement in outputs than trying to manage the outputs 
alone. 
Contractors themselves need to start examining themselves on the basis of these 
performance factors. They need to examine to what extent they are providing them 
for their customers and what they could do to improve their performance in these 
areas The arguments here presented could serve as an initial guide as to what 
contractors should be focussing upon proactively. More customers are becoming more 
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educated on the construction delivery process and becoming more exacting about 
what they want from their supply chain. Therefore, contractors who can demonstrate 
that they are becoming more educated in these areas too are likely to outperform 
their competition. 
10.5.1.2 Procurement and Engagement 
In addition, there needs to be a shift in the way in which the industry procures from, 
and engages with, its first tier suppliers. It is therefore suggested that the presence 
of the aforementioned behaviours are examined in depth by customers procuring for 
large programmes of works. Such an examination should be carried out in enough 
depth for the customer to satisfy themselves that the necessary supporting processes 
are part of business as usual within a contracting organization. The identification of 
these supporting processes is seen to be an area for future research and not covered 
further within this thesis. 
At this stage it is recommended that these processes should not be left to the 
contractor to demonstrate in presentations or documents. The customer should 
actively be researching the contracting organization to identify their existence. Such 
research should involve, but not be limited to, interviews with the business leader(s); 
interviews with the proposed contractor lead for the customer's programme of works; 
a focus group with some of the contractor's team who will be working on the 
customer's programme of works; an examination of the contractor's written 
processes; the observation of one of the contractor's senior management meetings; 
and a questionnaire to a cross-section of the contractor's employees. 
This approach is recommended as the customer can more easily establish whether 
their prospective partner possesses the characteristics described as excellent 
performance within this thesis. The more in-depth approach would replace the 'tender 
document and presentation' approach currently favoured by many customers. Control 
of the process would pass from the contractor, who currently controls what is put in 
the tender document and who attends any presentations to the customer, to the 
customer.  
Furthermore, this method of tendering would enable the customer to gain the 
understanding of how their contractors' businesses work. As stated earlier, such an 
understanding assists the customer in engaging with, and managing, their 
contractors. Such an approach would require a greater investment of time and money 
from the customer at the tendering stage. It is likely, however, that this approach 
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would produce better returns on investment across the life of the construction 
programme. 
10.6 Answering the Research Sub-Questions II 
The next sub-question was: 
Which first tier contractors currently provide excellent performance? 
The research herein reported discovered a commonality within the organizations 
nominated for research. This commonality aligns well with a comment made by one 
of the customer participants during the research. The comment was that during this 
customer’s journey to acquiring the supply chain that it currently had, it had noted 
(albeit without research to back it up) that the best performers were those who had 
less contact with wider market sectors. It was particularly noted that, somewhat 
counter intuitively, less innovation and ideas came from contractors with access to 
wider sectors than did those who were focussed on one or two sectors. 
It was noted that of the six contracting organizations nominated as excellent 
performers, four were specialists in the region and or market in which they operated 
for their customers. That is to say, they focussed almost entirely on one or two 
sectors and/or regions. One of the other organizations was a JV set up entirely to 
service their particular customer, but consisting of parent organizations with a focus 
on the sector. 
There is a clear topic for future research in this area to discover why larger 
contracting organizations appear to be less successful in bringing ideas and 
innovation to their customers than their smaller customers. Given their access to 
wider markets, it might be theorized that such large organizations would have 
interaction with processes/services which when transposed from one customer to 
another might represent innovation from the customer’s point of view. Therefore 
there is benefit to researching why this might not be happening as well as it might. 
10.7 Implications for Business 
It is clear from the research reported in this thesis that the definition of excellent 
contractor performance in the UK construction industry has undergone a shift. In 
order to be able to outperform their peer group, contractors must work to understand 
exactly what out-performance means to their customers. Once they have such an 
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understanding, there is a need for the organization to learn how to deliver such 
performance, and continually to maintain and improve that performance. 
An understanding of the impact of the adoption of the processes herein described on 
the construction organization is important. This section addresses the implications 
that were seen to emerge from the study for the ways in which contractors can work 
to enhance performance from the customer perspective through the use of LO 
processes. Based on the model developed in the ‘Answering the Research Question’ 
section above, there is a need for contractors to engage more closely with customers 
and work with them to develop LO processes to the advantage of both parties.  
In order for contractors to gain a clear understanding of what excellent performance 
means to their customers, contractors must take the lead. To do so, they must 
develop a clear understating of what of the performance factors discovered herein are 
important to the customer and make improvement in these areas their target. In 
addition, contractors might be able to assist in the development of KPI suites to 
measure and communicate required behaviours to the supply chain. The movement 
of the contracting organization from being an organization that carries out 
construction works towards one that takes ownership of its role, understands the 
customer, and acts as quasi-consultant, requires such proactive assistance. 
Conversely, it has become clear that the customer must also act proactively in driving 
and supporting the move towards LO in its contractors. The model of the construction 
industry in which the customer has greater control over the manufacture of his/her 
asset than in most other industries requires the support and even lead of the 
customer for the contractor to be able to change culture. In addition, the ‘lowest 
tender wins’ culture prevalent within some customer organizations precludes 
contractors from having the continuity of work to be able to develop LO processes 
and learn what excellent performance entails. 
It is important that customer and contractor employees do not maintain existing 
attitudes whilst paying only verbal support to the move towards a LO. Such behaviour 
would obstruct the industry’s potential move towards a widespread adoption of LO 
processes. The perceived lack of trust of their supply chain by some customer 
organizations must be addressed if the necessary culture change is to occur. Specific 
learning and development programs should be designed and developed to meet this 
need. 
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Senior managers in contracting and customer organizations need to comprehend the 
importance of a mutual understanding of excellent performance and the need to 
support the provider in putting in place processes to achieve excellent performance. 
They need to be briefed on the importance of their role in supporting their respective 
organizations in the development of new learning, an expectation that must be made 
explicit in their own role specifications. In addition, leaders of contracting 
organizations need to be prepared to motivate and support their employees staffing 
the transition towards full LO status as part of continuing individual development. 
This altered management role is likely to require an upgraded skill set to enable these 
leaders to perform the new part of their role. 
There is the opportunity to make the practical guidance within this thesis part of the 
national agenda for improving the performance of the construction industry. Bodies 
such as ‘Constructing Excellence’, which is made up of like minded individuals 
dedicated to the advancement of performance improvement through the use of such 
vehicles as collaborative working and the adoption of ‘Lean’ principles, would be an 
ideal vehicle to engage contractors, consultants and customers alike in the move 
towards an industry founded upon LO principles. 
10.8 Contributions to the author’s professional practice 
The personal journey undertaken by the author in the research and writing of this 
thesis has added to his own professional practice. There have been three notable 
areas where  
Interaction between the author and those organizations which were researched for 
this thesis. It is anticipated that through these interactions, and through receiving 
copies of transcriptions and related articles, that the research behind this thesis 
assisted them in their LO journeys. Two of the customer organizations (Oakland and 
Washington) are using the outputs from this thesis in order to amend and improve 
the way in which they interact with, and manage, their supply chains. In addition, 
other customer organizations which have come into contact with the research are in 
discussions with the author about how the outputs may be applicable to their 
particular delivery models. The author is supporting those organizations at the time 
of writing in improving the learning capability in their supply chains. 
Secondly, it is known to the author that the article published from some of the 
research undertaken for this thesis, namely Butcher & Sheehan (2010), will be used 
by the organizations to better link excellent performance from the perspective of the 
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customer with service provision from the contractor. The paper, and the award which 
it received from the Global Innovation in Construction Conference 2009, is included in 
Appendix C. Further to being presented at the conference and being published in a 
recognized journal, this article has been employed internally within the author’s 
organization for presentation and training purposes for identifying excellent 
contractor performance from a customer perspective. 
Thirdly, from the research work done behind this thesis, the author has moved his 
personal area of interest through learning and on into the implementation of business 
improvement. The author is, at the time of writing, moving further into research, 
writing about, and practicing Lean behavioural change for organizational performance 
improvement. The LO concept is a key foundation of Lean behavioural change, sue to 
the need for organizations to unlearn previous methods of working in order to 
embrace new ones. Some of the organizations which were party to the research 
behind this thesis are now members of an ‘Intelligent Construction Customer Forum’ 
which is chaired by the author. This forum was set up for the exchange of knowledge 
between customers in the fields of learning, Lean and behavioural change within the 
supply chain. 
10.9 Reflections on changes in the research 
As this research progressed from the initial scoping paper into the fieldwork, there 
were two major changes in the methods employed. These are noted for summary 
below: 
10.9.1 Change in research approach away from a ‘comparative’ study 
During the course of the research, it became clear that the questionnaire element of 
the proposed case study work had become redundant. The amount of information 
gleaned from the interviews, case studies, written documentation and field 
observation gave the author more than enough understanding of the presence and 
operation of any LO processes. Given the wide range of personnel to whom the 
author was exposed, the extent and depth to which the processes went became clear. 
In addition, the author was able to gain an understanding as to the depth (or 
otherwise) of the commitment to these processes and whether and how they 
impacted upon the way the contractors served their customers. 
It was originally intended that the herein reported research explore the difference 
between the processes employed by excellent performing and poor performing 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 240 
contractors. This exploration was intended to further demonstrate that the presence 
of certain processes improved the performance of one contractor over another given 
that both worked on the same customer’s programme of works. 
It quickly became apparent once the research was underway that this approach was 
flawed from two perspectives. Firstly, customers almost without fail noted that poor 
performing contractors were generally not retained on their programmes and 
therefore their supply chains tended only to range in performance from adequate to 
excellent. Secondly, it was realized following discussions with customers that poor 
performers tend to have several warnings before being removed from service. 
Therefore anyone under such a warning who was nominated for study would be likely 
to know that they were not being nominated for excellent performance and therefore 
might be unlikely to agree to be part of the research process. 
10.9.2 Change in Oakland’s nomination of excellent contractor 
During the course of setting up the case study work, there was a setback to the 
research. The alliance of six small contractors being treated by Oakland as a single 
contractor was hit by two setbacks caused by the 2008-09 recession. Oakland’s 
investment declined to almost zero in a matter of weeks following the worst of the 
financial crisis in late 2008. This cutback, coupled with similarly drastic reductions in 
investment from other customers, actually sent one of the six into administration. At 
the time of commencing the case study research it appeared likely that a maximum 
of four of the original six would remain working for this particular customer by the 
middle of 2009. 
The administration of one of the contractors dissolved the alliance of six. 
Furthermore, the impact of Oakland’s spend reduction upon the other five was also 
somewhat ruinous. For four of them, Oakland represented over 20% of their turnover 
and effectively losing just this work had a drastic financial impact. These four also 
lost work from their other customers in the same way as the one who went into 
administration. 
This change of situation presented several options to progress the study. Firstly, as 
the organizations were effectively (at least temporarily) independent rather than the 
alliance of six as originally nominated they could be viewed as no longer being the 
same nominated vehicle and abandoned entirely as subjects for this research. 
Secondly, the case study on them could be placed on hold until the customer had 
gone through the process of evaluating which contractors would be retained and the 
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case study carried out on the new alliance. Thirdly, individual case studies could be 
carried out on some of the remaining five organizations. 
Each of these approaches had their advantages and disadvantages. Abandoning this 
part of the research would be the approach which kept most closely to the premise 
that only contractors nominated as excellent performers would be researched. It 
would however, reduce the amount of data acquired and would mean that the 
customer who first inspired the idea for this research would no longer be a part of it. 
Placing the case study on hold would also be close to keeping the research criteria as 
close to those envisaged at the start of this work. This approach would, however, 
leave one element of the research with an open and uncertain timeframe and thus 
jeopardize the completion date of the entire work. 
The approach of carrying out an individual case study was eventually decided upon. It 
was accepted that the contractors were not nominated as individuals, but as a group. 
It would therefore have to be accepted that the approach had the potential to corrupt 
the research result. However, the LO processes which the group potentially 
possessed could still be examined through the individual organizations. Indeed, there 
was the potential to examine how these had permeated the organizations individually 
and enabled them to improve themselves as individual performers in the wider 
market. Therefore the Oakland nomination changed from its alliance of six to one 
contractor, Kansas. It was decided to proceed with the case study on this one 
contractor following a discussion with the customer in question. Oakland accepted 
that this contractor on their own was an excellent performer and the fact that it was 
the best of the six at being able to weather the financial storm suggested that it 
might be the best at ‘flexing’ against market changes – one of the indicators of 
excellent performance. 
10.10 Delimitations of scope and key assumptions 
The most obvious limitation of this research is that it is based upon the UK 
construction industry only. This limitation raises the quite pertinent question of 
whether the results, or indeed methods, are replicable outside the boundaries which 
have been set in this thesis. From recent observations, the UK construction industry 
remains a highly-fragmented contract-driven industry despite recent attempts to 
change its nature (Egan, 1998; 2002). As such, the research may not be relevant to 
industries which do not have similar restrictions. 
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In addition, there are internal limitations to this work. The argument has been that 
best-practice LO processes are the key factor in determining performance from the 
customer’s perspective and those processes are what was investigated. It may be, 
however, that other factors not addressed in this research may have a significant 
impact upon contractor performance. Those factors may have been mentioned during 
the data gathering process but may not have been identified in the coding process of 
data analysis. Such an omission has been seen as a key risk to manage with pre-
coding of qualitative research (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and must therefore be 
recognized. 
Furthermore, as excellent performance is defined through contemporary literature 
and a combination of customer interviews, there is the potential that this research 
becomes too generalized and may not fit many organizations’ specific models and 
definitions of performance. It is also anticipated that this research may be of little 
benefit to those employing largely SMEs in their supply chain as the research focuses 
upon larger contractors. By their nature, the larger customers are more likely to 
employ larger contractors more able to handle bigger volumes of work. Garcia-
Morales et al (2007) argued that some studies on large organizations cannot be 
easily mapped onto SMEs and it has to be accepted that this may be a limitation of 
the research herein reported. 
The limitation set out in Raiden & Dainty (2006) also is accepted. Raiden & Dainty 
describes the construction industry organization as a chaordic entity. As such, the 
organization may fluctuate between chaos and order which may make the 
identification and documentation of processes complex. Such complexity also needs 
to be acknowledged. 
In terms of limitations against the LO model (Senge et al, 1990, 1994), it was noted 
in earlier chapters that this thesis was not able to examine the presence of 
‘undiscussable’ items within the contractor organizations. The reason that this 
element was not examined was due to the in depth approach which would have been 
necessary within the case studies in order to uncover such deep rooted cultural 
issues. For the sake of practicality and time, such depth of research was not entered 
into and this remains an element for potential augmentation to this thesis. 
The key assumption here is the concept of the LO itself. This concept has been 
debated since the term came to prominence in the two seminal texts on the subject, 
namely Argyris & Schon (1978) and Senge et al (1990). There is debate within 
  
 
The Learning Organization in the Construction Industry Page 243 
various recent papers around whether an organization can learn at all (c/f Love et al, 
2004; Holt et al, 2000). The crux of the argument against the concept of the LO is 
that only an individual can learn and the organization does not exist without the 
cognitive reasoning of individuals. 
In this thesis it is argued that there is no LO without individual learning, but that the 
processes involved in individual learning are different from Organizational Learning. A 
LO is most obviously identified through changes in culture which individual learning 
alone cannot create (Love et al, 2004). Therefore, the changes in the organization 
are greater than the sum of the individual learning carried out. It is also the case that 
the structure of an organization can affect the individual’s ability to learn. 
Environmental turbulence, rigidity of organizational structure, adequacy of the 
organization's strategy, and its strength of culture can all affect the individual (Holt et 
al, 2000). This duality of influence is satisfactory to establish that there is a good 
case for the existence of the LO. Here it is not the intention to provide further insight 
into this debate. The assumption throughout this work is that the LO and the 
organization per se are constructs in their own right. 
10.11 Recommendations for Future Research 
The process of carrying out the research for the purposes of this thesis has 
uncovered a number of questions pertaining directly to the subjects of excellent 
contractor performance from the customer perspective and the LO in the construction 
industry. Each of these questions is beyond the scope of this thesis, but are worthy of 
further study to enhance the direction of study here reported. Each of these further 
research areas is set out briefly below. 
Does the ownership model influence the organization’s willingness to invest 
in the journey to LO? This question arose almost as a side quote during the 
contractor case studies. It does not have a direct bearing upon this thesis, but 
represents an interesting question as to whether owner-managed organizations are 
willing to invest in the processes required to work towards LO status. The question is 
pertinent as the journey may only start to bear fruit after the owner has sold the 
organization and therefore he/she may not directly benefit, although his/her 
successors may. 
Why do larger contracting organizations appear to struggle with innovation 
transfer and appear less likely to provide excellent customer service? The 
question here comes from the observation of the customers involved in this thesis 
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research of the outward appearance of a lack of such processes. Therefore, it is 
suggested that there is merit in discovering what is the cause of this perception; and 
whether there is a model which could be developed to alleviate such a customer 
perception. 
Is there a need for an SME to plan to be an LO, or is the fact that individuals 
are likely to interact more frequently and be closer to customers create a LO 
environment naturally? The appearance of the smaller organizations within this 
thesis research was that they possessed few formally operated processes and 
therefore suggested that much of their learning and flexibility occurred ‘naturally’. 
This position suggests that there might be a naturally sized ‘tipping point’ where an 
organization needs formally to address LO processes, which might differ between 
industries and types of organizations. Therefore, it is suggested that there is merit in 
investigating this phenomenon per se and developing a model such that organizations 
can identify and manage this ‘tipping point’. 
How does the concept of the ‘family atmosphere’ referred to by so many 
participants assist in excellent performance and/or the presence of LO 
characteristics? Given the frequency of the occurrence of the phrase ‘family 
atmosphere’ during the field research into the contracting organizations, there is a 
clear opportunity to understand and model this concept and map its impact upon the 
concept of the LO and organizational performance. In addition, it would be useful to 
understand to what extent organizations with such a culture cope better in times of 
adversity, such as the prevailing recession during the time of this thesis research. 
How can existing accepted construction industry tools be adapted for use 
such that they can support LO processes, leading on from the example of the 
risk register noted herein? It is clear from this research that the adoption of LO 
processes within the construction industry can be supported through morphing the 
existing accepted processes and adapting them to support LO culture. There is clear 
merit in investigating whether any other incidences, or potential incidences, are 
occurring across the industry. The example noted herein was the use by Dallas of the 
standard construction risk register as a learning tool. 
How can the excellent performance indicators discovered herein be 
developed into a useable suite of KPIs and measures for use by construction 
customers? There is herein a suggestion of excellent performance areas which 
customers should be measuring as part of their management of construction 
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programmes. There is, however, a need to develop a framework for carrying out such 
measurement so that it might be developed into an operable set of KPIs. 
Do the extensions to the LO model discovered herein, such as the 
requirement for customer involvement, exist within other industry areas? It 
became clear during the course of the research undertaken for this thesis that the 
journey to LO for the construction contractor requires the support and involvement of 
the customer. Given that many of the contractors had three or four individual 
customers which accounted for a large proportion of their business, it was sensible 
for them to align with these customers to preserve workload. It would therefore be 
valuable to discover whether this extension is necessary in other industries where the 
same near-monopsony buying situation prevails. If an extended LO model is indeed 
necessary, this represents a possibility for there to be an enhancement and extension 
of the LO theory set out by Senge et al (1990, 1994). 
Is the rejection of ‘excess’ turnover in favour of excellent performance on a 
‘manageable’ turnover an increasingly adopted strategy in the contracting 
industry? Given the poor condition of the construction market at the time of the 
research behind this thesis (reducing workloads and margins with concomitant 
redundancies etc); such a strategy might be unrealistic. However, it is worthy of 
future research whether such a strategy could be (and is being) successfully deployed 
during more buoyant market conditions as a longer-term contractor 
growth/profitability strategy. 
Why is a ‘true’ understanding of the customer’s customers and customer’s 
processes and the demonstration of real Systems Thinking in this area not a 
key performance indicator in the construction industry? Given the potentially 
huge impact that construction-project-level decisions can have on stakeholders and 
processes, it is interesting that none of the participants referred to a KPI or 
contractor selection criteria which mentioned this area. However, almost all of the 
customer participants interviewed for this thesis stressed how important such 
thinking was from their supply chain. There therefore is scope for research into this 
apparent paradox and a solution to it. 
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 1
Dave Butcher 
Doctorial Research Student 
University of Glamorgan 
Pontypridd 
Wales  
xxth xxxxxxxx 2009 
 
 
Dear xxxxx, 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the research that I am carrying out for my doctoral 
thesis. 
 
I attach the questions that I would like to discuss with you. The interview should not be 
considered formal but something where you are able to provide insights to the questions I ask 
from your point of view. You may respond in any way you choose such as by talking about 
your experiences and how you understood those experiences; offering your definitions of 
aspects we might discuss; or mentioning any feelings you might have about particular aspects 
or situations. I am interested in your unique perspective, even if you have not encountered 
particular situations at first hand. 
 
The important point is that they are your views and perceptions on the topics that you wish to 
bring into the interview. These can be what you thought at the time or in retrospect and on 
reflection. 
 
The interview is anticipated to take between an hour and ninety minutes but this is purely 
dependent on how it proceeds and what you would like to cover. It may be less than this. It 
should ideally take place in an area where we will not be disturbed or interrupted. 
 
I attach the questions which I am using to begin my work. These questions form the starting 
point for my research. It would be helpful if you could take a little time to consider these topics 
prior to our meeting and plan to talk about your knowledge and experiences within these 
topics. If you have no experience in a particular area you may wish to consider your 
perspective on the topic instead. 
 
Should you have any questions I will be more than happy to answer these prior to the 
interview itself, at the interview, or at a later stage. 
 
 
Ethical issues 
 
What ever is said between us will be non-attributable to yourself or any organisation for whom 
you work. 
 
You will not be named within any written document pertaining to this research, or in any other 
media used. 
 
Neither will any of your organisations be named except as a government department, a 
private sector organisation, etc. 
 
Organisations and participants will be anonymous in published materials and you will be 
identified only by pseudonym, unless otherwise agreed. 
 
I would like to record the interview to enable me to transcribe what is said accurately. Do I 
have your permission to do so? 
 
A copy of the interview transcription will be forwarded to you for your perusal as soon after the 
interview as practically possible and before the interview is incorporated into my work. You 
will have an opportunity at that stage to check it for accuracy and to add or delete any 
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information relevant to your experience. You will also be able to check the adequacy of any 
pseudonym used to ensure that confidentiality is maintained. 
 
The transcriptions will not be available to anyone but me and my thesis supervisors and there 
use will be solely for the development of my research. 
 
All materials relating to the research including interview transcripts will be kept in a locked 
cabinet in my research supervisor’s leader’s office when not in use. 
 
You can withdraw from the research at any time without any penalty and you are not 
compelled to divulge anything that you do not wish to. 
 
For my own part I am required to abide by the regulatory controls of my university’s Ethical 
Section which requires me to ensure the anonymity of all research participants who assist me 
with this project and will be checked by my supervisors in all work I produce. 
 
You need take part in only one interview. I may, however, at some stage need to come back 
to you to carry out a further interview if new areas are identified in which I consider that it 
would be important to obtain your thoughts and considerations. If I do need to do this then I 
will again ask you for your consideration and agreement to do this. I look forward to our 
meeting. 
 
The University requires that all participants be informed that if they have any complaints 
concerning the manner in which this research project is conducted it may be given to the 
researcher, or to the project leader, Professor Michael Sheehan (details below). 
 
If an independent person is preferred, you can contact: 
 
 the University's School Ethics Committee or the Research Unit in Academic Registry 
University of Glamorgan , Pontypridd, Wales, CF37 1DL 
 
Researcher: Dave Butcher Project supervisor: Professor Michael Sheehan 
Co-Director, Centre for Research on Workplace Behaviours 
Business School, University of Glamorgan, 
Pontypridd CF37 1DL, Wales 
e-mail: msheehan@glam.ac.uk 
Tel: + 44 00 1443 483656; Fax: +44 00 1443 482989  
 
 
Kind regards 
 
 
Dave Butcher 
 
 
Consent: 
 
I hereby agree to participate in this research project on the conditions that all the ethical 
requirements of the University of Glamorgan are met by the researcher and that the identity of 
myself and those organisations that I may name also remain anonymous. 
 
 
Name: xxxxxxxxx   Signature: 
 
I agree to ensure that all my accounts of this interview will remove the names of persons and 
organisations to ensure that they remain anonymous in any future work that is produced. 
 
 
Name: Dave Butcher   Signature:  
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Dave Butcher 
Doctorial Research Student 
University of Glamorgan 
Pontypridd 
Wales  
xxth xxxxxxx 2009 
 
 
Dear xxxxxx, 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the research that I am carrying out for my doctoral 
thesis. 
 
I attach the questions that I would like to discuss with you. The interview should not be 
considered formal but something where you are able to provide insights to the questions I ask 
from your point of view. You may respond in any way you choose such as by talking about 
your experiences and how you understood those experiences; offering your definitions of 
aspects we might discuss; or mentioning any feelings you might have about particular aspects 
or situations. I am interested in your unique perspective, even if you have not encountered 
particular situations at first hand. 
 
The important point is that they are your views and perceptions on the topics that you wish to 
bring into the interview. These can be what you thought at the time or in retrospect and on 
reflection. 
 
The interview is anticipated to take between an hour and ninety minutes but this is purely 
dependent on how it proceeds and what you would like to cover. It may be less than this. It 
should ideally take place in an area where we will not be disturbed or interrupted. 
 
Below I have listed the questions which I am using to begin my work. These questions form 
the starting point for my research. It would be helpful if you could take a little time to consider 
these topics prior to our meeting and plan to talk about your knowledge and experiences 
within these topics. If you have no experience in a particular area you may wish to consider 
your perspective on the topic instead. 
 
Should you have any questions I will be more than happy to answer these prior to the 
interview itself, at the interview, or at a later stage. 
 
Interview background (performance criteria) and questions 
 
Below is a list of tier-one performance criteria around which the interview will take place. 
Please keep these in mind when perusing the questions (below) and during the interview: 
 
1. Time performance 
a. Time overall 
b. Time predictability 
i. Of design 
ii. Of construction 
2. Cost performance 
a. Cost overall 
b. Cost predictability 
i. Of design 
ii. Of construction 
3. Quality performance 
a. Conformance to specification 
b. Functionality 
c. Defects 
d. Aesthetics 
4. Relationship 
a. Top management commitment 
b. Trust and respect 
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c. Effective communications 
d. Claims & disputes 
e. Professional image 
i. Drug/alcohol test results 
f. Team satisfaction 
g. Cultural alignment 
5. Flexibility 
a. Impact upon customer business 
b. Ability to manage ‘chaos’ from other sources 
6. Innovation 
a. Learning demonstrated 
b. Value management 
7. Health, Safety & Environment 
a. Health 
b. Accident rate 
c. Waste 
d. Environmental complaints 
 
Interview questions 
 
How would you rank and weight the above performance factors when you are 
assessing the performance of your current (or selecting new) first-tier 
construction contractors? 
 
How have you arrived at these factors? 
 
What do you understand the semantic interpretations of these factors, which are 
most important to you, to actually be? 
 
How would you assess performance against these factors for new and current 
contractors? 
 
What would you consider excellent performance against these measures to look 
like? 
 
Which tier one contractor would you say is best at delivering excellent 
performance against your key factors? 
 
Which tier one contractor would you say doesn’t yet quite meet those standards, 
but is improving against them? 
 
 
Ethical issues 
 
What ever is said between us will be non-attributable to yourself or any organisation for whom 
you work. 
 
You will not be named within any written document pertaining to this research, or in any other 
media used. 
 
Neither will any of your organisations be named except as a government department, a 
private sector organisation, etc. 
 
Organisations and participants will be anonymous in published materials and you will be 
identified only by pseudonym, unless otherwise agreed. 
 
I would like to record the interview to enable me to transcribe what is said accurately. Do I 
have your permission to do so? 
 
A copy of the interview transcription will be forwarded to you for your perusal as soon after the 
interview as practically possible and before the interview is incorporated into my work. You 
will have an opportunity at that stage to check it for accuracy and to add or delete any 
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information relevant to your experience. You will also be able to check the adequacy of any 
pseudonym used to ensure that confidentiality is maintained. 
 
The transcriptions will not be available to anyone but me and my thesis supervisors and there 
use will be solely for the development of my research. 
 
All materials relating to the research including interview transcripts will be kept in a locked 
cabinet in my research supervisor’s leader’s office when not in use. 
 
You can withdraw from the research at any time without any penalty and you are not 
compelled to divulge anything that you do not wish to. 
 
For my own part I am required to abide by the regulatory controls of my university’s Ethical 
Section which requires me to ensure the anonymity of all research participants who assist me 
with this project and will be checked by my supervisors in all work I produce. 
 
You need take part in only one interview. I may, however, at some stage need to come back 
to you to carry out a further interview if new areas are identified in which I consider that it 
would be important to obtain your thoughts and considerations. If I do need to do this then I 
will again ask you for your consideration and agreement to do this. I look forward to our 
meeting. 
 
The University requires that all participants be informed that if they have any complaints 
concerning the manner in which this research project is conducted it may be given to the 
researcher, or to the project leader, Professor Michael Sheehan (details below). 
 
If an independent person is preferred, you can contact: 
 
 the University's School Ethics Committee or the Research Unit in Academic Registry 
University of Glamorgan , Pontypridd, Wales, CF37 1DL 
 
Researcher: Dave Butcher Project supervisor: Professor Michael Sheehan 
Co-Director, Centre for Research on Workplace Behaviours 
Business School, University of Glamorgan, 
Pontypridd CF37 1DL, Wales 
e-mail: msheehan@glam.ac.uk 
Tel: + 44 00 1443 483656; Fax: +44 00 1443 482989  
 
 
Kind regards 
 
 
David Butcher 
 
 
Consent: 
 
I hereby agree to participate in this research project on the conditions that all the ethical 
requirements of the University of Glamorgan are met by the researcher and that the identity of 
myself and those organisations that I may name also remain anonymous. 
 
 
Name: xxxxxxxx  Signature: 
 
I agree to ensure that all my accounts of this interview will remove the names of persons and 
organisations to ensure that they remain anonymous in any future work that is produced. 
 
 
Name: David Butcher  Signature:  
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DOCTORAL RESEARCH – THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION IN THE UK 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY. D.BUTCHER, UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN 
 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR LEARNING ORGANIZATION PROCESSES 
 
 
TEAM LEARNING 
 
How does the organization motivate employees to share tacit klowledge and create explicit 
knowledge? 
 
What systems has the organization put in place to aid assist Emploqees with knowledge 
sharing? 
 
How does the organization import learning and experiences from outside the organization 
by learning From other organizations and industries? 
 
How is the usefulness of internal meetings asseqsed with respect to what is being learned 
that can improve the business? 
 
 
PERSONAL MASTERY 
 
How are employees encouraged to commit to lifelong learning within this organization? 
 
What suppmrt is available to those who do commit to lifelong learning? 
 
How can, and do, employees raise any problem issues from their perspective and 
implement solutions within this organization? 
 
 
SYSTEMS THINKING 
 
How does the or'anization exploit the interconnections between processes and 
departments to improve the way the organization operates? 
 
How do you ensure that individual roles and responsibilities within the organization are 
aligned to the overall business vision? 
 
What feedback loops are in place within the organization to ensure that lessons learned 
become implemented in service delivery? 
 
What is the procedure for implementing business or process change/improvement within 
the organization? 
 
To what extent is there coherence between the formal organisational structure and 
informal culture? 
 
How does the organization flex when confronted with changes in the business 
environment? 
 
How is benchmarking and measurement deployed to improve the way the organization 
operates? 
 
 
SHARED VISION 
 
To what extent is there coherence between organisational goals and individual employee 
needs? 
 
How is the organization’s vision kept up to date? 
 
How do employees create internal networks or communities of practice? 
 
How is leadership demonstrated by employees other than senior managers? 
 
 
MENTAL MODELS 
 
How are employees encouraged to experiment within their service delivery to customers? 
 
What is the organization’s process for evaluating and implementing new employee ideas? 
 
What planning for potential upcoming scenarios is undertaken by the organization? 
 
What is the organization’s innovation strategy? 
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EXCELLENT CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE IN THE 
UK CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
David C.A. Butcher1 and Michael J. Sheehan2 
1 Mott MacDonald, Canterbury House, 85 Newhall Street, Birmingham, UK 
2 Business School, University of Glamorgan, Pontypridd CF37 1DL, UK 
Within the UK construction industry, achieving compliance with output KPIs no 
longer represents excellent performance. Rather, such compliance tends to be viewed 
as the minimum performance requirement on construction programmes. Within that 
paradigm shift, what needs to be understood is the customer’s perspective of excellent 
performance. Drawing from semi-structured interviews with some of the largest 
construction customers in the UK, this paper develops an understanding of the 
customer’s perspective of excellent first-tier contractor performance on a programme 
of construction projects. From the customer’s perspective, a number of key 
behaviours determine excellent contractor performance. These include: being open 
about their business strengths and weaknesses against their peer group; challenging 
and improving themselves without the need for prompting; demonstrably adding 
value; really listening and acting upon the messages being transmitted by the 
customer; demonstrating desire to learn and share learning as part of a community; 
delighting the customer’s stakeholders and customers; consistency of message from 
employees at all levels; keeping business promises; aligning with the customer’s 
culture; transferring individual knowledge to the collective; and demonstrating a keen 
understanding of the customer’s business. This behavioural understanding has led to a 
shift in the way customers are interacting with their first-tier contractors. Many of the 
performance facets mentioned are input or ‘lead’ factors; or are about attitude and 
behaviour rather than pure construction competence. By managing at this level as 
opposed to the output KPI level, customers are to a varying extent influencing the 
way in which their contractors develop as businesses. The findings have implications 
for contractors and customers undertaking, or procuring, a large programme of 
construction projects so that expectations are met. 
Keywords: contractors, customer perspective, excellent performance, key 
performance indicators, procurement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding what excellent construction contractor performance is from the 
perspective of the customer is an important area when attempting to improve the 
industry as a whole. Given that customers fund all works within the industry, it is 
important to keep abreast of what they expect from their first tier contractors. Previous 
works have largely centred around the achievement of quantitative KPIs and on the 
'golden triangle' of quality, time and cost (Wang 2006). In addition, much of the 
previous research has concentrated on large projects; whereas it is as important to 
understand excellent performance on a long running programme of works. Gaining 
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such an understanding at programme level will inform contractors what ought to be 
their targets for continuous improvement over the life of such a programme. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Construction customers with multi-million multi-year capital construction 
programmes were invited to take part in this research. This approach was taken as 
such customers are well educated in the construction process and have clear ideas 
about what, to them, excellent performance means. The participants were all senior 
enough within the customer organizations to understand what excellent contractor 
performance meant to them as customers. Given their standing within the overall 
community of UK construction industry customers, the views of these participants can 
therefore be treated as being representative of best practice. 
The participants were briefed on what the research as a whole was about and what 
precisely would be their contribution. They were asked to participate in a semi 
structured interview, based around the questions described below in this paper. These 
questions were pre-issued, verbatim, to the participants in order to allow them to 
gather their thoughts about the subject in advance of the interview. 
Interview background (performance criteria) and questions 
Below is a list of tier-one performance criteria around which the customer interviews 
took place. These criteria represent an initial list of factors of excellent performance in 
UK construction contractors from the point of view of the customer. The factors were 
developed from various research papers published over the last ten years. It should be 
noted that the research from which the factors are drawn was not solely UK based. 
Participants were provided with the following list in advance of the semi-structured 
interview in order to help them to prepare for the interview and to stimulate responses 
in the interview. Participants were requested to keep these factors in mind during the 
interview, but were told that they could depart from them, or set them aside 
completely if they so wished. They therefore possessed the freedom to completely set 
aside the text and speak from the heart if they so wished (following Yin, 2003). The 
factors and questions are as follows, with author name and year of publication of the 
relevant research paper also listed. 
Excellent performance factors 
Time performance (Yeung, 2008) 
Time overall (Bassioni, 2004); Time predictability (Bassioni, 2004); Of design 
(Martin, 2004); Of construction (Martin, 2004) 
Cost performance (Yeung, 2008) 
Cost overall (Bassioni, 2004); Cost predictability (Bassioni, 2004); Of design (Martin, 
2004); Of construction (Martin, 2004) 
Quality performance (Yeung, 2008) 
Conformance to specification (Yeung, 2008); Functionality (Lam, 2007); Defects 
(Martin, 2004); Aesthetics (Lam, 2007) 
Relationship (Chan, 2006) 
Top management commitment (Yeung, 2008); Trust and respect (Yeung, 2008); 
Effective communications (Yeung, 2008); Claims & disputes (Lam, 2007); 
Professional image (Lam, 2007); Drug/alcohol test results (Crane, 1999); Team 
satisfaction (Lam, 2007); Cultural alignment (Chan, 2006) 
Flexibility (Bassioni, 2004) 
Impact upon customer business (Chan, 2004); Ability to manage ‘chaos’ from other 
sources (Lim, 1999) 
Innovation (Yeung, 2008) 
Learning demonstrated (Lam, 2007); Value management (Crane, 1999) 
Health, Safety & Environment (Martin, 2004) 
Health (Lam, 2007); Accident rate (Lam, 2007); Waste (Lam, 2007); Environmental 
complaints (Chan, 2006) 
Interview questions 
 How would you rank and weight the above performance factors when you are 
assessing the performance of your current (or selecting new) first-tier 
construction contractors? 
 How have you arrived at these factors? 
 What do you understand the semantic interpretations of these factors, which 
are most important to you, to actually be? 
 How would you assess performance against these factors for new and current 
contractors? 
 What would you consider excellent performance against these measures to 
look like? 
Interview procedure 
Each of the participants was interviewed once, with each interview lasting 
approximately fifty minutes. The interviews were all carried out at the business 
premises of the client, which enabled some clients to display pieces of confidential 
information which could not otherwise have been viewed. The questions were posed 
largely as set out above, but given the freedom the author had given to the 
participants, many of the interviews quickly departed from the text. The issues that 
arose are noted in the results and analysis. Furthermore, a catch all question requesting 
any further points, opinions or questions surrounding excellent contractor performance 
was posed at the logical conclusion of each interview. This occasionally yielded some 
further opinion and insight into customer views of their suppliers, which is also 
captured herein. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
From the interviews with the customer organizations, several interesting elements 
have come to the fore in terms of what excellent performance from their first tier 
contractors looks like. The interviews revealed that many of the traditional 
performance measures, such as time, quality, cost, and health & safety are treated as 
required performance in the current environment rather than indicators of excellence. 
These factors are still generally seen on Key Performance Indicator (KPI) scorecards. 
Such KPI scorecards are commonly used to measure all aspects of output performance 
on programmes of construction works. The analysis of the interviews suggests that 
excellent scores against these factors are now seen as the minimum requirement to 
continue to work for large customers. These KPI suites of output factors appear to be 
used in today’s market as factors for contractors to ensure against the dissatisfaction 
of their customer. In other words, those who do not perform well against their KPIs 
are those who tend to find themselves not working for the customer for very long. 
They are not used in order to identify organizations for immediate dismissal from their 
programme, but rectification has to come quickly. 
Excellent performance factors are more along the lines of input factors, such as high 
performing teams, learning, cultural issues and team integration. The customers who 
have these KPIs in place appear to understand that improving input elements will also 
drive the output measures. What has been uncovered is the extension beyond output 
KPIs to rating first tier contractors by the more ‘leading’ or ‘input’ factors. These 
factors may not necessarily be measured in the statistical sense but they appear to be 
what sets excellent performing contractors apart from their peer group. 
With such a two-tiered approach, customers tend to place the statistical output 
(prevent dissatisfaction) measures at a project level and the qualitative/input (create 
satisfaction) measures at the programme level. The programme level indicators tend to 
be the ones which are dealt with at a very senior management level by all parties 
concerned. The fact that the input issues are dealt with at this level suggests a further 
understanding that those first tier contractors who nurture the input drivers are the 
excellent performers at this and output level. 
Minimum requirements of contractor performance 
Time performance 
Yeung (2008) postulates that ‘variation of actual completion time expressed as a 
percentage of finally agreed completion time’ is they key element. This was 
confirmed as a minimum performance output (of varying importance) by all 
participants interviewed. Some participants also suggested that whether a programme 
focuses greatly upon this output depends upon changing internal drivers. What comes 
from this research is that customers who stated that time was the key output actually 
welcomed time variation, in terms of achieving completion before agreed time. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that the key measure of performance is a combination 
of time predictability and reduction in delivery time. Participants interviewed for this 
research want the certainty that the handover date will be achieved, but are also 
interested in projects being delivered ahead of time. In addition, they need to be kept 
informed of an early delivery date well in advance in order to be able to take 
advantage of it. Given this perspective, it can be argued that although the compliance 
with an end date is required performance, consistently beating it, whilst keeping the 
customer informed, is viewed as excellent performance. 
This placed time as being the key output delivery factor ahead of cost and quality as 
customers are realizing the opportunity cost and potential gain of time saved in the 
construction process. This perspective moves away from the most recent research 
(Yeung, 2008) which appears to focus upon the construction as the end in itself to a 
more commercially informed position which focuses upon the wider implications on 
the customer’s business as the end in sight. 
Cost performance 
Yeung’s (2008) research suggests that the key deliverable of cost performance is 
performance against original budget, as was concluded with time performance. Again, 
capital cost has been raised as an output deliverable by the participants interviewed for 
this research. The key difference found within this research was that performance 
against a budget was not always the key deliverable from the customers’ perspective. 
Participants interviewed for this research did make the point that predictability of cost 
was a requirement for their measurement against how their projects had performed 
within their KPI suite. However, when actually selecting contractors, lowest cost was 
the key driver, due to the construction department being ‘managed by the accounting 
department’. This does demonstrate a slight duality in the performance driver. 
Predictability of cost was stated as important at project level to ensure funding was 
managed well within the customer organization. The key driver at programme level 
was often cost reduction to ensure that a predictable saving could be tracked and 
returned to the business at points in the programme. 
Quality of product 
Number of defects at handover point was perhaps the most consistent ‘output’ 
measure mentioned by the participants interviewed. It appeared that this was because 
all aspire to the position of having zero defects at this point. However, from the 
interviews it appeared as if none of the customers was achieving this goal on their 
programme. Such under achievement was likely to be due to the fact that projects are 
not constructed under anything like controlled conditions. 
The aspiration of zero defects was indeed a useful goal for driving behaviours and was 
clearly at the forefront of construction customers’ minds during the interviews. What 
would set an excellent performer out from other first tier contractors would be an 
organization that does not have defects caused by making the same mistake more than 
once. Interestingly, none of the participants interviewed currently measures their 
defects by the business impact of those defects. Although participants did confess that 
this would be perhaps the most important perspective on defects from their business’s 
position, it was not done this way because of the difficulty of acquiring data in this 
way. Defects were generally measured by number and time to rectify by all of the 
participants. Whilst such measurement criteria may be relatively easy to achieve, it 
was unlikely to give the business visibility of how they were affected by the defects. 
It may be argued that an excellent performer would make deliberate attempts to avoid 
one defect that would impact negatively upon their customer’s business. If this was 
done at the expense of two very minor defects, an ironic result would be the contractor 
incurring a worse KPI score for an intelligent action designed to protect the 
customer’s business. Exploring such disconnects between popular KPIs and what 
genuinely matters to the customer’s business is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
needs to be borne in mind when establishing the true nature of excellent performance. 
Health, safety & environmental considerations through employee health and site 
accident rate, reduction of waste and reduction of environmental complaints 
Again, those participants interviewed for this research viewed these listed elements as 
minimum requirements. Many of them are now legal requirements for compliance, 
although customers may put more stringent compliance requirements on their 
contractors than are required by law due to their own internal policies. This tends to be 
the case in the environmental element than in the health and safety element, possibly 
due to the health and safety regulations (CDM Regulations) already in force. 
The elements of environmental complaints and waste reduction were discussed during 
the interviews, although not to the extent anticipated. Environmental complaints were 
generally considered from the perspective of the customer organizations’ own 
customers rather than the general public; albeit that in some cases these two groups 
were broadly the same. The key issue to the customers was again generally tied up in 
their contractors' understanding of their business, discussed later herein, rather than 
any quantitative measure. 
An absence of claims & disputes 
Claims and disputes were stated as not recognized by the participants in this research. 
It is not that disputes were dismissed out of hand; rather it would appear from the 
interviews that good communication may have replaced the need for dispute and 
litigation in these customers’ large programmes of works. First tier contractors who 
preferred a litigious route to deal with contractual and project problems were not 
welcome members of their supply chains. Other participants did not mention claims or 
disputes at all. While this finding suggests an absence of disputes and claims, it does 
not really touch upon the level and effectiveness of communication. 
Differentiators and demonstrators of excellent performance 
Excellent relationships; through top management commitment, high levels of trust and 
respect, effective communications, contractor team satisfaction and excellent cultural 
alignment between customer and contractor. 
The elements above were almost all mentioned as clear indicators of excellent 
performing contractors by most of the participants interviewed in this research. Some 
of the perspectives, however, differ from those published in recent research. Top 
management commitment was discussed during interviews as an intangible quality 
provided by the better contractors which was not measured in any clear way. 
Yeung’s (2008) perspective was that the key performance was shown by the 
percentage of top management attendance in partnering meetings. From the interviews 
carried out for the research here reported, it was difficult to see how Yeung’s (2008) 
measure demonstrates excellent performance. While it is an easily measurable metric, 
having people in a room does not demonstrate commitment in the way it was 
described in the interviews. Attendees at meetings may not be committed, they may be 
disruptive or disinterested in terms of not demonstrating an emotional attachment. 
Therefore having the wrong type of people at top management level may actually 
remove performance from a contractor's delivery offering. 
This research uncovered the need to purchase first tier contractor management 
capability as part of the overall package provided. Such capability was seen as adding 
value through the management of practical delivery and planning. In such a delivery 
model the responsibility for the delivery of the programme rests with the first tier 
contractors rather than the customer. Such an approach will require a greater deal of 
first tier contractor management commitment than if they were simply delivering 
projects which were allocated to them by the customer. 
Emotional intelligence was raised as a major differentiator between first tier 
contractors in terms of management commitment. Customers can identify those 
contractors who treat the programme of works given to them as merely an income 
stream and those who have emotional engagement. Participants suggested that such 
engagement was one of the roots of first tier contractors understanding what they want 
as customers. This was a key factor in creating excellent performance as the contractor 
could align themselves to deliver what the customer requires from their service 
delivery. A less than excellent contractor was seen as tending towards providing 
standard service based upon what they were used to doing for other customers. 
Stating an emotional attachment as a differentiator between contractors was seen to be 
an interesting perspective as it suggested a mental commitment being made by the 
contractor’s management. This was a difficult element to measure but was seen to 
emerge from the experience the customer had in dealing with the contractor. Given the 
emphasis that participants put upon this point during interview, it was clear that such a 
commitment was clearly something they were looking for in their first tier contractors. 
Yeung’s (2008) understanding of trust and respect measure used a Likert scale of 
satisfaction scores. Discussions of trust and respect in the research here reported 
centred more around customers not needing to examine and/or interfere in the delivery 
provided by their contractors. The view was that trust and respect were what excellent 
performing contractors shared with the customer when the customer knew that their 
programme of works would be delivered without the need to worry. Participants were 
noting an increasing ability to trust their first tier contractors with the delivery of the 
programme. In addition, they were trusted to comply with key outputs without the 
need for customer intervention. Participants stated that they are starting to impart trust 
to first tier suppliers to deal directly with their own stakeholders on their behalf. 
Improvement in the trust area had thereby removed a potentially wasteful 
communication step, thereby adding value to all parties. 
Yeung (2008) takes the perspective that excellent communication is a requirement of 
excellent performance. His position, again, is that it should be a Likert scale measure 
of key stakeholders' opinions of the effectiveness to differentiate contractor 
performance. Some participants within the research here reported discussed 
performance improvements being a function of good dialogue between customer and 
contractor. Others spoke of the detailed engagement required to establish long term 
development plans with their first tier contractors in order to achieve the goals of both 
organizations. Another had formed a formal alliance with their first tier contractors 
which involved communication at many levels. 
Effective and consistent communication was taken for granted within these 
construction relationships. In fact, many comments made about poor performers also 
appeared to centre on the issue of communication. To some customers, the ability of 
the contractor to listen was a big differentiator between excellent performers and the 
rest. This was an interesting perspective and seemingly not discussed in depth in 
previous literature. It also strongly alluded to two way communications being a real 
differentiator, whereas the previous research had tended to focus more upon how the 
contractor transmits messages to the customer. Through excellent communication, 
excellent performing contractors will show an aptitude for quickly understanding and 
aligning themselves behind the message coming from their customer. The output 
priorities may change (often from between quality, time and cost) through the life of a 
programme of construction works depending upon the needs of the customer. 
Assuming that the customer was informed from a construction perspective and was 
able to articulate the message about what was important to them, the excellent 
performer would be able to pick up that message and deliver on it. The excellent 
performing contractor was as much about customers giving the correct message as the 
contractor themselves interpreting it. Other participants stated annoyance at 
contractors who join their supply chain and try to dictate what should be important to 
the customer rather than listen to that message. Again, this finding alludes to the 
importance of two way communication. 
One element of communication from contractor to customer which did come out as 
being an element of excellent performance was the propensity to challenge the 
customer organization to improve what they were doing. One particular participant 
stated that contractors who act as ‘yes men’ when the customer was making an 
obvious error were not excellent performers. This argument was distinct from 
dictating what was important to the customer; it was more along the lines of acting as 
a consultant to help the customer deliver what was important without making a 
mistake whilst so doing. This assertion can be described as a link between top 
management relationships and communication. 
Another interesting perspective raised was that excellent performing contractors 
possess a ‘commitment to constant dissatisfaction’. This perspective suggested that 
satisfaction was viewed by customers today as a journey with perhaps no ultimate 
destination. Respondents stated that excellent contractors were those who, no matter 
how well they have performed, are always dissatisfied with it and look to perform 
better next time. One key observation here was that the perspective of the customer of 
satisfaction was that of 'programme outputs' as opposed to Lam’s (2007) position of 
satisfaction being happiness in the job. It was seen to be entirely possible that the two 
were one and the same, but such a finding is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Attitude was seen to be another element which customers were now looking at when 
considering excellent performance. It was not viewed as customers only wanting to 
work with contractors who were the same as them in their outlook to business, but 
clearly it can help. There are several key attributes which were mentioned during the 
interviews: a strong sense of integrity, the desire to create transparency in terms of 
their performance and their business, commitment to constant dissatisfaction, a strong 
desire to learn from other people, and an ingrained culture of relationship building. 
The customers who organized their first tier contractors into an alliance delivery route 
mentioned the desire to learn and to work at relationship building consistently. These 
customers understood that their first tier contractors were part of a community, or 
even several communities. How those communities worked as stand alone and 
interlinked communities was seen to be vital to them successfully delivering the 
output of their programme. It appeared that the correct attitudes and behaviours were 
key to making long term programmes and alliances successful. 
Chan’s (2006) position was that partnering for construction excellence relies partly 
upon a shared culture and approach to business without organizational boundaries. It 
became clear from the research here reported that customers were looking 
increasingly for attitude and behaviour as key criteria when hiring individuals for their 
organizations. There was seen to be a departure from hiring on pure competency as 
there was an understanding that with the correct attitude and behaviour, competency 
could be achieved through appropriate learning and development. 
This finding was seen to be a clear position set out by the participants and it appeared 
that rather than looking to develop the correct cultures in workshops, customers were 
looking actively for contractors who came to them with these qualities already 
demonstrated. Excellent performance was therefore also defined as an organization 
staffing its delivery team with key personnel with the correct attitude and behaviour. 
Innovation through learning demonstrated and the ability to value manage the project 
solution 
Innovation was viewed as a way that a first tier contractor could add value to the 
construction process that was beyond the contract or project specification. Some have 
described this differentiator as the ability of the first tier contractor to think on their 
feet when encountering issues on site. Alternatively, innovation can manifest itself as 
being able to give input at the design development stage which assisted in designing 
out waste at a project level. Innovation in terms of wholesale changes in the way 
things were done appeared to come from the materials or building technology arenas 
rather than contractors, according to the participants in the study here reported. 
Yeung’s (2008) perspective on innovation was that the cost saving resulting from 
innovation was the key measurable. This assertion, however, did not concur with the 
information gleaned from the interviews. Yeung's (2008) perspective assumes that 
cost was the most important output to the customer. However, given that one of the 
key points of research here reported was that the main driving output of the 
construction programme change, such a perspective for innovation requires widening. 
Yeung's (2008) position appears to be more akin to value management which was not 
mentioned in any great depth by the interviewees in this research. ‘Designing out 
waste’ can mean cost, but it could also mean time or elements of design that 
compromise the function or functional requirements of the finished product. 
Those customers who do still carry out the bulk of measurement at an output level 
appear to understand the power of learning as a performance differentiator. Customers 
understand that output measures might be fallible due to the uncertain nature of 
construction works. Participants acknowledged that mistakes would be made during 
projects and that these may be created by the customer themselves. Kagioglou (2001) 
suggested that the ability to learn from experience as an organization was a 
measurable as part of a process/performance measurement scorecard although it must 
be driven in alignment with overall vision and strategy. 
Sharing learning 
What also became clear from the research here reported was that contractors working 
together on large programmes of work need to exchange learning that drives 
excellence. If one contractor on a large programme was performing excellently and 
others were falling behind then this added less value to the customer than if all were 
performing excellently. Therefore, excellent performers were those who learn and 
share learning with their peer group to advantage their mutual customer. If the 'bar is 
raised' by all contractors on a programme, they can take this improvement and spread 
it to other customer work streams. This way all contractors who take part in learning 
and sharing gain something, while the customer also gains. 
Role of the customer 
The above excellent contractor performance aspects should not go without a mention 
of the role of the customer in the construction programme. The comments that came 
from the participants were that they have to be giving the correct messages about the 
above issues. Customers understand that excellent performance will only be delivered 
following excellent leadership from the customer themselves. If customers do not act 
in such a way that demonstrates and encourages excellent performance, than they are 
unlikely to receive it from their supply chain. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Performance Management  
Following on from the research here reported, there needs to be a paradigm shift in the 
way in which the industry measures and manages its first tier suppliers. This research 
suggests that customers should expand their performance management beyond the use 
of output KPIs. Customers who keep extensive output KPI suites may have to reduce 
these in order to incorporate the following input measures: 
 Emotional commitment and ownership of the programme 
 Effective two-way communication 
 Contractor developing their business to align with the customer 
 Effective and appropriate challenge of customer decisions 
 Commitment to constant dissatisfaction, at the business and programme levels 
 Transparency of business performance 
 Consistency of attitude, behaviour and culture 
 Delighting the customer's stakeholders 
 Protecting the customer's business from the impact of construction 
 Flexibility and responsiveness to programme change 
 Focussed innovation and learning with tangible outputs 
Customers will have to develop a framework around these in a way that best suits 
their business requirements. The results element of the research provides an in-depth 
recommendation of a starting point for a best-practice model. It is accepted that this 
will require a certain amount of deeper thought and preparation than a simple output 
KPI suite. The extra effort, however, would be more than repaid in terms of the 
customer being able to better manage the contractor in driving the required 
behaviours. There would be no room for 'box ticking' in order to achieve KPI 
measures at the expense of what may be really important to the customer. 
Furthermore, it would alleviate the annoyance of contractors who harm their own KPI 
scores by focussing upon what they know is really important to their customer. 
These new best practice performance management factors can, if necessary, be 
measured quantitatively, but the more important issue is that they are identified and 
proactively managed. If these are to be measured as an 'input KPI suite', then the 
customer will need to define exactly what s/he needs to be the behaviours 
demonstrated under each one. The required behaviours will have to be clear enough to 
be adopted and followed and be focussed enough that improving them will add real 
value to the customer's programme. In this way, areas which delight customers will be 
managed alongside those which simply keep them satisfied. 
It is suggested that these input factor KPIs are updated quarterly as part of a managed 
performance improvement programme. Performance improvement initiatives can be 
put in place to support and improve each of the behaviours. This is recommended as a 
long term approach to performance improvement that will improve the contractor 
businesses at the same time as driving excellent performance to the customer. The 
customer and the contractor should work together to establish the finer points of the 
required performance and when the performance level should be reached. The 
initiatives can then be crafted to achieve this level of performance and this can be a 
further measurable item.In addition, output KPIs will be improved through the 
management of the excellent performance inputs. Driving longer term improvement at 
the input level is more likely to drive a sustained improvement in outputs than trying 
to manage the outputs alone. 
Contractors themselves need to start examining themselves on the basis of these 
performance factors. To what extent are they providing them for their customers? 
What could they do to improve their performance in these areas? This paper serves as 
an initial guide as to what contractors should be focussing upon proactively. More 
customers are becoming more educated on the construction delivery process and 
becoming more savvy about what they want from their supply chain. Therefore 
contractors who can demonstrate that they are becoming more educated in these areas 
too are likely to steal a march on their competition. 
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